Law Commons^™

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Structural Integrity And A Call For Adaptive And Incremental Agency Design Policy, Hannah Clendening

Indiana Law Journal

INTRODUCTION

I. UNDERSTANDING AND RATIONALIZING COMPETING DESIGN OBJECTIVES

A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND THE CFPB’S FORMATION

B. D.C. CIRCUIT’S REASONING IN PHH CORP. V. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU

C. BASIC TENETS OF LEADING ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN THEORIES

D. ANOTHER LOOMING CONSIDERATION: AGENCY CAPTURE

II. A NEED FOR ADAPTIVE AND INCREMENTAL APPROACHES TO AGENCY DESIGN

CONCLUSION

Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0? Digital Service Providers, Nizan Geslevich Packin

Indiana Law Journal

The Article explains why addressing Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0 has not yet become a political and societal priority. First, digital service providers are technology companies, which, many believe, are shaped by market forces such that they fail and succeed in equal measure without producing negative ripple effects on the economy or society. Second, technology giants are not as carefully regulated as banks becauseunlike banks, they do not take insured deposits backed by the government. Third, even heavily regulated financial institutions have not been required until recently to focus on cybersecurity. Finally, some believe that there is no point in worrying about Too-Big-To-Fail …

Is Say On Pay All About Pay? The Impact Of Firm Performance, Jill E. Fisch, Darius Palia, Steven Davidoff Solomon

Steven M. Davidoff Solomon

The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 mandated a number of regulatory reforms including a requirement that large U.S. public companies provide their shareholders with the opportunity to cast a non-binding vote on executive compensation. The “say on pay” vote was designed to rein in excessive levels of executive compensation and to encourage boards to adopt compensation structures that tie executive pay more closely to performance. Although the literature is mixed, many studies question whether the statute has had the desired effect. Shareholders at most companies overwhelmingly approve the compensation packages, and pay levels continue to be high. Although a lack of …

Separations Of Wealth: Inequality And The Erosion Of Checks And Balances, Kate Andrias

Articles

American government is dysfunctional: Gridlock, filibusters, and expanding presidential power, everyone seems to agree, threaten our basic system of constitutional governance. Who, or what, is to blame? In the standard account, the fault lies with the increasing polarization of our political parties. That standard story, however, ignores an important culprit: Concentrated wealth and its organization to achieve political ends. The only way to understand our current constitutional predicament—and to rectify it—is to pay more attention to the role that organized wealth plays in our system of checks and balances. This Article shows that the increasing concentration of wealth and political …

The Global Architecture Of Financial Regulatory Taxes, Carlo Garbarino, Giulio Allevato

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Article endeavors to broaden the analysis of available policy tools to address the problems created by financial crises and discusses how, in addition to direct regulation, certain tax measures having a regulatory nature may operate to address the so-called “negative externalities” often associated with those crises. There is a negative externality when an economic agent making a decision does not pay the full cost of the decision’s consequences. In such cases, the cost to society as a whole is greater than the cost borne by the individuals creating the economic impact. In practice, negative externalities result in market inefficiencies …

The New Synthesis Of Bank Regulation And Bankruptcy In The Dodd-Frank Era, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

Since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, U.S. bank regulation and bankruptcy have become far more closely intertwined. In this Article, I ask whether the new synthesis of bank regulation and bankruptcy is coherent, and whether it is likely to prove effective.

I begin by exploring some of the basic differences between bank resolution, which is a highly administrative process in the U.S., and bankruptcy, which relies more on courts and the parties themselves. I then focus on a series of remarkable new innovations designed to facilitate the rapid recapitalization of systemically important financial institutions: convertible contingent capital …

A Return To Old-Time Religion? The Glass-Steagall Act, The Volcker Rule, Limits On Proprietary Trading, And Sustainability, Douglas M. Branson

Articles

Pursuant to directions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), five federal agencies collaborated to produce a 983 page rule limiting proprietary trading by financial institutions (the Volcker Rule, which becomes effective in summer, 2015). The Volcker Rule limits proprietary trading to no more than 3 percent of “Tier One” assets. The hoped for effects are that financial institutions will be strictly limited in trading for their own accounts. Some say, propelled by unbridled greed, U.S. financial institutions borrowed excessive amounts of money, inflating leverage ratios as high as 36 or 40 to 1, using the borrowed funds to engage in …

Behaviorism In Finance And Securities Law, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, I take stock (as something of an outsider) of the behavioral economics movement, focusing in particular on its interaction with traditional cost-benefit analysis and its implications for agency structure. The usual strategy for such a project—a strategy that has been used by others with behavioral economics—is to marshal the existing evidence and critically assess its significance. My approach in this Essay is somewhat different. Although I describe behavioral economics and summarize the strongest criticisms of its use, the heart of the Essay is inductive, and focuses on a particular context: financial and securities regulation, as recently revamped …

Gambling On Our Financial Future: How The Federal Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is A Safer Bet To Prevent Another Financial Collapse, Brian M. Mccall

Brian M McCall

Dodd-Frank Act And Remittances To Post-Conflict Countries: The Law Of Unintended Consequences Strikes Again, Raymond Natter

Raymond Natter

The Dodd-Frank Act established a new Federal framework for the regulation of international remittance payments that originate in the U.S. However, the statute and implementing regulations may have the unintended consequence of disrupting the flow of remittance funds to post-conflict nations.

What Should We Expect From The Dodd-Frank Bounty Program?, Diego G. Pardow

Diego G. Pardow

Among other changes, the Dodd–Frank bounty program substantially increases the size of the rewards. The supporters argue that the program should encourage more players to step in, whereas the critics claim that it would only increase less reliable whistleblowers. This note describes the economic reasoning behind the dispute, attempting to build a reasonable expectation in light of the available empirical data. Although most of the evidence from previous bounty programs sides with the supporter’s theory, it has to be considered that the quantity and quality of whistleblower reporting are not the only relevant factors. Whistleblowers play a key role diversifying …

Running In The Shadows, Joshua A. Craven

joshua a craven

The financial crisis of 2007-2008 can be characterized as a run on the shadow banking system. Over several decades, the United States slowly and quietly developed a massive shadow banking system—a complex chain of borrowers and investors entering into repo agreements financed by money-market mutual funds and primary dealers, collateralized with asset-backed securities derived from mortgages originated by lenders and securitized through special purpose vehicles, then purchased by banks with capital raised by entering into repo agreements. For years, this chain of transactions operated to meet banks’ short-term liquidity needs, until uncertainty in the value of the asset-backed securities used …

American Finance And American Democracy: Towards An Institutionalist "Law And Economics", Tamara Lothian

Tamara Lothian

This article reconsiders the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 and the present debate about the regulation of finance in the light of a vision of how finance can better serve the American economy and American Democracy. The central claim is that regulation as conventionally understood cannot adequately redress the problems, and seize the opportunities, revealed by the crisis. We should approach financial regulation as the first step in a series of institutional innovations designed to put finance more effectively at the service of the real economy (financial deepening) while broadening economic opportunity in the country (financial democratization). I develop …

The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And Systemic Risk Perpetuated, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

A good crisis should never go to waste. In the world of financial regulation, experience has shown – since at least the time of the South Sea Bubble three hundred years ago – that only after a catastrophic market collapse can legislators and regulators overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive "re-form" legislation. U.S. financial history both confirms and conforms to this generalization. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were the product of the 1929 stock-market crash and the Great Depression, with their enactment following the inauguration of President Franklin Roosevelt …

Review Of Seeds Of Destruction: Why The Path To Economic Ruin Runs Through Washington, And How To Reclaim American Prosperity, Michael S. Barr

Reviews

The United States has just gone through the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Our financial system came to brink of collapse, saved only by a massive intervention by the federal government. Although officially the Great Recession is now over, high unemployment and slow growth persist. Deficits that were ballooning in the 2000s with the weight of tax cuts, increased health care expenditures, and defense spending related to Iraq and Afghanistan, even before the financial crisis, have continued to climb, as lower tax receipts, automatic stabilizers, and fiscal stimulus kicked into gear.

Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital To Mitigate Systemic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Because the quickest, simplest way for a financial institution to increase its profitability is to increase its leverage, an enduring tension will exist between regulators and systemically significant financial institutions over the issues of risk and leverage. Many have suggested that the 2008 financial crisis was caused because financial institutions were induced to increase leverage because of flawed systems of executive compensation. Still, there is growing evidence that shareholders acquiesced in these compensation formulas to cause managers to accept higher risk and leverage. Shareholder pressure then is a factor that could induce the failure of a systemically significant financial institution. …