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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Case For Effective Environmental Politics: Federalist Or Unitary State? Comparing The Cases Of Canada, The United States Of America, And The People’S Republic Of China, Justin Fisch
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Federalism, by its nature, is a segmented system of governance. The Canadian and American constitutional orders are divided along very clear lines of jurisdictional authority between levels of government. Environmental issues, by their nature, are holistic in scope—they transcend borders, governments, jurisdictions, and authorities. For this reason, one might assume that a unitary state would be better positioned to tackle them. Is this justified? This Article examines the Chinese unitary state, in comparison to the federalist systems in Canada and the United States of America, to discern whether a unitary government can better manage issues plaguing the environment.
The Political Safeguards Of Horizontal Federalism, Heather K. Gerken, Ari Holtzblatt
The Political Safeguards Of Horizontal Federalism, Heather K. Gerken, Ari Holtzblatt
Michigan Law Review
For decades, we have debated whether “political safeguards” preserve healthy relations between the states and the federal government and thus reduce or eliminate the need for judges to referee state–federal tussles. No one has made such an argument about relations among the states, however, and the few scholars to have considered the question insist that such safeguards don’t exist. This Article takes the opposite view and lays down the intellectual foundations for the political safeguards of horizontal federalism. If you want to know what unites the burgeoning work on horizontal federalism and illuminates the hidden logic of its doctrine, you …
Federalism: Theory, Policy, Law, Daniel Halberstam
Federalism: Theory, Policy, Law, Daniel Halberstam
Book Chapters
Even France now values local government. Over the past 30 years, top-down appointment of regional prefects and local administrators has given way to regionally elected councils and a revision of Article 1 of the French Constitution, which proclaims that today the state’s ‘organization is decentralized’. The British Parliament, too, has embraced local rule by devolving powers to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. And in China, decentralization has reached a point where some scholars speak of ‘de facto federalism’. A systematic study of the distribution of authority in 42 democracies found that over the past 50 years, regional authority grew in …
Comparative Federalism And The Role Of Judiciary, Daniel Halberstam
Comparative Federalism And The Role Of Judiciary, Daniel Halberstam
Book Chapters
The distinctive feature of federalism is to locate the central and constituent governments' respective claims of organizational autonomy and jurisdictional authority within a set of privileged legal norms that are beyond the arena of daily politics. For the most part, the debate about the role of the judiciary as federal umpire has taken place within two separate disciplinary compartments: comparative politics and law. Building on recent e��orts to bring these two disciplines closer, this article provides a fresh look at three common criticisms of granting the central judiciary power to protect federalism. It argues that political safeguards of federalism are …
Ideological Endowment: The Staying Power Of The Electoral College And The Weaknesses Of The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, Daniel P. Rathbun
Ideological Endowment: The Staying Power Of The Electoral College And The Weaknesses Of The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, Daniel P. Rathbun
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The National Popular Vote (“NPV”) movement is designed to eliminate the federalist impact of the Electoral College without amending the Constitution. By fashioning an interstate compact to grant participating states’ electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote, NPV proponents suppose they can induce states to forfeit their electoral “weights” and replace the current, federalist election process with a fully majoritarian one. But by leaving the Electoral College in place, the NPV movement is setting itself up for a double pushback: first, in the form of immediate legal resistance, and second, through states’ long-term involvement in a meaningfully …
The Case For Federal Anti-Gerrymandering Legislation, Brian O'Neill
The Case For Federal Anti-Gerrymandering Legislation, Brian O'Neill
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Partisan gerrymandering is a political tradition the United States can no longer afford. Due in part to the effects of partisan gerrymandering, very few congressional elections are meaningfully competitive. This Note argues that partisan gerrymandering damages both the quality of American democracy and the federal system of the United States. This Note concludes that the important federal interests at stake warrant action by Congress to halt partisan gerrymandering. The Note further concludes that any action by Congress should incorporate the principles of federalism by resisting the temptation to micromanage and Congress should instead require state commissions to draft the boundaries …
Principles, Politics, And Constitutional Law, Mark Tushnet
Principles, Politics, And Constitutional Law, Mark Tushnet
Michigan Law Review
The contrast in Senator Thurmond's performance in hearings concerning Judge Bork, whose nomination he supported, and Justice Marshall, whose nomination he opposed, suggests the apparently cynical view that one's position on the proper scope of senatorial inquiry during a nomination depends upon one's position on the merits of the nomination. Much has been written, usually provoked by controversial nominations, about the proper scope of senatorial inquiry. The press of immediate controversy, however, diverts attention from more fundamental issues about the nature of constitutional government, to which I devote this essay.
Population Changes And Constitutional Amendments: Federalism Versus Democracy, Peter Suber
Population Changes And Constitutional Amendments: Federalism Versus Democracy, Peter Suber
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
To amend the federal Constitution, we need the assent of two-thirds of each house of Congress and three-fourths of the states. This Article focuses on the three-fourths requirement for the states. This threshold is particularly high, and it suggests that constitutional amendment is very difficult. In fact, amendment is difficult in different degrees for different constituencies, depending not on their numbers but on where they live.
Is A Provision For The Initiative And Referendum Inconsistent With The Constitution Of The United States?, W. A. Coutts
Is A Provision For The Initiative And Referendum Inconsistent With The Constitution Of The United States?, W. A. Coutts
Michigan Law Review
We are told today that the Constitution of the United States forbids the adoption of the Initiative and the Referendum, as these involve such purely democratic principles as to be inconsistent with the republican form of government guaranteed by the fourth section of the fourth article of the Federal Constitution. The special interests that are opposed to the Initiative tell us that we must find some other cure for the evils at which it aims; that the Initiative is a purely democratic principle and, as such, it is forbidden by the fourth section of the fourth article of the Federal …