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The Role Of The World Bank In Controlling Corruption, Susan Rose-Ackerman Jan 1997

The Role Of The World Bank In Controlling Corruption, Susan Rose-Ackerman

Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture

In 1997, Professor of Law and Political Science, Susan Rose-Ackerman of Yale University, delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s seventeenth Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: "The World Bank’s Role in Controlling Corruption."

Susan Rose-Ackerman is Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University, and Co-director of the Law School’s Center for Law, Economics, and Public Policy. She holds a Ph.D. in economics from Yale University and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation and the Fullbright Commission. She was a visiting Research Fellow at the World Bank in 1995-96 where she did research on corruption and economic …


Commentary, At Issue – House Rules: Is A Supermajority Requirement For Tax Hikes Constitutional? – No, The Framers Had Only A Simple Majority In Mind, Susan Low Bloch Jan 1997

Commentary, At Issue – House Rules: Is A Supermajority Requirement For Tax Hikes Constitutional? – No, The Framers Had Only A Simple Majority In Mind, Susan Low Bloch

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The supermajority requirement undermines the constitutional principles of Article I and separation of powers. Rule XXI is not merely a rule of internal procedure; it determines when bills get presented to the Senate and the president.


Disciplining Congress: The Taxing And Spending Powers, Susan Low Bloch Jan 1997

Disciplining Congress: The Taxing And Spending Powers, Susan Low Bloch

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Our panel will address a topic that goes to the heart of a debate over the nature of humankind: When dealing with governmentsponsored redistribution of wealth, can our elected representatives, to whom the Constitution grants federal taxing and spending authority, be trusted to exercise that authority; or must we place upon them what James Madison referred to as "auxiliary precautions," burdens higher than those imposed by the requirement that they stand for reelection, in the case of the House, every two years, or in the case of the Senate, every six years?