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Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson
Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson
Michigan Law Review
It is widely believed that insulating an administrative agency from the influence of elected officials, whatever its other benefits orjustifications, reduces the agency's responsiveness to the preferences of political majorities. This Article argues, to the contrary, that a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation from political control alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic policymaking. An elected politician, though responsive to majoritarian preferences, will almost always deviate from the majority in one direction or the other Therefore, even if the average policy position of a given elected official tends to track the policy views of the median voter …
Industry Influence In Federal Regulatory Agencies, Michigan Law Review
Industry Influence In Federal Regulatory Agencies, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies by Paul J. Quirk
Cary: Politics And The Regulatory Agencies, Donald C. Cook
Cary: Politics And The Regulatory Agencies, Donald C. Cook
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Politics and the Regulatory Agencies by William L. Cary