Law Commons^™

Stop The Games: How Broker-Dealer Gamification Affronts Antitrust, Tanner Dowdy

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Hospital Mergers: The Symptoms Of Anticompetitive Consolidation & A Routine Checkup On The Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Stefan Rao Kostas

University of Miami Business Law Review

In 2021, President Biden issued an executive order that addressed the negative implications of market concentration within the healthcare industry. Specifically, President Biden called for the revision of the Horizontal and Vertical Merger Guidelines to enact antitrust safeguards that limit unchecked hospital mergers and promote competition. This Article delves into the role of the healthcare sector in the U.S. economy and how the current state of hospital mergers limits competition and, thus, the quality of care available to patients. Further, this Article studies U.S. federal regulations, case law, and merger retrospectives to uncover pitfalls within the current Horizontal Merger Guidelines. …

Output Effect Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Sinchit Lai

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

A growing body of literature evaluates the impact of antitrust laws on economic growth. Most of these empirical studies identify a positive impact; however, the existing literature only studies the effect of the existence of antitrust laws, but not their enforcement. To fill this gap in the literature, this Article uses private antitrust case filing numbers to examine the growth effect. Employing U.S. data and, after addressing endogeneity, using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis, I identify a negative and robust association between private enforcement and output on a national level in the short run over the period from …

Table Of Contents

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents

Freedom Without Opportunity: Using Medicare Policy And Cms Mechanisms To Anticipate The Platform Economy’S Pitfalls And Ensure Healthcare Platform Workers Are Fairly Paid, Kim A. Aquino

Brooklyn Law Review

The rapidly aging population, along with the demand for innovative Medicare delivery models such as bundled payment programs have incentivized the use of technology in healthcare because of its potential to cut costs and improve quality of care. Like many industries embracing technological strides to automate and digitize services, the healthcare industry has welcomed new labor markets like the platform economy to facilitate connections between patients and workers with ease. Along with streamlining connections, the platform economy also promises workers flexibility and autonomy over their own schedule. The platform economy’s promise of freedom, however, is not enough to prevent the …

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents.

The Economics And Antitrust Of Bundling, Rajeev R. Bhattacharya

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

This article explains the economics and antitrust of bundling. I first show that popular arguments such as demand complementarities, economies of scope, and price discrimination are not sufficient. I then detail potentially anticompetitive factors such as leverage and opacity. I then use simple examples to show how variation in consumer valuations explains bundling and is not anticompetitive. Finally, I explore other business judgment rule explanations for bundling.

The Future Of Dairy Cooperatives In The Modern Marketplace: Redeveloping The Capper-Volstead Act, Sarah K. Phillips

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Agriculture plays a fundamental role in the U.S. economy as a multibillion-dollar industry that feeds people all over the world. However, over the past decade, the dairy industry in particular has changed from a reliable sector of the greater agricultural industry into an unsettled, politically-charged, and fractured group. Dairy farmers’ consistently receiving low milk prices has facilitated this divide. Tired of being ignored and underpaid, dairy farmers are demanding change in the current dairy market structure.

Federal Milk Marketing Orders and a variety of statutes regulate the dairy industry, but the 1922 Capper-Volstead Act remains the most notable piece of …

Taming Sherman's Wilderness, Derrian Smith

Indiana Law Journal

This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I outlines the interpretive difficulties spawned by the vagueness of the Sherman Act—particularly, the judiciary’s necessary but undeniable departures from the text of the statute and the resulting doctrinal confusion. Part II considers ways in which the judiciary’s decision-making in Sherman Act cases approximates agency rulemaking and whether it makes sense to delegate interpretive authority to an antitrust agency. Yet, while the agency solution has upside, it would not easily escape criticisms that the Act does not provide sufficient notice of the conduct it proscribes and that the Act is an impermissible delegation …

Procompetitive Justifications In Antitrust Law, John M. Newman

Indiana Law Journal

The Rule of Reason, which has come to dominate modern antitrust law, allows defendants the opportunity to justify their conduct by demonstrating procompetitive effects. Seizing the opportunity, defendants have begun offering increasingly numerous and creative explanations for their behavior.

But which of these myriad justifications are valid? To leading jurists and scholars, this has remained an “open question,” even an “absolute mystery.” Examination of the relevant case law reveals multiple competing approaches and seemingly irreconcilable opinions. The ongoing lack of clarity in this area is inexcusable: procompetitive-justification analysis is vital to a properly functioning antitrust enterprise.

This Article provides answers …

Counter-Ip Conspiracies: Patent Alienability And The Sherman Antitrust Act, Hannibal Travis

University of Miami Law Review

Anticompetitive collusion by intellectual property owners frequently triggered antitrust enforcement during the twentieth century. An emerging area of litigation and scholarship, however, involves conspiracies by potential licensees of intellectual property to reduce or eliminate opportunities by a property’s holders to profit from it, or even to recoup their investments in creating and protecting it. The danger is that potential licensees will collude with one another to suppress royalties or sale prices. This Article traces the history of such litigation, provides an overview of the scholarly and theoretical arguments against monopsonistic or oligopsonistic collusion against licensors of intellectual property, and summarizes …

Economic Law, Inequality, And Hidden Hierarchies On The Eu Internal Market, Damjan Kukovec

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Article has several aims. First, the aim is to show the continuing importance and relevance of antitrust and international trade lawyers in countering the concentration of power in the hands of the few or in some geographic areas of the world, if some of the assumptions of antitrust and trade are adjusted. Second, the goal is to articulate a particular analysis from the perspective of the (European) periphery. As the recent Euro crises and the near exit of Greece from the Union show, the European prospect of development for all has not arrived. This Article will articulate the privilege …

A Socio-Economic Approach To Antitrust: Unpacking Competition, Consumer Surplus, And Allocative Efficiency, Jeffrey L. Harrison

Akron Law Review

The primary function of socio-economics is to ask questions and broaden the discussion. I have attempted to do that by unpacking and contextualizing the two economic goals of antitrust law - maximizing consumer surplus and allocative efficiency. I have avoided what I believe is today's faith-based approach as exemplified by the Supreme Court. That approach has now gone beyond economics and seems to reveal, in its most benign form, a deep distrust of government.

At its most basic and obvious level the two antitrust goals cede to those with income - earned or not - the right to determine how …

Competition Law For A Post-Scarcity World, Salil K. Mehra

Texas A&M Law Review

Writers, economists and IP scholars have hailed signs of an incipient shift to a post-scarcity world. Driving this change are rapid decreases not only in marginal cost, but also in the fixed or first-unit costs of production. Whether these changes become economy-wide, or remain confined to a subset of industries, they have dramatic implications for competition law and policy. This Article is the first to address these implications. In particular, because of the incentive for incumbent firms to engage in what may be termed “anti-disruption” – as examples such as the Apple/e-books antitrust case and the regulatory responses to Uber …

United States - European Economic Community Antidumping Laws: The Need For A Comprehensive Approach, Larry B. Loftis

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

E-Books, Collusion, And Antitrust Policy: Protecting A Dominant Firm At The Cost Of Innovation, Nicholas Timchalk

Seattle University Law Review

Amazon’s main rival, Apple, went to great lengths and took major risks to enter the e-book market. Why did Apple simply choose not to compete on the merits of its product and brand equity (the iPad and iBookstore) as it does with its other products? Why did Apple decide not to continue to rely on its earlier success of situating its products differently in the market than other electronics and working hard to be different and cutting-edge with its e-book delivery? This Note argues that the combination of Amazon’s 90% market share, network externalities, and an innovative technology market creates …

The Department Of Justice Merger Guidelines: A Critique And A Proposed Improvement, R. Preston Mcafee, Michael A. Williams

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Plus Factors And Agreement In Antitrust Law, William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Halbert L. White

Michigan Law Review

Plus factors are economic actions and outcomes, above and beyond parallel conduct by oligopolistic firms, that are largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely consistent with explicitly coordinated action. Possible plus factors are typically enumerated without any attempt to distinguish them in terms of a meaningful economic categorization or in terms of their probative strength for inferring collusion. In this Article, we provide a taxonomy for plus factors as well as a methodology for ranking plus factors in terms of their strength for inferring explicit collusion, the strongest of which are referred to as "super plus factors."

Bricks, Mortar, And Google: Defining The Relevant Antitrust Market For Internet-Based Companies, Jared Kagan

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Applying A Legal Matrix To The World Of Sports, Elsa Kircher Cole

Michigan Law Review

The intensity of fans' love for sports is no modern phenomenon. In ancient Rome, fierce rivalries existed between fans of the Red, Green, Blue, and White factions in chariot racing. Even emperors had their favorites. A foul in a race by a member of one faction could spark a riot in the stands. Winning charioteers would have their busts displayed in public places and were paid salaries far beyond that of the average citizen. Juvenal complained in his Satires that a chariot driver might earn 100 times more than a lawyer! The best drivers even achieved free agency and could …

Maximum Vertical Price Fixing From Albrecht Through Brunswick To Khan: An Antitrust Odyssey, James M. Fesmire

Seattle University Law Review

The article attempts to sort out some of this confusion caused by the legal journey from Albrecht to Khan by portraying that long road as a successful example of the antitrust injury doctrine's ability to bring substantive antitrust law into compliance with the goals of antitrust. First, the article examines how the existence of successive monopoly provides an incentive for maximum vertical price fixing and how maximum vertical price fixing leads to an increase in consumer welfare. Second, it examines manufacturer alternatives to vertical price restraints, finding them less attractive in terms of social welfare. Third, the article analyzes other …

Is Somebody "Crying Wolf"?: An Assessment Of Whether Antitrust Impedes Export Trade, John Will Ongman

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

The impact of the United States antitrust laws on American exports has in recent years become a controversial issue, especially in view of the increasing U.S, trade deficit. In this article, Mr. Ongman employs economic analysis to determine the desirability of a protectionistic Sherman Act. He concludes that such a policy, resulting in foreign retaliation and spillover into the domestic market, would be unwise.

Book Reviews, George A. Hay, H. Michael Mann, Teresa Amott

Vanderbilt Law Review

Book Reviews:

The Antitrust Penalties: A Study in Law and Economics By Kenneth G. Elzinga and William Breit

Reviewed by George A. Hay

The Antitrust Penalties was published in 1976. Its main mes-sage is that the only efficient antitrust penalty is a heavy fine and that incarceration comes out poorly by any benefit-cost standard.Later that year, in a celebrated and possibly unprecedented appearance, newly appointed Assistant Attorney General Donald I. Baker argued before a federal district judge that jail sentences were the appropriate penalty for a group of defendants who had just been convicted in one of the major price-fixing …

Decision Theory And Antitrust: Quantitative Evaluation For Efficient Enforcement, Ira Horowitz

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Possibilities And Limits Of Decision Theory In Antitrust: A Response To Professor Horowitz, Joseph F. Brodley

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Antitrust - Standing - State Does Not Have Standing To Sue As Parens Patriae Under Section 4 Of The Clayton Act For Damages To The General Economy Attributed To Violations Of The Antitrust Laws, James M. Papada Iii

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Patent-Antitrust Balance: Proposals For Change, N.R. Powers

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Law - The Per Se Rule - Naked Horizontal Territorial Restraints Held To Be Illegal Per Se, A. Roy Decaro

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

The New Antitrust: A Structural Approach, Charles E. Mueller

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Abc's Of Clayton 7: Amendment Of 1950, Brown Shoe, The Court And Current Complexities, Various Editors

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.