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The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Sep 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Sep 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Jul 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Jul 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects In Product-Differentiated Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2009

Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects In Product-Differentiated Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay offers a brief, non-technical exposition of the antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers in product differentiated markets where the resulting price increase is thought to be unilateral - that is, only the post-merger firm increases its prices while other firms in the market do not. More realistically, non-merging firms who are reasonably close in product space to the merging firm will also be able to increase their prices when the post-merger firm's prices rise. The unilateral effects theory is robust and has become quite conventional in merger analysis. There is certainly no reason for thinking that it involves any …


The Neal Report And The Crisis In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2009

The Neal Report And The Crisis In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The Neal Report, which was commissioned by Lyndon Johnson and published in 1967, is rightfully criticized for representing the past rather than the future of antitrust. Its authors completely embraced a theory of competition and industrial organization that had dominated American economic thinking for forty years, but was just in the process of coming to an end. The structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm that the Neal Report embodied had in fact been one of the most elegant and most tested theories of industrial organization. The theory represented the high point of structuralism in industrial organization economics, resting on the proposition that certain …


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Feb 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Feb 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Feb 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Feb 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


Mergers And Market Dominance, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Feb 2009

Mergers And Market Dominance, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Mergers involving dominant firms legitimately receive close scrutiny under the antitrust laws, even if they involve tiny firms. Further, they should be examined closely even in markets that generally exhibit low entry barriers. Many of the so-called "unilateral effects" cases in current merger law are in fact mergers that create dominant firms. The rhetoric of unilateral effects often serves to disguise this fact by presenting the situation as if it involves the ability of a small number of firms (typically two or three) in a much larger market to increase their price to unacceptable levels. In fact, if such a …


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Jan 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Jan 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Jan 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Jan 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …


Of Mice And Men: Why An Anticommons Has Not Emerged In The Biotechnological Realm, Chester J. Shiu Jan 2009

Of Mice And Men: Why An Anticommons Has Not Emerged In The Biotechnological Realm, Chester J. Shiu

Chester J Shiu

In 1998 Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg posited that excessive patenting of fundamental biomedical innovations might create a “tragedy of the anticommons.” A decade later, their dire predictions have not come to pass, an outcome which calls much of the legal scholarship on the topic into question. This Article proposes that legal commentators’ theoretical arguments have largely ignored two very important factors. First, the National Institutes of Health (NIH)—the single most important actor in the biomedical research industry—has played an active role in keeping the biomedical research domain open. In particular, regardless of what the current patent regime may theoretically …


The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2009

The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A price squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated firm "squeezes' a rival's margins between a high wholesale price for an essential input sold to the rival, and a low output price to consumers for whom the two firms compete. Price squeezes have been a recognized but controversial antitrust violation for two-thirds of a century. We examine the law and economics of the price squeeze, beginning with Judge Hand's famous discussion in the Alcoa case in 1945. While Alcoa has been widely portrayed as creating a "fairness" or "fair profit" test for unlawful price squeezes, Judge Hand actually adopted a cost-based …


United States Competition Policy In Crisis: 1890-1955, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2009

United States Competition Policy In Crisis: 1890-1955, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The development of marginalist, or neoclassical, economics led to a fifty-year long crisis in competition theory. Given an industrial structure with sufficient fixed costs, competition always became "ruinous," forcing firms to cut prices to marginal cost without sufficient revenue remaining to pay off investment. Early neoclassicists such as Alfred Marshall were not able to solve this problem, and as a result many economists were hostile toward the antitrust laws in the early decades of the twentieth century. The ruinous competition debate came to an abrupt end in the early 1930's, when Joan Robinson and particularly Edward Chamberlin developed models that …


Complex Bundled Discounts And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Erik Hovenkamp Jan 2009

Complex Bundled Discounts And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Erik Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A bundled discount occurs when a seller conditions a discount or rebate on the buyer's purchaser or two or more different products. Firms that produce fewer than all the good in the bundle find it difficult to compete because they must amortize the discount across a smaller range of goods. For example, if the dominant firm offers a 10% discount for purchase of both good A and good B, but the rival makes only good B, it will have to offer a discount that is large enough to match the dominant firm's B discount as well as the foregone discount …


Intellectual Liability, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2009

Intellectual Liability, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Intellectual property is increasingly a misnomer since the right to exclude is the defining characteristic of property and incentives to engage in inventive and creative activity are increasingly being granted in the form of liability rights (which allow the holder of the right to collect a royalty from users) rather than property rights (which allow the holder of the right to exclude others from using the invention or creation). Much of this recent reorientation in the direction of liability rules arises from a concern over holdout or monopoly power in intellectual property. The debate over whether liability rules or property …


Opportunism, Uncertainty, And Relational Contracting - Antitrust Rules In The Film Industry, Ryan M. Riegg Dec 2008

Opportunism, Uncertainty, And Relational Contracting - Antitrust Rules In The Film Industry, Ryan M. Riegg

Ryan M. Riegg

For a long time, economists and investors have been baffled as to why Studios continue to produce movies with "blockbuster"-sized budgets (i.e. movies with budgets over $100 million) when producing those movies expose Studios to considerable economic risk.
By explaining the unique economics of the Film industry, and the effect of the Paramount (antitrust) rules on Film distribution contracts, this article provides an explanation to the puzzle of the blockbuster that is confirmed by recent trends in Film industry. Additionally, by using the Film industry as a model, this article also demonstrates how relational contracting can be understood as a …