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Full-Text Articles in Law
Building A Law-And-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond The Twentieth-Century Synthesis, Jedediah S. Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski, K. Sabeel Rahman
Building A Law-And-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond The Twentieth-Century Synthesis, Jedediah S. Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski, K. Sabeel Rahman
Faculty Scholarship
We live in a time of interrelated crises. Economic inequality and precarity, and crises of democracy, climate change, and more raise significant challenges for legal scholarship and thought. “Neoliberal” premises undergird many fields of law and have helped authorize policies and practices that reaffirm the inequities of the current era. In particular, market efficiency, neutrality, and formal equality have rendered key kinds of power invisible, and generated a skepticism of democratic politics. The result of these presumptions is what we call the “Twentieth-Century Synthesis”: a pervasive view of law that encases “the market” from claims of justice and conceals it …
Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, Lina M. Khan
Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, Lina M. Khan
Faculty Scholarship
Amazon is the titan of twenty-first century commerce. In addition to being a retailer, it is now a marketing platform, a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender, an auction house, a major book publisher, a producer of television and films, a fashion designer, a hardware manufacturer, and a leading host of cloud server space. Although Amazon has clocked staggering growth, it generates meager profits, choosing to price below-cost and expand widely instead. Through this strategy, the company has positioned itself at the center of e-commerce and now serves as essential infrastructure for a host of other …
Corporate Control And Idiosyncratic Vision, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani
Corporate Control And Idiosyncratic Vision, Zohar Goshen, Assaf Hamdani
Faculty Scholarship
This Article offers a novel theory of corporate control. It does so by shedding new light on corporate-ownership structures and challenging the prevailing model of controlling shareholders as essentially opportunistic actors who seek to reap private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Our core claim is that entrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them to pursue their vision (i.e., any business strategy that the entrepreneur genuinely believes will produce an above-market rate of return) in the manner they see fit. We call the subjective value an entrepreneur attaches to her vision the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision. Our framework identifies …
Parallel Exclusion, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu
Parallel Exclusion, C. Scott Hemphill, Tim Wu
Faculty Scholarship
Scholars and courts have long debated whether and when "parallel pricing" – adoption of the same price by every firm in a market – should be considered a violation of antitrust law. But there has been a comparative neglect of the importance of "parallel exclusion" – conduct, engaged in by multiple firms, that blocks or slows would-be market entrants. Parallel exclusion merits greater attention, for it can be far more harmful than parallel price elevation. Setting a high price leaves the field open for new entrants and may even attract them. In contrast, parallel action that excludes new entrants both …
What Happened To Property In Law And Economics?, Thomas W. Merrill, Henry E. Smith
What Happened To Property In Law And Economics?, Thomas W. Merrill, Henry E. Smith
Faculty Scholarship
Property has fallen out of fashion. Although people are as concerned as ever with acquiring and defending their material possessions, in the academic world there is little interest in understanding property. To some extent, this indifference reflects a more general skepticism about the value of conceptual analysis, as opposed to functional assessment of institutions. There is, however, a deeper reason for the indifference to property. It is a commonplace of academic discourse that property is simply a "bundle of rights," and that any distribution of rights and privileges among persons with respect to things can be dignified with the (almost …
When Should An Offer Stick? The Economics Of Promissory Estoppel In Preliminary Negotiations, Avery W. Katz
When Should An Offer Stick? The Economics Of Promissory Estoppel In Preliminary Negotiations, Avery W. Katz
Faculty Scholarship
The purpose of this Article is to examine the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as it applies in the context of preliminary negotiations, from the viewpoint of the economic theory of rational choice. This is part of a larger project that attempts to understand better the regulatory role of contract formation law generally. From a regulatory vantage point, estoppel and related legal doctrines operate as economic regulations; they shape the bargaining process by influencing the negotiators' incentives to make and to rely on preliminary communications. As with all economic regulations, however, some rules do better than others at promoting efficient exchange, …
Shareholder Dividend Options, Zohar Goshen
Shareholder Dividend Options, Zohar Goshen
Faculty Scholarship
This Article proposes a legal norm that shifts discretion over dividend policy from managers to the capital markets (i.e., shareholders). State corporate law could effect such a shift by adopting a rule that mandates shareholder control over the dividend decision. The rule would require every firm to adopt an option mechanism that, at predetermined dates, provided each of the firm's shareholders with the right to select either cash or stock dividends in an amount equal to the shareholder's pro rata share of the firm's earnings. For instance, the law might require that, once a year, the firm offer to each …
Decoupling Sales Law From The Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, Jody S. Kraus
Decoupling Sales Law From The Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, Jody S. Kraus
Faculty Scholarship
The determination of whether the buyer has accepted or rejected goods provides the sales law solution to the problems of allocating burden of proof, assigning duties to salvage goods in failed transactions, and reducing systematic undercompensation. But one doctrine is unlikely to provide the best solution to each of these distinct problems. Decoupling the rules addressing burden of proof, salvage, and undercompensation from the doctrines of acceptance and rejection, and thus from one another, would significantly improve sales law.
This strategy has a distinguished precedent in the history of sales law. Karl Llewellyn based his objection to the doctrine of …
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing A Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, Ian Ayres, Eric Talley
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing A Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, Ian Ayres, Eric Talley
Faculty Scholarship
It is a common argument in law and economics that divided ownership can create or exacerbate strategic behavior. For instance, when several persons own the land designated for a proposed stadium, individual sellers may "hold out" for a disproportionate share of the gains from trade. Alternatively, when building a public library would benefit multiple residents, individual buyers may "free ride" on the willingness of others to pay for its construction. Such transaction costs of collective action fall under a variety of analytic rubrics, including the "tragedy of the commons" and the theory of "public goods." Nonetheless, each example of market …
Benign Restraint: The Sec's Regulation Of Execution Systems, David M. Schizer
Benign Restraint: The Sec's Regulation Of Execution Systems, David M. Schizer
Faculty Scholarship
To the handful of traders who founded the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1792 – and perhaps even to the securities traders of the 1960's – today's securities markets would be virtually unrecognizable. New communications and data processing technologies, the globalization of investment portfolios, and a surge in trading volume have created new needs and possibilities. As a result, revolutionary advances have occurred in the design and performance of execution systems: the technologies (computers, telephones, modems) and formats (auction-based stock exchanges, dealer-based "over-the-counter" markets, computerized single price auctions) that traders use to conduct trades. These advances enable trades on …
Rethinking The Theory Of Legal Rights, Jules S. Coleman, Jody S. Kraus
Rethinking The Theory Of Legal Rights, Jules S. Coleman, Jody S. Kraus
Faculty Scholarship
In the economic approach to law, legal rights are designed, in part, to overcome the conditions under which markets fail. In correcting for market failure, economic analysis endorses two rules for assigning legal rights. The first specifies the allocation of rights under conditions of rational cooperation, full information and zero transaction costs. Provided that exchange is available and that obstacles to exercising it are insignificant, rational cooperators will negotiate around inefficiencies. Under these conditions, legal rights are not assigned in order to establish optimal levels of resource deployment directly; rather, they establish well-defined entitlements or negotiation points which create a …
Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment On Two Models, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lewis A. Kornhauser
Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment On Two Models, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lewis A. Kornhauser
Faculty Scholarship
One of the most important debates of current corporate law practice and scholarship is about the appropriate role of target management confronted with a takeover bid. The controversy turns on the identification of a criterion for evaluating takeovers and target management defensive tactics. An influential body of opinion contends that maximization of shareholder wealth is the appropriate criterion because, first, traditional notions of fiduciary duty generally require managers to act in the shareholders' interest, and, second, shareholder wealth maximization is seen as the best available proxy for social wealth maximization. On this view, takeovers are desirable because they can increase …