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Full-Text Articles in Law
Trends In Private Patent Costs And Rents For Publicly-Traded United States Firms, James Bessen, Peter Neuhausler, John L. Turner, Jonathan Williams
Trends In Private Patent Costs And Rents For Publicly-Traded United States Firms, James Bessen, Peter Neuhausler, John L. Turner, Jonathan Williams
Faculty Scholarship
We use detailed data to estimate the private costs and private rents of United States patents for publicly-traded firms. In analyzing costs, we first introduce a novel theoretical model to interpret our estimates. We then combine lawsuit data from Derwent Litalert with non-practicing entity (NPE) lawsuits collected by Patent Freedom, and use an event-study approach to estimate losses suffered by alleged infringers during 1984-2009. To estimate rents, we combine patent data from the USPTO and EPO with financial data from COMPUSTAT, and use market-value regressions to estimate the value of patent rents for publicly-traded US firms during 1979-2002. We find …
Deterrence And Aggregate Litigation, Keith N. Hylton
Deterrence And Aggregate Litigation, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and class actions, with an emphasis on positive value claims. In the multiple victim scenario with positive value claims, the probability that an individual victim will bring suit falls toward zero with geometric decay as the number of victims increases. The reason is that the incentive to free ride increases with the number of victims. Deterrence does not collapse but is degraded. Undercompliance is observed, which worsens as the number of victims increases. Compliance is never socially optimal, and the shortfall from optimality increases with the number of victims. These results, …
The Direct Costs From Npe Disputes, Michael J. Meurer, James Bessen
The Direct Costs From Npe Disputes, Michael J. Meurer, James Bessen
Faculty Scholarship
In the past, “non-practicing entities” (NPEs), popularly known as “patent trolls,” have helped small inventors profit from their inventions. Is this true today or, given the unprecedented levels of NPE litigation, do NPEs reduce innovation incentives? Using a survey of defendants and a database of litigation, this paper estimates the direct costs to defendants arising from NPE patent assertions. We estimate that firms accrued $29 billion of direct costs in 2011. Although large firms accrued over half of direct costs, most of the defendants were small or medium-sized firms. Moreover, an examination of publicly listed NPEs indicates that little of …
How Much Is That Lawsuit In The Window; Pricing Legal Claims, Maya Steinitz
How Much Is That Lawsuit In The Window; Pricing Legal Claims, Maya Steinitz
Faculty Scholarship
This article poses the question: How should parties to litigation finance agreements – third party funding or contingency fees – deal with the inherent difficulty in pricing legal claims? It answers that a practical solution would be to use staged funding. Staged funding side-step the impossibility of accurately pricing litigation ex ante by allowing re-pricing and exit that are pegged to information disclosure. Done right, staging allows all parties to minimize the effects of uncertainty, better price their bargain, optimize the distribution of the proceeds of litigation between its different investors – far beyond practices common today. Staged funding also …
The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer
The Patent Litigation Explosion, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
This Article provides the first look at patent litigation hazards for public firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Litigation is more likely when prospective plaintiffs acquire more patents, when firms are larger and technologically close and when prospective defendants spend more on research and development ("R&D"). The latter suggests inadvertent infringement may be more important than piracy. Public firms face dramatically increased hazards of litigation as plaintiffs and even more rapidly increasing hazards as defendants, especially for small public firms. The increase cannot be explained by patenting rates, R&D, firm value or industry composition. Legal changes are the most likely …
The Private Costs Of Patent Litigation, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer
The Private Costs Of Patent Litigation, James Bessen, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
This paper estimates the total cost of patent litigation to alleged infringers. We use a large sample of stock market event studies around the date of lawsuit filings for US public firms from 1984-99. We find that the total costs of litigation are much greater than legal fees and costs are large even for lawsuits that settle. Lawsuits cost alleged infringers about $28.7 million ($92) in the mean and $2.9 million in the median. Moreover, infringement risk rose sharply during the late 1990s to over 14% of R&D spending. Small firms have lower risk relative to R&D.
The Economics Of Litigation And Arbitration: An Application To Franchise Contracts, Keith N. Hylton, Christopher R. Drahozal
The Economics Of Litigation And Arbitration: An Application To Franchise Contracts, Keith N. Hylton, Christopher R. Drahozal
Faculty Scholarship
If we define the deterrence benefits from contract enforcement as avoided harms net of avoidance costs, we should expect contracting parties to choose the dispute resolution forum that provides the greatest difference between deterrence benefits and dispute resolution costs for every type of dispute. We apply this general framework to franchise contracts and conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of arbitration agreements among franchising parties. Although it is obvious that contracting parties have an incentive to choose arbitration in order to reduce dispute-resolution costs, there have been no studies of the importance of deterrence concerns. We examine the deterrence …
The Gains From Faith In An Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts Between Defendants And Liability Insurers, Michael J. Meurer
The Gains From Faith In An Unfaithful Agent: Settlement Conflicts Between Defendants And Liability Insurers, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
A pervasive problem in the settlement of liability litigation arises because liability insurers bundle their promise to indemnify the insured with a promise to represent the insured in settlement and litigation [see, e.g., Beckwith Machinery Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 638 F.Supp. 1179 (W.D. Pa. 1986)]. Standard policies not only require the insurer to pay for legal representation but, more importantly, give the insurer the privilege of controlling the litigation and settlement process. The problem is how to resolve the conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured that may arise during settlement negotiations. This conflict is manifest when …
Litigation Costs And The Economic Theory Of Tort Law, Keith N. Hylton
Litigation Costs And The Economic Theory Of Tort Law, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
The economic theory of tort law has developed along two lines. The first and more traditional is positive theory, which justifies tort doctrine. The second is normative theory, which usually criticizes the operational efficiency of the tort system, and is the focus of this Article. This Article argues that once the dynamics of litigation are properly taken into account, all bets are off on the economic efficiency of tort law. The simple fact that litigation is a costly enterprise provides a rich source of inefficiencies with which the tort system must grapple.
Foreword: The Economics Of Contract Law, Michael J. Meurer
Foreword: The Economics Of Contract Law, Michael J. Meurer
Faculty Scholarship
The articles in this issue are samples from the burgeoning economics of contract law. They demonstrate that lawyers a can bring economic models to bear on quite specific issues of co offer normative guidance regarding the structure of efficient The success of the symposium and the quality of the articles of this field will continue to flourish. The articles cover a fairly narrow range of contract law issues. The second through sixth articles all address topics involving remedies. Two of these loo at the optimal remedies to be provided by contract law, and the other three are concerned with remedies …