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Intention And Motivation, Joseph Raz
Intention And Motivation, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
What is the role of intentions in the actions intended? What do they contribute, and how do they contribute to the occurrence of the intended actions?
The paper will offer an account of acting with an intention and of having an intention to act. It will not offer an account of intentional action, merely suggesting that when intentional actions are not actions done with an intention, their explanation as intentional relates to that of actions with intentions, showing how like them and unlike them they are. Motivation will be discussed mainly to distinguish its role in leading to action from …
Intention And Value, Joseph Raz
Intention And Value, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
In previous writings, I joined those who take the view that action with an intention is an action for (what the agent takes to be) a reason, where whatever value there is in the action is a reason for it. This paper sketches the role of reasons and intentions in leading to action with an intention. Section 1 explains that though belief in the value of the intended action is not an essential constituent of intentions, nevertheless when humans act with an intention they act in the belief that there is value in the action. Section 2 explains the relative …
Intention And Value, Joseph Raz
Intention And Value, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
The paper sketches the role of reasons and intentions in leading to action with an intention, explaining the way possession of rational powers transforms the formation of intentions. Part One explains how when humans act with an intention they act in the belief that there is value in the action. Part Two explains the relative role of value and intention in “producing” the action, and relates their role to that of motivation.
On The Guise Of The Good, Joseph Raz
On The Guise Of The Good, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
The chapter examines the main argument for, and the presuppositions of the claim that intentional actions are actions taken in, and because of, a belief that there is some good in them. An analysis of intentional actions, and of action for a (normative) reason, followed by a consideration of a number of objections to the thesis of the Guise of the Good force various revisions and refinements of the thesis yielding a defensible version of it. It is argued that the revised thesis is supported by the same argument that inspired the Guise of the Good from the beginning and …