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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Miscalculating Welfare, Michael B. Dorff, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
Miscalculating Welfare, Michael B. Dorff, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
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In their quest to maximize efficiency, law and economics scholars often produce novel, creative, and counterintuitive legal rules. Indeed, legal economists have argued for baby selling, against anti-discrimination laws in the workplace, and for insider trading. In this essay, we discuss some concerns about this form of legal scholarship that privileges the creative and counterintuitive over the fair, mundane, and intuitive. Drawing on a range of empirical evidence, this essay argues that the failure to include, and to give sufficient weight to, fairness preferences undermines legal economists' policy recommendations. Specifically, after setting forth three examples of this phenomenon, in the …
Beyond Intention, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
Beyond Intention, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
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The conventional view is that a result is intended if it is motivationally significant - i.e., if it is why the person acted. However, inseparable effects cases place pressure on this conventional view for we intuitively reject the claim that, for instance, one can intend to decapitate without intending to kill. These cases therefore threaten an important border in both law and morality - the distinction between what we intend and what we foresee. In resolving the problem of inseparable effects, this article challenges the conventional view that intentions are co-extensive with motivational significance. Drawing on philosophy of mind literature, …
Self-Defense And The State, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
Self-Defense And The State, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
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This article is a contribution to a symposium honoring Sandy Kadish. This article seeks to explore whether and to what extent our understanding of self-defense depends upon a citizen's relationship with the state. Part II begins by setting forth Professor Kadish's claim that self-defense is "a right to resist aggression" that is held by a citizen against the state. After contending that such an account is insufficient to justify self-defense, the remainder of the article seeks to explore the relationship between the state and self-defense. Part III argues that self-defense is a pre-political moral right, as opposed to a political …
Living On The Edge: The Margins Of Legal Personhood, Symposium Foreword, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
Living On The Edge: The Margins Of Legal Personhood, Symposium Foreword, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
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In January 2008, at the Association of American Law Schools' annual meeting, the Jurisprudence Section conducted a panel on "The Margins of Legal Personhood." The goal of this panel was to draw (or sever) connections between and among different "marginal" entities: the psychopath, the animal, and the embryo or fetus. As is perhaps immediately apparent, these entities are not marginalized in a political sense, but rather lie at the margins of our moral and legal communities. Prima facie, they may have some, but lack all, of the capacities necessary for full membership. Because they live on the edge, we must …
Culpable Acts Of Risk Creation, Larry Alexander, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
Culpable Acts Of Risk Creation, Larry Alexander, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
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In our view, an actor deserves punishment when he demonstrates insufficient concern for others, that is, when he engages in a culpable act of risk creation. In this essay, we address how we would rethink the actus reus so as to track the actor's culpability and blameworthiness. Part I sets forth our view that defendants deserve to be punished for culpable acts. Briefly put, an actor is culpable when he risks others' legally protected interests for insufficient reasons. In Part II, we turn to the question of how we would formulate a unit of culpable action. We argue that with …