Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

Feminist Judging Matters: How Feminist Theory And Methods Affect The Process Of Judgment, Linda L. Berger, Bridget J. Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi Jan 2018

Feminist Judging Matters: How Feminist Theory And Methods Affect The Process Of Judgment, Linda L. Berger, Bridget J. Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi

Scholarly Works

Professor Linda Berger rejoins her Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the United States Supreme Court coauthors in this essay presenting feminism as the foundation for a developing form of rich, complex, and practical legal scholarship-the lens and the means through which we may approach and resolve many legal problems. First, this essay explores the intellectual foundations of feminist legal theory and situates the United States and international feminist judgments projects within that scholarly tradition. It next considers how the feminist judgments projects move beyond traditional academic scholarship to bridge the gap between the real-world practice of law and feminist theory. …


Doctrinal Reasoning As A Disruptive Practice, Jessie Allen Jan 2018

Doctrinal Reasoning As A Disruptive Practice, Jessie Allen

Articles

Legal doctrine is generally thought to contribute to legal decision making only to the extent it determines substantive results. Yet in many cases, the available authorities are indeterminate. I propose a different model for how doctrinal reasoning might contribute to judicial decisions. Drawing on performance theory and psychological studies of readers, I argue that judges’ engagement with formal legal doctrine might have self-disrupting effects like those performers experience when they adopt uncharacteristic behaviors. Such disruptive effects would not explain how judges ultimately select, or should select, legal results. But they might help legal decision makers to set aside subjective biases.


A Pragmatic Justification Of The Judicial Hunch, Mark C. Modak-Truran Jan 2001

A Pragmatic Justification Of The Judicial Hunch, Mark C. Modak-Truran

Journal Articles

Judges currently face a daunting task. On the one hand, they are increasingly aware of the indeterminacy of the law, while on the other hand, they face an explosion of fact. Judges are floating on shaky legal timbers in a sea of documents, deposition transcripts, affidavits, oral courtroom testimony, and expert opinions. The explosion of fact alone presents monumental problems for deciding cases without unduly simplifying or reducing this factual complexity. For example, both federal and state judges are implementing case management systems to deal with their crushing case loads and the increasing complexity of their cases. In addition, there …


Corrective Justice And The Revival Of Judicial Virtue, Mark C. Modak-Truran Jan 2000

Corrective Justice And The Revival Of Judicial Virtue, Mark C. Modak-Truran

Journal Articles

Judges must be wise. Sound judicial reasoning requires moral virtue. These sentiments about judging have been lost. They apparently belong to a bygone era. While many advocate self-restraint or prudence as judicial virtues, moral virtue has been conspicuously absent from the list. Except for avoiding obvious vices such as bribery, favoritism, prejudice, sloth, and arbitrariness, conventional wisdom maintains that being a good judge does not require being a good person. Even theorists sympathetic to a relationship between law and morality balk at making moral virtue a prerequisite of judicial decision making. Rather, many contend that judicial decision making is a …