Law Commons^™

Executive Opportunism, Presidential Signing Statements, And The Separation Of Powers, Daniel B. Rodriguez, Edward H. Stiglitz, Barry R. Weingast

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Executive discretion over policy outcomes is an inevitable feature of our political system. However, in recent years, the President has sought to expand his discretion through a variety of controversial and legally questionable tactics. Through a series of simple separation of powers models, we study one such tactic, employed by both Democratic and Republican presidents: the use of signing statements, which purport to have status in the interpretation of statutory meaning. Our models also show that signing statements upset the constitutional vision of lawmaking and, in a wide range of cases, exacerbate legislative gridlock. We argue that courts should not …

A Fourth Way?: Bringing Politics Back Into Recess Appointments (And The Rest Of The Separation Of Powers, Too), Josh Chafetz

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

It sounds odd when stated forthrightly, but most separation-of-powers discussions are largely inattentive to politics. Formalist theories tend to assert that the distribution of powers is set in stone; in contrast, functionalist theories tend to focus on abstract considerations of comparative institutional competence or on ossifying past practice into a "historical gloss" binding the present. Both approaches generally ignore the live political context in which the branches continually compete with one another for decision-making power.

"Pragmatic formalist" hybrids, like that proposed by Ron Krotoszynski in his contribution to the Duke Law Journal's annual administrative law symposium, while broadening the …

Congress's Constitution, Josh Chafetz

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Congress has significantly more constitutional power than we are accustomed to seeing it exercise. By failing to make effective use of its power, Congress has invited the other branches to fill the vacuum, resulting in a constitutional imbalance. This Article considers a number of constitutional tools that individual houses—and even individual members—of Congress, acting alone, can deploy in interbranch conflicts. Although the congressional powers discussed in this Article are clearly contemplated in constitutional text, history, and structure, many of them have received only scant treatment in isolation. More importantly, they have never before been considered in concert as a set …

Cleaning House: Congressional Commissioners For Standards, Josh Chafetz

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Given the profusion of congressional ethics scandals over the past two years, it is unsurprising that the new Democratic majority in the 110th Congress has made ethics reform a priority. But although both the House and the Senate have tightened their substantive rules, the way the rules are enforced has received almost no attention at all.

This Comment argues that ethics enforcement should remain within the houses of Congress themselves. Taking enforcement power away from the houses is constitutionally questionable (under the Speech or Debate Clause), structurally unwise (given general concerns about separation of powers), and institutionally problematic (as it …

Schoolhouses, Courthouses, And Statehouses: Educational Finance, Constitutional Structure, And The Separation Of Powers Doctrine, Michael Heise

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.