Law Commons^™

A Positive Externalities Approach To Copyright Law: Theory And Application, Jeffrey L. Harrison

Jeffrey L Harrison

The basic goal of copyright law is, at a general level, fairly well understood, yet the law itself seems untethered to any consistent analytical approach designed to achieve that goal. This Article has two goals. The first is to explain in some detail what copyright law might look like if it reflected economic reasoning. The second is to put to the test the question of whether copyright law is as far out of sync with economic guidelines as White-Smith Music and Eldred suggest. In order to understand the economic approach and the inconsistency of copyright law, as well as the …

Patents, Antitrust, And The Rule Of Reason, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

Antitrust law has historically immunized many patent agreements if they fell within the "scope of the patent." Three dissenting Justices in the Actavis case advocated this test: a pharmaceutical pay-for-delay settlement falls within the scope of the patent if it delays a competitor's entry no longer than the remaining life of the patent. In that case the patentee will not be obtaining any more than it would from a valid patent -- namely, the right to exclude infringers for the full patent term.

The "scope of the patent" test is not useful for defining the boundaries of antitrust immunity in …

Essential Facilities Doctrine And China’S Anti-Monopoly Law, Yong Huang, Elizabeth Xiao-Ru Wang, Xin Roger Zhang

Elizabeth Xiao-Ru Wang

No abstract provided.

The Fashion Lottery: Cooperative Innovation In Stochastic Markets, Jonathan Barnett, Gilles Grolleau, Sana El Harbi

Jonathan M Barnett

The fashion market is an anomaly: innovation is vigorous but original producers are substantially unprotected against imitation, which proliferates under an incomplete property regime consisting of strong trademark protections and weak design protections. We account for this anomaly through a “cooperative innovation” model where producers prefer an incomplete property regime that permits some imitation to alternative regimes that permit no imitation or all imitation, independent of budget constraints. A property regime that permits positive but limited levels of imitation operates as a form of group insurance that alleviates the risk of recoupment failure in a market characterized by demand uncertainty, …

Copyright Without Creators, Jonathan M. Barnett

Jonathan M Barnett

Copyright is typically justified by the rationale that profits induce authors and other artists to invest resources in cultural production. This rationale is vulnerable to the objection that some artists have intrinsic incentives to invest in cultural production and do not require significant capital to do so. Even accepting this objection, copyright is justified by an alternative rationale: it supports the profit-motivated intermediaries that bear the high costs and risks involved in evaluating, distributing and marketing content in mass-cultural markets. This “authorless” rationale is consistent with the intermediated structure of mature mass-cultural markets and accounts for long-standing features of copyright …

The Host's Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture In Platform Markets For Informational Goods, Jonathan M. Barnett

Jonathan M Barnett

Voluntary forfeiture of intellectual assets—often, exceptionally valuable assets--is surprisingly widespread in information technology markets. A simple economic rationale can account for these practices. By giving away access to core technologies, a platform holder commits against expropriating (and thereby induces) user investments that support platform value. To generate revenues that cover development and maintenance costs, the platform holder must regulate access to other goods and services within the total consumption bundle. The tradeoff between forfeiting access (to induce adoption) and regulating access (to recover costs) anticipates the substantial convergence of open and closed innovation models. Organizational patterns in the software and …

Intellectual Property As A Law Of Organization, Jonathan M. Barnett

Jonathan M Barnett

The incentive thesis for patents is challenged by the existence of alternative means by which firms can capture returns on innovation. Taking into account patent alternatives yields a robust reformulation of the incentive thesis as mediated by organizational form. Patents enable innovators to make efficient selections of firm scope by transacting with least-cost suppliers of commercialization inputs. These expanded transactional opportunities reduce the minimum size of the market into which any innovator—or the supplier of any other technological or production input—can attempt entry. Disaggregation of the innovation and commercialization process then induces the formation of secondary markets in disembodied technology …

Is Intellectual Property Trivial?, Jonathan M. Barnett

Jonathan M Barnett

We typically assume that intellectual property makes a substantial difference in regulating access to intellectual goods and thereby provides incentives for the production of intellectual goods. But the existence of alternative instruments by which to appropriate innovation returns suggests that even substantial changes in intellectual property may often make little difference in regulating access, which in turn means that those changes may often make little difference in regulating innovation incentives. This raises a conundrum: in markets where “more or less IP” exerts no substantial effect on access costs and innovation gains, why do firms expend resources on influencing changes in …

Property As Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, Jonathan M. Barnett

Jonathan M Barnett

It is commonly asserted that innovation markets suffer from excessive intellectualproperty protections, which in turn stifle output. But empirical inquiries can neither confirm nor deny this assertion. Under the “agnostic” assumption that we cannot assess directly whether intellectual-property coverage is excessive, an alternative query is proposed: can the market assess if any “propertization outcome” is excessive and then undertake actions to yield a socially preferable outcome? Grounded in the “bottom up” methodology of new institutional economics, this process-based approach takes the view that innovator populations make rent-seeking investments that continuously “select” among a range of “innovation regimes” that trade off …

What's So Bad About Stealing?, Jonathan M. Barnett

Jonathan M Barnett

The moral prohibition against theft, and legal causes of action against trespass and like activities, are usually stated in absolutist terms that admit few exceptions. But application of the theft prohibition to creative goods is incomplete and unstable across industries, regions and periods. Existing economic explanations for the theft prohibition either overestimate its scope of application in creative environments or fail to specify a mechanism by which adjustments in its scope are implemented. A “power” approach that ties changes in the moral and legal treatment of “creative theft” to the distribution of formal and informal “influence capacities” across affected populations …

From Patent Thickets To Patent Networks: The Legal Infrastructure Of The Digital Economy, Jonathan M. Barnett

Jonathan M Barnett

Scholarly and popular commentary often assert that markets characterized by intensive patent issuance and enforcement suffer from “patent thickets” that suppress innovation. This assertion is difficult to reconcile with continuous robust levels of R&D investment, coupled with declining prices, in technology markets that have operated under intensive patent issuance and enforcement for several decades. Using network visualization software, I show that information and communication technology markets rely on patent pools and other cross-licensing structures to mitigate or avoid patent thickets and associated inefficiencies. Based on the composition, structure, terms and pricing of selected leading patent pools in the ICT market, …

Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, And Mt. Gox?, Lawrence J. Trautman

Lawrence J. Trautman Sr.

During 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department evoked the first use of the 2001 Patriot Act to exclude virtual currency provider Liberty Reserve from the U.S. financial system. This article will discuss: the regulation of virtual currencies; cybercrimes and payment systems; darknets, Tor and the “deep web;” Bitcoin; Liberty Reserve; Silk Road and Mt. Gox. Virtual currencies have quickly become a reality, gaining significant traction in a very short period of time, and are evolving rapidly. Virtual currencies present particularly difficult law enforcement challenges because of their: ability to transcend national borders in the fraction of a second; unique jurisdictional issues; …

The Evolution Of Intellectual Property Protections In The People’S Republic Of China: Is There An Enforcement Problem?, William Mcguire, Michael Wotherspoon

William McGuire

No abstract provided.