Law Commons^™

Third Party Moral Hazard And The Problem Of Insurance Externalities, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

Insurance can lead to loss or claim-creation not just by insureds themselves, but also by uninsured third parties. These externalities—which we term “third party moral hazard”—arise because insurance creates opportunities both to extract rents and to recover for otherwise unrecoverable losses. Using examples from health, automobile, kidnap, and liability insurance, we demonstrate that the phenomenon is widespread and important, and that the downsides of insurance are greater than previously believed. We explain the economic, social and psychological reasons for this phenomenon, and propose policy responses. Contract-based methods that are traditionally used to control first-party moral hazard can be welfare-reducing in …

Market Myopia's Climate Bubble, Madison Condon

Faculty Scholarship

A growing number of financial institutions, ranging from BlackRock to the Bank of England, have warned that markets may not be accurately incorporating climate change-related risks into asset prices. This Article seeks to explain how this mispricing can exist at the level of individual assets drawing from scholarship on corporate governance and the mechanisms of market (in)efficiency. Market actors: 1. Lack the fine-grained asset-level data they need in order to assess risk exposure; 2. Continue to rely on outdated means of assessing risk; 3. Have misaligned incentives resulting in climate-specific agency costs; 4. Have myopic biases exacerbated by climate change …

The Social Cost Of Contract, David A. Hoffman, Cathy Hwang

All Faculty Scholarship

When private parties perform contracts, the public bears some of the costs. But what happens when society confronts unexpected contractual risks? During the COVID-19 pandemic, completing particular contracts—such as following through with weddings, conferences, and other large gatherings—will greatly increase the risk of rapidly spreading disease. A close reading of past cases illustrates that when social hazards sharply increase after formation, courts have sometimes rejected, reformed, and reinterpreted contracts so that parties who breach to reduce external harms are not left holding the bag.

This Essay builds on that observation in making two contributions. Theoretically, it characterizes contracts as bargains …

The Cost Of Legal Restrictions On Experience Rating, Levon Barseghyan, Francesca Molinari, Darcy Steeg Morris, Joshua C. Teitelbaum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We investigate the cost of legal restrictions on experience rating in auto and home insurance. The cost is an opportunity cost as experience rating can mitigate the problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk, including mispriced coverage and resulting demand distortions. We assess this cost through a counterfactual analysis in which we explore how risk predictions, premiums, and demand in home insurance and two lines of auto insurance would respond to unrestricted multiline experience rating. Using claims data from a large sample of households, we first estimate the variance-covariance matrix of unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk. We then show …

The Paradox Of Insurance, Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, we uncover a paradoxical phenomenon that has hitherto largely escaped the attention of legal scholars and economists, yet it has far-reaching implications for insurance law: loss-creation by uninsured parties caused by the presence of insurance. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we show that insurance can create significant negative externalities by inducing third parties to engage in antisocial, illegal and unethical activities in order to extract money from insureds or insurers. Moreover, as the amount and scope of insurance grows, so does its distortionary effect on third parties. We term this phenomenon the paradox of insurance. The risk …

Externalities And The Common Owner, Madison Condon

Faculty Scholarship

Due to the embrace of modern portfolio theory, most of the stock market is controlled by institutional investors holding broadly diversified economy-mirroring portfolios. Recent scholarship has revealed the anti-competitive incentives that arise when a firm’s largest shareholders own similarly sized stakes in the firm’s industry competitors. This Article expands the consideration of the effects of common ownership from the industry level to the market-portfolio level, and argues that diversified investors should rationally be motivated to internalize intra-portfolio negative externalities. This portfolio perspective can explain the increasing climate change related activism of institutional investors, who have applied coordinated shareholder power to …

If We Pay Football Players, Why Not Kidney Donors, Philip J. Cook, Kimberly D. Krawiec

Faculty Scholarship

Ethicists who oppose compensating kidney donors claim they do so because kidney donation is risky for the donor’s health, donors may not appreciate the risks and may be cognitively biased in other ways, and donors may come from disadvantaged groups and thus could be exploited. However, few ethical qualms are raised about professional football players, who face much greater health risks than kidney donors, have much less counseling and screening concerning that risk, and who often come from racial and economic groups deemed disadvantaged. It thus seems that either ethicists—and the law—should ban both professional football and compensated organ donation, …

In Defense Of The Restatement Of Liability Insurance Law, Tom Baker, Kyle D. Logue

All Faculty Scholarship

For most non-contractual legal claims for damages that are brought against individuals or firms, there is some form of liability insurance coverage. The Restatement of the Law Liability Insurance is the American Law Institute’s first effort to “restate” the common law governing such liability insurance policies, and we are the reporters. In a recent essay funded by the insurance industry, Yale Law Professor George Priest launched a strident critique of the Restatement project, arguing that the rules adopted in the Restatement:

(a) are radically contrary to existing case law,

(b) have a naïve “pro-policyholder” bias that ignores basic economic insights …

Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff

All Faculty Scholarship

Top law firms are notoriously competitive, fighting for prime clients and matters. But some of the most elite firms are also deeply cooperative, willingly sharing key details about their finances and strategy with their rivals. More surprisingly, they pay handsomely to do so. Nearly half of the AmLaw 100 and 200 belong to mutual insurance organizations that require member firms to provide capital; partner time; and important information about their governance, balance sheets, risk management, strategic plans, and malpractice liability. To answer why these firms do so when there are commercial insurers willing to provide coverage with fewer burdens, we …

Risk And Regulatory Calibration: Wto Compliance Review Of The U.S. Dolphin-Safe Tuna Labeling Regime, Cary Coglianese, André Sapir

All Faculty Scholarship

In a series of recent disputes arising under the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body has interpreted Article 2.1 to provide that discriminatory and trade-distortive regulation could be permissible if based upon a “legitimate regulatory distinction.” In its recent compliance decision in the US-Tuna II dispute, the AB reaffirmed its view that regulatory distinctions embedded in the U.S. dolphin-safe tuna labeling regime were not legitimate because they were not sufficiently calibrated to the risks to dolphins associated with different tuna fishing conditions. This paper analyzes the AB’s application of the notion of risk-based regulation in the US-Tuna II dispute and finds …

Why Law Now Needs To Control Rather Than Follow Neo-Classical Economics, John William Draper

Pace Environmental Law Review

This article argues that neo-classical economics places an emphasis on short-term gain over precaution, and in doing so, places the lives of a myriad of individual humans—and even the species itself—at risk. Given the foreseeable risks, if humanity wants to survive longer, we need to rethink our economic principles and priorities and the relationship between economics and law.

I begin with a most brief overview of the various sources of risk to the human species and its life support system. Then I will move on to look at how neo-classical economics interacts with significant risk.

Equity And Feasibility Regulation, Dov Waisman

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Human Survival, Risk, And Law: Considering Risk Filters To Replace Cost-Benefit Analysis, John William Draper

Librarian Scholarship at Penn Law

Selfish utilitarianism, neo-classical economics, the directive of short-term income maximization, and the decision tool of cost-benefit analysis fail to protect our species from the significant risks of too much consumption, pollution, or population. For a longer-term survival, humanity needs to employ more than cost-justified precaution.

This article argues that, at the global level, and by extension at all levels of government, we need to replace neo-classical economics with filters for safety and feasibility to regulate against significant risk. For significant risks, especially those that are irreversible, we need decision tools that will protect humanity at all scales. This article describes …

Trust And Control: The Value Effect Of Venture Capital Term Sheet Provisions As Risk Allocation Tools, Jason M. Gordon, David Orozco

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The parties to a venture funding agreement are in a state of coopetition. The parties account for perceived risk in the entrepreneur-investor relationship through varying levels of control demanded from and trust afforded to the other party. The level of risk perceived by each party may differ along individual aspects of the prospective equity deal. The provisions of the term sheet delineate the subjective risk perceptions of each party to the transaction by allocating control or trusting a party with decision-making rights. When negotiating term sheet provisions, a party should seek to understand and recognize the risk perceived by the …

Discounting And Criminals' Implied Risk Preferences, Murat C. Mungan, Jonathan Klick

All Faculty Scholarship

It is commonly assumed that potential offenders are more responsive to increases in the certainty than increases in the severity of punishment. An important implication of this assumption within the Beckerian law enforcement model is that criminals are risk-seeking. This note adds to existing literature by showing that offenders who discount future monetary benefits can be more responsive to the certainty rather than the severity of punishment, even when they are risk averse, and even when their disutility from imprisonment rises proportionally (or more than proportionally) with the length of the sentence.

The Cost Of Nothing Trumps The Value Of Everything: The Failure Of Regulatory Economics To Keep Pace With Improvements In Quantitative Risk Analysis, Adam M. Finkel

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

The entire U.S. federal regulatory apparatus, especially that part devoted to reducing (or deciding not to reduce) risks to the environment, health, and safety (EHS), relies increasingly on judgments of whether each regulation would yield benefits in excess of its costs. These judgments depend in turn upon empirical analysis of the potential increases in longevity, quality of life, and environmental quality that the regulation can confer, and also of the economic resources needed to “purchase” those benefits—analyses whose quality can range from extremely fine to disappointingly poor. The quality of a risk analysis (from which the benefits of control are …

Behaviorism In Finance And Securities Law, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, I take stock (as something of an outsider) of the behavioral economics movement, focusing in particular on its interaction with traditional cost-benefit analysis and its implications for agency structure. The usual strategy for such a project—a strategy that has been used by others with behavioral economics—is to marshal the existing evidence and critically assess its significance. My approach in this Essay is somewhat different. Although I describe behavioral economics and summarize the strongest criticisms of its use, the heart of the Essay is inductive, and focuses on a particular context: financial and securities regulation, as recently revamped …

Risky Returns: Accounting For Risk In The Federal Budget, David Kamin

Indiana Law Journal

There has been a growing consensus among academics, analysts, and policymakers that the official federal budget estimates should reflect the “cost of risk”—the amount that the private market would demand to bear risk. The result would be to add tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars in annual costs to the federal budget and, in combination with the budget enforcement laws now in place, make it much more difficult for the federal government to create or expand programs that involve risk—ranging from student lending to home mortgage guarantees to, potentially, broad social insurance programs like unemployment insurance. This Article …

The Law And Economics Of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical And Empirical Review, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the law and economics of liability insurance. The canonical Shavell model predicts that, despite the presence of some ex ante moral hazard (care-reduction by insureds), liability insurance will generally raise welfare because its risk-spreading gains will likely be larger than its adverse effects on precautionary activities. We discuss the numerous features of liability insurance contracts that are designed to reduce ex ante moral hazard, and examine the evidence of their effects. Most studies conclude that these features work reasonably well, so that liability insurance probably does not generate substantial ex ante moral …

Regulation By Liability Insurance: From Auto To Lawyers Professional Liability, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff

All Faculty Scholarship

Liability insurers use a variety of tools to address adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance relationships. These tools can act on insureds in a manner that can be understood as regulation. We identify seven categories of such regulatory activities: risk-based pricing, underwriting, contract design, claims management, loss prevention services, research and education, and engagement with public regulators. We describe these activities in general terms and then draw upon prior literature to explore them in the context of five areas of liability and corresponding insurance: shareholder liability, auto liability, gun liability, medical professional liability, and lawyers’ professional liability. The goal …

American Parent Bank Liability For Foreign Branch Deposits: Which Party Bears Sovereign Risk?, Adam Telanoff

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Financial Economic Theory Of Punitive Damages, Robert J. Rhee

Michigan Law Review

This Article provides a financial economic theory of punitive damages. The core problem, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, is not the systemic amount of punitive damages in the tort system; rather it is the risk of outlier outcomes. Low frequency, high severity awards are unpredictable, cause financial distress, and beget social cost. By focusing only on offsetting escaped liability, the standard law and economics theory fails to account for the core problem of variance. This Article provides a risk arbitrage analysis of the relationship between variance, litigation valuation, and optimal deterrence. Starting with settlement …

Forward Contracts - Prohibitions On Risk And Speculation Under Islamic Law, Nicholas C. Dau-Schmidt

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

Forward contracts allow buyers and sellers of goods to reduce risk by contracting for sale at a predetermined price and quantity prior to the actual exchange of goods and payment. While forward contracts are extensively used in the Western world without restriction, those who adhere to Islamic law are often constrained by principles intended to reduce risk, gambling, and usury. These principles can prove overly restrictive; however, Islamic law restrictions also illuminate the problems associated with the overly permissive Western system in which speculators contract in a manner tantamount to gambling-a problem associated with the recent financial crisis. This Note …

The Meaning Of The Market Myth, Benjamin Means

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This Book Review contends that the perfectly rational market may be a myth, not just in the sense of a false or over-simplified account of reality, but also in the deeper, anthropological sense of cultural explanation. Part I describes how rational-market theories were developed by financial economists and applied to Wall Street, sometimes without adequate appreciation for the difference between simplified economic models and real-world behavior. Part II contends that if the rational-market theory has met with acceptance that outstrips its empirical support, the favorable reception may be explained in part by the theory’s congruence with broader normative views about …

Genealogies Of Risk: Searching For Safety, 1930s-1970s, William Boyd

Publications

Health, safety, and environmental regulation in the United States are saturated with risk thinking. It was not always so, and it may not be so in the future. But today, the formal, quantitative approach to risk provides much of the basis for regulation in these fields, a development that seems quite natural, even necessary. This particular approach, while it drew on conceptual and technical developments that had been underway for decades, achieved prominence during a relatively short timeframe; roughly, between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s--a time of hard looks and regulatory reform. Prior to this time, formal conceptions of …

Mitigating Financial Risk For Small Business Entrepreneurs, Michelle M. Harner

Michelle M. Harner

Financial distress by definition threatens a company’s viability. Entrepreneurial and start-up entities are particularly vulnerable to this threat. Yet, much of the discussion following the recent recession focuses almost exclusively on financial institutions and “too-big-to-fail” entities. This essay re-examines lessons gleaned from the recession in the context of smaller, entrepreneurial entities. Specifically, it analyzes how small business entrepreneurs might invoke principles of enterprise risk management to mitigate the long-term impact of financial distress on their business models. It also considers related refinements to extant small business regulations, including the U.S. bankruptcy laws. The essay’s primary objective is to help policymakers, …

Making Sense Of The New Financial Deal, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, I assess the enactment and implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress’s response to the 2008 financial crisis. To set the stage, I begin by very briefly reviewing the causes of the crisis. I then argue that the legislation has two very clear objectives. The first is to limit the risk of the shadow banking system by more carefully regulating the key instruments and institutions of contemporary finance. The second objective is to limit the damage in the event one of these giant institutions fails. While the new regulation of the instruments of contemporary finance—including clearing and exchange …

The Shifting Terrain Of Risk And Uncertainty On The Liability Insurance Field, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent sociological and historical work suggests that insurance risks often are not reliably calculable, except in hindsight. Insurance is “an uncertain business,” characterized by competition for premiums that pushes insurers into the unknown. This essay takes some preliminary steps that extend this insight into the liability insurance field. The essay first provides a simple quantitative comparison of U.S. property and liability insurance premiums over the last sixty years, setting the stage to make three points: (1) liability insurance premiums have grown at a similar rate as property insurance premiums and GDP over this period, providing yet another piece of evidence …

Mitigating Financial Risk For Small Business Entrepreneurs, Michelle M. Harner

Faculty Scholarship

Financial distress by definition threatens a company’s viability. Entrepreneurial and start-up entities are particularly vulnerable to this threat. Yet, much of the discussion following the recent recession focuses almost exclusively on financial institutions and “too-big-to-fail” entities. This essay re-examines lessons gleaned from the recession in the context of smaller, entrepreneurial entities. Specifically, it analyzes how small business entrepreneurs might invoke principles of enterprise risk management to mitigate the long-term impact of financial distress on their business models. It also considers related refinements to extant small business regulations, including the U.S. bankruptcy laws. The essay’s primary objective is to help policymakers, …

Under Attack: Terrorism Risk Insurance Regulation, Alexia Brunet Marks

Publications

Scholarly debates over the September 11th attacks focus predominantly on high-profile issues, such as torture, preventive detention, interrogation, privacy, and surveillance. These debates have overshadowed the equally important and far-reaching issue of terrorism risk insurance, which not only involves billions of dollars, but provides powerful incentives to keep us safe. Developing a sound understanding of the market for terrorism risk insurance is essential to guiding the difficult determination of the appropriate balance between private and public responsibility for preventing and (when necessary) compensating for terrorism.

The attacks of September 11th represented one of the costliest insurance events in American history. …