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The Unreasonableness Of Catholic Integralism, Micah Schwartzman, Jocelyn Wilson
The Unreasonableness Of Catholic Integralism, Micah Schwartzman, Jocelyn Wilson
San Diego Law Review
In this symposium contribution, we argue that Catholic integralism is unreasonable. Our conception of reasonableness is defined in terms of substantive moral and epistemic commitments to respecting the freedom and equality of citizens who hold a wide—but not unlimited—range of religious, ethical, and philosophical conceptions of the good. In arguing that Catholic integralism conflicts with this understanding of reasonableness, it might seem that we are begging the question against integralists. But our purpose here is not to engage integralists on their own terms. So far, the debate about integralism has been conducted mostly among Catholics and Christian conservatives. Our critique …
On This Side Of The Law And On That Side Of The Law, Maimon Schwarzschild
On This Side Of The Law And On That Side Of The Law, Maimon Schwarzschild
San Diego Law Review
Value pluralism is the idea that legitimate human values and goals are many, often incompatible, and not reducible to any single overarching principle or Good. Value pluralism is probably the central idea - you could say the single overarching idea - in the work of Sir Isaiah Berlin, the English philosopher and historian of ideas. Berlin's theme is that individuals, and societies as well, have ideals and aspirations that conflict, and that therefore cannot all be fully realized. Thus a society cannot have perfect equality and perfect liberty because some people will exercise freedom to differentiate themselves, and hence to …
Pluralism, Liberalism, And Distributive Justice, George Crowder
Pluralism, Liberalism, And Distributive Justice, George Crowder
San Diego Law Review
My general task in this paper is to argue that Ronald Dworkin is incorrect about the indeterminate and paralyzing character of pluralism. The background worry that motivates Dworkin's attack on the truth of pluralism is misplaced. Pluralism is not the field of indeterminacy and reform paralysis that he supposes it to be. More specifically, I argue this point with reference to the question of justice in economic distribution. Using the liberal-pluralist approach I have developed elsewhere, I try to show that a value-pluralist approach to distributive justice, far from leading to inaction or acquiescence in existing patterns of power, commends …
Normative Conflict In International Law, Carmen Pavel
Normative Conflict In International Law, Carmen Pavel
San Diego Law Review
In Part II, I will illustrate the problem of conflict in international law by drawing on two cases in international trade law. I will then argue in Parts III and IV that legal conflict often represents a genuine normative conflict grounded in our multiple, incommensurable, and potentially conflicting moral commitments. In doing so, I will deflect potential skepticism about the reality of normative conflict in international law. Drawing from existing international legal practice, I will show in Part IV that we can resort to a substantial toolbox of rules and principles to reconcile legal norms that are in tension with …
Value Pluralism And The Two Concepts Of Rights, Horacio Spector
Value Pluralism And The Two Concepts Of Rights, Horacio Spector
San Diego Law Review
In Part II, I will indicate how the Will Theory and the Interest Theory each capture distinct features of the usage of right in contemporary moral and legal discourse. However, I will also argue that neither of the two theories is successful in explaining all the properties of rights. In Part III, I will argue that the debate between the two theories is irresolvable because the Will Theory and the Interest Theory reflect the meaning of rights within rival and incommensurable value paradigms existing in today's moral and legal culture. The incommensurability of the underlying value paradigms leads to radical …
Introduction To The 2009 Editors' Symposium: Isaiah Berlin, Value Pluralism, And The Law, Larry Alexander
Introduction To The 2009 Editors' Symposium: Isaiah Berlin, Value Pluralism, And The Law, Larry Alexander
San Diego Law Review
The outstanding collection of articles and comments thereon that follows this Introduction constitutes the 2009 Editors' Symposium of the San Diego Law Review.
What Value Pluralism Means For Legal-Constitutional Orders, William A. Galston
What Value Pluralism Means For Legal-Constitutional Orders, William A. Galston
San Diego Law Review
I begin by summarizing my version of liberal pluralism, emphasizing that the notion of pluralism implies not only value conflicts and hard choices but also a set of normative principles that are capable of guiding public policy. I then use that framework to adjudicate between rival approaches to distributive justice within liberalism, starting with the basic division between laissez-faire and egalitarian-redistributive approaches and proceeding to the leading alternatives within egalitarianism.
Berlin's Methodological Parsimony, Daniel M. Weinstock
Berlin's Methodological Parsimony, Daniel M. Weinstock
San Diego Law Review
In this Article, I want to suggest a third line of argument that can be retrieved from Two Concepts. It is primarily methodological. It enjoins political theorists to define the extension of normative concepts in a manner that makes as perspicuous as possible the various normative considerations that are relevant to political decisionmaking. Although related to the pluralist defense of negative freedom briefly alluded to above, I will suggest that it is distinct from it, and that it allows us to address important but under appreciated lacunae that beset the argument from value pluralism, as well as the argument according …
The Path Between Value Pluralism And Liberal Political Order: Questioning The Connection, Patrick Neal
The Path Between Value Pluralism And Liberal Political Order: Questioning The Connection, Patrick Neal
San Diego Law Review
After a few terminological preliminaries in Part II, I turn to two primary tasks. First, in Part III, I raise questions that seem to me to confront the basic logic of the connection between value pluralism and liberalism. Second, in Part IV, I discuss at length the "argument from diversity" articulated by George Crowder in support of the view that value pluralism supports liberalism. This line of argument is only one of a number that Crowder advances in support of that view, and so doubts about its success do not necessarily implicate the other lines of argument he pursues. However, …
The Plural Implications Of Value Pluralism: A Comment On Maimon Schwarzschild's On This Side Of The Law And On That Side Of The Law, Iddo Porat
San Diego Law Review
I suggest that there are two main views that can be found in Professor Schwarzschild's paper. The first is a strong suspicion of any type of centralized power, especially judicial power, as potentially stifling the plurality of values in society and imposing a monolithic view from above. This theme makes federalism and judicial activism especially central issues in the paper, and I will concentrate on both of them in my comment. The second view regarding the application of value pluralism is more subtle. It is a Burkean defense of traditional institutions, arguing that they represent a way of life in …
Value Pluralism Does Not Support Liberalism: A Comment On William A. Galston's What Value Pluralism Means For Legal-Constitutional Orders, Richard J. Arnesto
Value Pluralism Does Not Support Liberalism: A Comment On William A. Galston's What Value Pluralism Means For Legal-Constitutional Orders, Richard J. Arnesto
San Diego Law Review
In a free society, there is a strong presumption in favor of letting individuals act as they choose without interference by others. William A. Galston has developed this argument with exemplary clarity. He is wrong. The idea that value incommensurability is a reason for toleration of diverse ways of life and protection of the individual's freedom to choose among diverse ways of life is a mistake. Value pluralism does not establish any normative presumption in favor of liberty, so the worry "does this presumption hold without limit," or "are there good reasons that constrain it at some point," is otiose.
Urbanization, The Intelligentsia, And Meaning Change: A Comment On Horacio Spector's Value Pluralism And The Two Concepts Of Rights, Christopher T. Wonnell
Urbanization, The Intelligentsia, And Meaning Change: A Comment On Horacio Spector's Value Pluralism And The Two Concepts Of Rights, Christopher T. Wonnell
San Diego Law Review
In my view, Professor Spector's paper is more persuasive in identifying the rhetorical change that has taken place than in providing a causal account of its genesis. The traditional rights of private property and freedom of contract do seem a long way from the new rights to receive medical care or safe and affordable housing. However, the rural-to-urban hypothesis for the cause of this change is not especially persuasive. Laissez-faire thinking of autonomous private spheres was at its height in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, among conditions far more urban and commercial than had historically been the case …
"Is That English You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is An Impossibility, Larry Alexander, Saikrishna Prakash
"Is That English You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is An Impossibility, Larry Alexander, Saikrishna Prakash
San Diego Law Review
"Textualism" is a very general and abstract term that represents a variety of views about the interpretation of legal texts. One strand of textualism is conceptual and descriptive; this strand makes claims about what texts actually mean. Another strand of textualism is normative; this strand makes claims about how judges ought to proceed when they interpret particular kinds of legal texts, such as constitutions and statutes. In the first part of this paper, we are particularly concerned with an especially strong form of conceptual textualism - the position that texts can be interpreted without any reference, express or implied, to …
The Pope's Submarine, John H. Garvey
The Pope's Submarine, John H. Garvey
San Diego Law Review
This Article looks at the conflict between religious authority and liberal politics from a point of view within the Catholic Church. It examines the grounds of the teaching authority asserted by the Church, the scope and strength of that authority, and the possibility that obedience to authority will create dilemmas for religiously committed public officials. For purposes of illustration it uses New York Governor Mario Cuomo's religious and political observations on the subject of abortion.