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Law and Gender

1996

Feminist Legal Theory

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Feminism For Men: Legal Ideology And The Construction Of Maleness, Nancy Levit Jan 1996

Feminism For Men: Legal Ideology And The Construction Of Maleness, Nancy Levit

Nancy Levit

It may seem a little odd to suggest that feminist theory has overlooked men. Yet, in several important respects, apart from the role of culprit, men have been largely omitted from feminism. Feminist legal theorists have paid mild attention to the "Can men be feminists?" question but this issue is usually relegated to footnotes. The negative effect gender role stereotypes have on men is typically subsidiary to the main focus of feminist legal literature, which has concentrated on documenting the patterns of subordination of women and on questions of feminist ideology.

The primary purpose of this article is to suggest …


Straying From The Path Of The Law After One Hundred Years, The, Tracy E. Higgins Jan 1996

Straying From The Path Of The Law After One Hundred Years, The, Tracy E. Higgins

Faculty Scholarship

What common ground can be found between modern feminist legal theory and a century-old essay advocating understanding the law from the perspective of the "bad man"? The question admits of no simple answer. Feminists, including myself, might agree with some irony that "[i]f you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man" but would add that this is precisely the problem. Of course, Holmes does not use the concept of the bad man in a feminist sense to suggest that the law empowers the bad man at the expense of women. …


Democracy And Feminism , Tracy E. Higgins Jan 1996

Democracy And Feminism , Tracy E. Higgins

Faculty Scholarship

Although feminist legal theory has had an important impact on most areas of legal doctrine and theory over the last two decades, its contribution to the debate over constitutional interpretation has been comparatively small. In this Article, Professor Higgins explores reasons for the limited dialogue between mainstream constitutional theory and feminist theory concerning questions of democracy, constitutionalism, and judicial review. She argues that mainstream constitutional theory tends to take for granted the capacity of the individual to make choices, leaving the social construction of those choices largely unexamined. In contrast, feminist legal theory's emphasis on the importance of constraints on …