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Brief Of Amici Curieae 56 Professors Of Law And Economics In Support Of Petition Of Writ Of Certiorari, John R. Allison, Margo Bagley, James Bessen, Jeremy Bock, Daniel H. Brean, Michael A. Carrier, Michael W. Carroll, Bernard Chao, Tun-Jen Chiang, Colleen V. Chien, Andrew Chin, Robert Cook-Deegan, Md, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Dr. Dieter Ernst, Samuel F. Ernst, Robin C. Feldman, Lee Fleming, Brian Frye, William Gallagher, Shubha Ghosh, Eric Goldman, Bronwyn H. Hall, Yaniv Heled, Christian Helmers, Joachim Henkel, Susan Helper, Tim Holbrook, Herbert Hovenkamp, William Hubbard, Dr. Xavier Jaravel, Dennis S. Karjala, Peter Lee, Mark A. Lemley, David K. Levine, David S. Levine, Doug Lichtman, Yvette Joy Liebesman, Orly Lobel, Brian Love, Phil Malone, Michael J. Meurer, Dr. Shawn Miller, Matthew Mitchell, Susan Barbieri Montgomery, Sean Pager, Arti K. Rai, Jacob H. Rooksby, Jorge R. Roig, Matthew Sag, Pamela Samuelson, Ana Santos Rutschman, Lea Bishop Shaver, Toshiko Takenaka, John L. Turner, Jennifer Urban, Eric Von Hippel

Andrew Chin

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that a defendant in a patent case may be sued where the defendant is incorporated or has a regular and established place of business and has infringed the patent. This Court made clear in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 (1957), that those were the only permissible venues for a patent case. But the Federal Circuit has rejected Fourco and the plain meaning of § 1400(b), instead permitting a patent plaintiff to file suit against a defendant anywhere there is personal jurisdiction over that defendant. The result has been rampant …

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Brief Of Amici Curiae 56 Professors Of Law And Economics In Support Of Petition Of Writ Of Certiorari, John R. Allison, Margo Bagley, James Bessen, Jeremy Bock, Daniel H. Brean, Michael A. Carrier, Michael W. Carroll, Bernard Chao, Tun-Jen Chiang, Colleen V. Chien, Andrew Chin, Robert Cook-Deegan, Md, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Dr. Dieter Ernst, Samuel F. Ernst, Robin C. Feldman, Lee Fleming, Brian Frye, William Gallagher, Shubha Ghosh, Eric Goldman, Bronwyn H. Hall, Yaniv Heled, Christian Helmers, Joachim Henkel, Susan Helper, Tim Holbrook, Herbert Hovenkamp, William Hubbard, Dr. Xavier Jaravel, Dennis S. Karjala, Peter Lee, Mark A. Lemley, David K. Levine, David S. Levine, Doug Lichtman, Yvette Joy Liebesman, Orly Lobel, Brian Love, Phil Malone, Michael J. Meurer, Dr. Shawn Miller, Matthew Mitchell, Susan Barbieri Montgomery, Sean Pager, Arti K. Rai, Jacob H. Rooksby, Jorge R. Roig, Matthew Sag, Pamela Samuelson, Ana Santos Rutschman, Lea Bishop Shaver, Toshiko Takenaka, John L. Turner, Jennifer Urban, Eric Von Hippel

Michael W. Carroll

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that a defendant in a patent case may be sued where the defendant is incorporated or has a regular and established place of business and has infringed the patent. This Court made clear in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 (1957), that those were the only permissible venues for a patent case. But the Federal Circuit has rejected Fourco and the plain meaning of § 1400(b), instead permitting a patent plaintiff to file suit against a defendant anywhere there is personal jurisdiction over that defendant. The result has been rampant …

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An Event Study Of Patent Verdicts And Judicial Leakage, Bryan Engelhardt, Zachary Fernandes

Economics Department Working Papers

To check for the impartiality of the United States judicial system, we investigate whether judicial decisions are leaked prior to their public release. Utilizing an event study methodology, we test for leaked information by analyzing the effect of patent infringement verdicts on the stock prices of the firms involved before and after the public release of the verdict. We find evidence that at least some of the decisions are leaked prior to their public release.

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Brief Of Amici Curiae 56 Professors Of Law And Economics In Support Of Petition Of Writ Of Certiorari, John R. Allison, Margo Bagley, James Bessen, Jeremy Bock, Daniel H. Brean, Michael A. Carrier, Michael W. Carroll, Bernard Chao, Tun-Jen Chiang, Colleen V. Chien, Andrew Chin, Robert Cook-Deegan, Md, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Dr. Dieter Ernst, Samuel F. Ernst, Robin C. Feldman, Lee Fleming, Brian Frye, William Gallagher, Shubha Ghosh, Eric Goldman, Bronwyn H. Hall, Yaniv Heled, Christian Helmers, Joachim Henkel, Susan Helper, Tim Holbrook, Herbert Hovenkamp, William Hubbard, Dr. Xavier Jaravel, Dennis S. Karjala, Peter Lee, Mark A. Lemley, David K. Levine, David S. Levine, Doug Lichtman, Yvette Joy Liebesman, Orly Lobel, Brian Love, Phil Malone, Michael J. Meurer, Dr. Shawn Miller, Matthew Mitchell, Susan Barbieri Montgomery, Sean Pager, Arti K. Rai, Jacob H. Rooksby, Jorge R. Roig, Matthew Sag, Pamela Samuelson, Ana Santos Rutschman, Lea Bishop Shaver, Toshiko Takenaka, John L. Turner, Jennifer Urban, Eric Von Hippel

Faculty Scholarship

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that a defendant in a patent case may be sued where the defendant is incorporated or has a regular and established place of business and has infringed the patent. This Court made clear in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 223 (1957), that those were the only permissible venues for a patent case. But the Federal Circuit has rejected Fourco and the plain meaning of § 1400(b), instead permitting a patent plaintiff to file suit against a defendant anywhere there is personal jurisdiction over that defendant. The result has been rampant …

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A Unified Framework For Competition Policy And Innovation Policy, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

I describe a model of competition law enforcement that treats competition and innovation policy as the inseparable partners they ought to be. The enforcement authority determines an optimal punishment knowing that if it sets the penalty too high it will reduce firms’ incentives to invest in innovation, and if firms do not invest, new goods and new markets will not be created. The authority therefore moderates the penalty in order to maintain innovation incentives. The implications of this framework for competition policy and for innovation policy are quite different from what is commonly observed today. I discuss implications for competition …

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Actavis, The Reverse Payment Fallacy, And The Continuing Need For Regulatory Solutions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The Actavis decision punted more than it decided. Although narrowing the range of possible outcomes by rejecting the legal rules at the extremes and opting for a rule of reason middle ground, the opinion failed to grapple with the most challenging issues of regulatory policy raised by pharmaceutical patent settlements. In particular, it failed to clearly delineate the social costs of permitting and disallowing patent settlements, avoided grappling with the crucial issues of patent validity and infringement, and erroneously focused on “reverse payments” as a distinctive antitrust problem when equally or more anticompetitive settlements can be crafted without reverse payments. …

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Injunctive And Reverse Settlements In Competition-Blocking Litigation, Keith N. Hylton, Sungjoon Cho

Faculty Scholarship

We distinguish standard settlements, in which the status quo is preserved, and injunctive settlements, which prohibit the defendant's activity. The reverse (payment) settlement is a special type of injunctive settlement. We examine the divergence between private and social incentives to settle and policies that would minimize socially undesirable injunctive and reverse settlements (e.g., banning reverse settlements). The results are applied to competition-blocking litigation, such as patent infringement and antidumping.

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The Private Costs Of Patent Litigation, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

This paper estimates the total cost of patent litigation to alleged infringers. We use a large sample of stock market event studies around the date of lawsuit filings for US public firms from 1984-99. We find that the total costs of litigation are much greater than legal fees and costs are large even for lawsuits that settle. Lawsuits cost alleged infringers about $28.7 million ($92) in the mean and $2.9 million in the median. Moreover, infringement risk rose sharply during the late 1990s to over 14% of R&D spending. Small firms have lower risk relative to R&D.

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Analyze This: A Law And Economics Agenda For The Patent System, Rebecca S. Eisenberg

Articles

Legal scholars and economists might enhance the value and impact of their work by making more effective use of each other's knowledge and capabilities. Legal scholars can offer a more nuanced understanding of the legal rules that underlie the patent system and the doctrinal levers that might be manipulated in furtherance of public policy goals. Economists bring to bear a set of analytical and methodological tools that could shed considerable light on what these doctrinal levers are doing and which of them we ought to be manipulating. Together, we have a better chance of asking the right questions and thinking …

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Andrew Chin

Michael W. Carroll

An Event Study Of Patent Verdicts And Judicial Leakage, Bryan Engelhardt, Zachary Fernandes

Economics Department Working Papers

Faculty Scholarship

A Unified Framework For Competition Policy And Innovation Policy, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Actavis, The Reverse Payment Fallacy, And The Continuing Need For Regulatory Solutions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Injunctive And Reverse Settlements In Competition-Blocking Litigation, Keith N. Hylton, Sungjoon Cho

Faculty Scholarship

The Private Costs Of Patent Litigation, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

Analyze This: A Law And Economics Agenda For The Patent System, Rebecca S. Eisenberg

Articles