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Full-Text Articles in Law
Leegin, The Rule Of Reason, And Vertical Agreement, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Leegin, The Rule Of Reason, And Vertical Agreement, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court’s Leegin decision overturned the longstanding rule of per se illegality for resale price maintenance and applied a rule of reason. One might think that the question whether a vertical “agreement” exists between a manufacturer and a dealer should not be affected by the mode of analysis to be applied after an agreement is found. First one asks whether an agreement exists, and determines whether the per se rule or rule of reason applies only after receiving an affirmative answer. Nevertheless, ever since Colgate the Supreme Court has generally taken a more restrictive approach on the agreement issue …
Resale Price Maintenance: Consignment Agreements, Copyrighted Or Patented Products And The First Sale Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Resale Price Maintenance: Consignment Agreements, Copyrighted Or Patented Products And The First Sale Doctrine, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The rule of reason adopted for resale price maintenance in the Supreme Court’s Leegin decision, which upset the century old Dr. Miles rule of per se illegality, requires some reconsideration of a number of issues about antitrust treatment of RPM. Under the old per se rule, bona fide “consignment” agreements were not covered by Section 1 of the Sherman Act at all because there was said to be no qualifying “agreement” between the supplier and the dealer. Rather the dealer was simply said to be acting as an agent of the seller. However, insofar as RPM produces competitive dangers, such …
Vertical Restraints, Dealers With Power, And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Vertical Restraints, Dealers With Power, And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court’s Leegin decision has now brought the rule of reason to all purely vertical intrabrand distribution restraints. But the rule of reason does not mean per se legality and occasions for anticompetitive vertically imposed restraints may still arise. Of all those that have been suggested the most plausible are vertical restraints imposed at the behest of a powerful dealer or group (cartel) of dealers.
Although a vertical distribution restraint resembles a dealer cartel in that both limit intraband competition, a manufacturer restraining the distribution of its product shuns the excess dealer profits a dealer cartel would seek. Accordingly, …
American Needle And The Boundaries Of The Firm In Antitrust Law, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
American Needle And The Boundaries Of The Firm In Antitrust Law, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In American Needle the Supreme Court unanimously held that for the practice at issue the NFL should be treated as a “combination” of its teams rather than a single entity. However, the arrangement must be assessed under the rule of reason. The opinion, written by Justice Stevens, was almost certainly his last opinion for the Court in an antitrust case; Justice Stevens had been a dissenter in the Supreme Court’s Copperweld decision 25 years earlier, which held that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary constituted a single “firm” for antitrust purposes. The Sherman Act speaks to this issue …
From Energy Sector Inquiry To Recent Antitrust Decisions In European Energy Markets: Competition Law As A Means To Implement Energy Sector Regulation In Eu, Michael Diathesopoulos
From Energy Sector Inquiry To Recent Antitrust Decisions In European Energy Markets: Competition Law As A Means To Implement Energy Sector Regulation In Eu, Michael Diathesopoulos
Michael Diathesopoulos
This paper presents the conceptual path followed by European Union, European Commission and European Competition Network, after the Energy Sector Inquiry (2007) towards the realisation of the objective of an Energy Internal Market, fully functional and open to competition. Firstly, we examine the findings of Sector Inquiry and then we describe how the Third Energy Package - that followed - tried to address the issues highlighted by the Inquiry and how Third Energy Package introduces a promising but complex system, in order to develop sector rules. Following the above, we proceed to a brief but close examination of 10 recent …
Antitrust, Institutions, And Merger Control, D. Daniel Sokol
Antitrust, Institutions, And Merger Control, D. Daniel Sokol
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article makes two primary contributions to the antitrust literature. First, it identifies the dynamic interrelationship across antitrust institutions. Second, it provides new empirical evidence from practitioner surveys to explore how the dynamic institutional interrelationship plays out in the area of merger control. This Article provides a descriptive, analytical overview of the various institutions to better frame the larger institutional interrelations for a comparative institutional analysis. In the next Part it examines mergers as a case study of how one might apply antitrust institutional analysis across these different kinds and levels of antitrust institutions. The Article utilizes both quantitative and …
American Needle: The Sherman Act, Conspiracy, And Exclusion, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
American Needle: The Sherman Act, Conspiracy, And Exclusion, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This essay, part of a colloquium in the CPI Antitrust Journal, explores the meaning and significance of the Supreme Court’s decision in American Needle v. NFL. The Supreme Court held that for purposes of the dispute at hand the NFL should be treated as a collaboration of its member teams rather than a single entity. The factors that the Supreme Court considered most important were, first, that the NFL’s member teams are individually owned profit making entities who compete with each other in at least some economic markets, such as that for the sale of apparel bearing NFL symbols. …
Public Choice Y Derecho De La Competencia: A Propósito Del Caso Clorox Y Los Acuerdos Colusorios Verticales, Óscar Súmar
Public Choice Y Derecho De La Competencia: A Propósito Del Caso Clorox Y Los Acuerdos Colusorios Verticales, Óscar Súmar
Oscar Súmar
No abstract provided.
The Ftc's Anticompetitive Pricing Case Against Intel, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Ftc's Anticompetitive Pricing Case Against Intel, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The FTC’s wide ranging complaint against Intel Corporation indicates that the FTC intends to rely on the “unfair methods of competition” language in §5 of the FTC Act to reach beyond the proscriptions on unilateral conduct contained in §2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has expressly authorized such expansion, and statutory text, legislative history and legal policy all support it. While §2 reaches only conduct that threatens to “monopolize” a market, the “unfair methods of competition” language can reach improper abuses of a dominant position that fall short of creating monopoly. Further, the FTC has expertise that courts …
Intra-Enterprise Activity, Joint Ventures And Sports Leagues: Identifying Unilateral Conduct Under The Antitrust Laws, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Intra-Enterprise Activity, Joint Ventures And Sports Leagues: Identifying Unilateral Conduct Under The Antitrust Laws, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In the American Needle case the Supreme Court will consider whether the NFL’s decision to give an exclusive trademark license to one firm should be counted as “unilateral” on the NFL’s part, or rather as the concerted joint venture activity of the NFL’s individual member teams. The intellectual property in question is not trademarks in the NFL itself, but rather the trademarks and other intellectual property developed separately by each individual team, and which the teams in turn have licensed exclusively to the NFL.
In general, when a joint venture is engaged in its own business the unilateral characterization is …
The Insurance Industry's Antitrust Immunity, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Insurance Industry's Antitrust Immunity, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that federal legislation generally, including the antitrust laws, is “applicable to the business of insurance [only] to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.” The statute was enacted after United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Assn. (1944), held that insurance transactions were “interstate commerce” and thus subject to the antitrust laws. That case had in turn undermined the traditional view expressed in Paul v. Virginia (1868), that insurance was not interstate commerce, but strictly local transactions. The South Eastern case followed in turn upon the Supreme Court's decision in Wickard v. …
An Economic Assessment Of Patent Settlements In The Pharmaceutical Industry, Bret Dickey, Jonathan Orszag, Laura Tyson
An Economic Assessment Of Patent Settlements In The Pharmaceutical Industry, Bret Dickey, Jonathan Orszag, Laura Tyson
Bret Dickey
In recent years, patent settlements between branded and generic manufacturers involving “reverse payments” from branded manufacturers to generic manufacturers have received close antitrust scrutiny, driven by concerns that such settlements harm consumers by delaying the entry of lower-priced generic drugs. It appears that such settlements will be a focus of the Obama Administration’s antitrust enforcement policy. Yet there is a growing consensus among the courts that such settlements are anticompetitive only under narrow sets of circumstances. In this paper, we present an analytical framework for evaluating the competitive effects of patent settlements, including those involving reverse payments, and demonstrate that …
Striking An Efficient Balance: Making Sense Of Antitrust Standing In Class Action Certification Motions, Kelly J. Bozanic
Striking An Efficient Balance: Making Sense Of Antitrust Standing In Class Action Certification Motions, Kelly J. Bozanic
Kelly J. Bozanic
Class actions are powerful litigation devices, especially in antitrust cases. Plaintiffs who otherwise would not have the economic incentive to pursue judicial redress are vested with status as equal players in the commercial marketplace. The aims of both the antitrust laws and Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are served through class actions, yet class actions also bear the potential of negatively impacting the consuming public. This is so, because district court judges considering certification motions face seemingly contradictory standards when it comes to certifying an antitrust class. As a result, plaintiff classes are often given an …
The Reasonable Certainty Requirement In Lost Profits Litigation: What It Really Means, Robert M. Lloyd
The Reasonable Certainty Requirement In Lost Profits Litigation: What It Really Means, Robert M. Lloyd
Robert M Lloyd
This article explains the factors courts consider when determining whether to award damages for lost profits. It contains an extensive review of the case law.
Preserving A Political Bargain: The Political Economy Of The Non-Interventionist Challenge To Monopolization Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Preserving A Political Bargain: The Political Economy Of The Non-Interventionist Challenge To Monopolization Enforcement, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
The antitrust rules governing exclusionary conduct by dominant firms are among the most controversial in U.S. competition policy. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, they were debated in three arenas, involving legal policy, economic policy, and politics. In each arena, the dispute mainly arose as criticism of traditional standards by advocates of less intervention. Viewed through a political economy lens, the controversy can be understood as a potential challenge to an informal political bargain reached during the 1940s by which competition was adopted as national economic policy in preference to regulation or laissez-faire. From this perspective, and applying …
International Disparities Panel, Sean Flynn
International Disparities Panel, Sean Flynn
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
Tying Arrangements And Antitrust Harm, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Tying Arrangements And Antitrust Harm, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
A tying arrangement is a seller’s requirement that a customer may purchase its “tying” product only by taking its “tied” product. In a variable proportion tie the purchaser can vary the amount of the tied product. For example, a customer might purchase a single printer, but either a contract or technological design requires the purchase of varying numbers of printer cartridges from the same manufacturer.
Such arrangements are widely considered to be price discrimination devices, but their economic effects have been controversial. Tying has been attacked on the theory that price discrimination of this sort reduces consumer welfare. We show …
Harvard, Chicago And Transaction Cost Economics In Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Harvard, Chicago And Transaction Cost Economics In Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Since Oliver Williamson published Markets and Hierarchies in 1975 transaction cost economics (TCE) has claimed an important place in antitrust, avoiding the extreme positions of the two once reigning schools of antitrust policy. At one extreme was the “structural” school, which saw market structure as the principal determinant of poor economic performance. At the other extreme was the Chicago School, which also saw the economic landscape in terms of competition and monopoly, but found monopoly only infrequently and denied that a monopolist could “leverage” its power into related markets. Since the 1970s both the structural and Chicago positions have moved …
The Federal Trade Commission And The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Federal Trade Commission And The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The FTC has explicit antitrust authority to enforce the Clayton Act, although not the Sherman Act. More than a half century ago, however, the Supreme Court held that the FTC Act’s prohibition of “unfair methods of competition” reaches everything the Sherman Act reaches and also a “penumbra” of practices that are not technical Sherman Act violations. That view, which had fallen into disuse in recent decades, is now being revived.
This essay defends a limited version of that “penumbra” view and suggests several applications. First, while both Sherman Act provisions are open ended in their coverage, they have limitations. Section …
The Obama Administration And Section Two Of The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Obama Administration And Section Two Of The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
During the administration of President George W. Bush, the Antitrust Division was not enthusiastic about use of §2 of the Sherman Act to pursue anticompetitive single-firm conduct. Indeed, its most prominent contribution on the issue was the Antitrust Division’s §2 Report, which the Obama Antitrust Division withdrew only eight months after it was issued.This withdrawal was entirely in keeping with candidate Obama’s repeated promises to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement.
This essay analyzes the current state of antitrust and makes recommendations concerning structures and practices where increased §2 enforcement is warranted and those where it is not. Wise use of enforcement dollars …
Ip And Antitrust: Reformation And Harm, Christina Bohannan, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Ip And Antitrust: Reformation And Harm, Christina Bohannan, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust and intellectual property law both seek to improve economic welfare by facilitating competition and investment in innovation. At various times both antitrust and IP law have wandered off this course and have become more driven by special interests. Today, antitrust and IP are on very different roads to reform. Antitrust reform began in the late 1970s with a series of Supreme Court decisions that linked the plaintiff’s harm and right to obtain a remedy to the competition - furthering goals of antitrust policy. Today, patent law has begun its own reform journey, but it is in a much earlier …
The Law And Economics Of Monopolization Standards, Keith N. Hylton
The Law And Economics Of Monopolization Standards, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
Monopolization, the restriction of competition by a dominant firm, is regulated in roughly half of the world’s nations. The two most famous laws regulating monopolization are Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in the United States, and Article 82 of the European Community Treaty. Both laws have been understood as prohibiting ‘abuses’ of monopoly power.