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Can Sandel Dethrone Meritocracy?, Robert L. Tsai
Can Sandel Dethrone Meritocracy?, Robert L. Tsai
Faculty Scholarship
This is an invited review essay of Michael Sandel, The Tyranny of Merit: What's Become of the Common Good? (FSG 2020), for the inaugural issue of The American Journal of Law and Inequality (R. Kennedy, M. Minow, C. Sunstein, eds.). Sandel makes three principal arguments: (1) meritocracy is deeply flawed because it worsens inequality and fills meritocracy's winners with hubris and losers with shame; (2) universities should introduce a lottery into the admissions process; and (3) this reform, coupled with increased emphasis on the dignity of labor, will repair the politics of resentment that now roil our country.
I respond …
Toleration, Autonomy, And Governmental Promotion Of Good Lives: Beyond 'Empty' Toleration To Toleration As Respect, Linda C. Mcclain
Toleration, Autonomy, And Governmental Promotion Of Good Lives: Beyond 'Empty' Toleration To Toleration As Respect, Linda C. Mcclain
Faculty Scholarship
This Article considers discontent with liberal toleration as being both too empty, because it fails to secure respect and appreciation among citizens who tolerate each other, and too robust, because it precludes government from engaging in a formative project of helping citizens to live good, self-governing lives. To meet these criticisms, the Article advances a model of toleration as respect, as distinguished from a model of empty toleration, drawing on three rationales for toleration: the anti-compulsion rationale, the jurisdictional rationale, and the diversity rationale. It defends toleration as respect against some common criticisms-emanating from feminist, civic republican, and liberal perfectionist …
Principles, Positivism, And Legal Theory, David B. Lyons
Principles, Positivism, And Legal Theory, David B. Lyons
Faculty Scholarship
A complete theory of law, writes Ronald Dworkin, tells us what law is and what it ought to be. The current "ruling" theory of law combines legal positivism with utilitarianism: it holds, first, that law is a set of explicitly adopted rules and, second, that law ought to maximize the general welfare. Dworkin rejects both branches of that theory. He argues that law contains "principles" as well as rules and that these principles cannot be traced to any explicit adoption or enactment. Dworkin argues further that the ruling theory neglects moral rights, which must be respected, he claims, even if …