Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Publication
- Publication Type
- File Type
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
License To Deal: Mandatory Approval Of Complex Financial Products, Saule Omarova
License To Deal: Mandatory Approval Of Complex Financial Products, Saule Omarova
Saule T. Omarova
“There is definitely going to be another financial crisis around the corner because we haven’t solved any of the things that caused the previous crisis,” said hedge fund legend Mark Mobius, speaking in Tokyo nearly a full year after the United States officially embarked upon the greatest reform of financial services regulation since the New Deal. Today, the world is still reeling from the recent financial crisis, which ravaged even the strongest economies and left them battling recession, budget deficits, soaring unemployment, and political discontent. Facing another financial crisis in this situation is a frightening prospect. National governments, individually or …
Bank Resolution In The European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective On What It Would Take, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Bank Resolution In The European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective On What It Would Take, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Jeffrey N Gordon
The project of creating a European Banking Union is designed to overcome the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision framework and a common resolution scheme has been reached with difficulty. However, the resolution framework is weak, underfunded and exhibits some serious flaws. Further, Member States’ disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a successful Banking Union. This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure substitute for these two shortcomings that can minimize the …
Market Efficiency After The Financial Crisis: It's Still A Matter Of Information Costs, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Market Efficiency After The Financial Crisis: It's Still A Matter Of Information Costs, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman
Faculty Scholarship
Contrary to the views of many commentators, the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis ("ECMH"), as originally framed in financial economics, was not "disproven" by the Subprime Crisis of 2007-2008, nor has it been shown to be irrelevant to the project of regulatory reform of financial markets. To the contrary, the ECMH points to commonsense reforms in the wake of the Crisis, some of which have already been adopted. The Crisis created a lot of losers – from individual investors to pension funds and German Landesbanken – who purchased mortgage-backed securities that they did not, and perhaps could not, understand, and it …
How To Improve The Financial Architecture And Its Resilience, Dirk Helbing, Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Fabio Caccioli, J. Doyne Farmer, Steve Keen, Katharina Pistor, Dennis J. Snower, Olsen Richard, Angelo Ranaldo, Norbert Häring, Edward Fullbrook
How To Improve The Financial Architecture And Its Resilience, Dirk Helbing, Eve Mitleton-Kelly, Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, Fabio Caccioli, J. Doyne Farmer, Steve Keen, Katharina Pistor, Dennis J. Snower, Olsen Richard, Angelo Ranaldo, Norbert Häring, Edward Fullbrook
Faculty Scholarship
This financial resilience survey was circulated on behalf of a working group of the Complexity Council of the World Economic Forum comprised of Prof. Eve Mitleton-Kelly of London School of Economics and Prof. Dirk Helbing at ETH Zurich's Risk Center. It was sent to a few dozens of financial experts with the aim to create an inventory of ideas of how the financial system might be improved and made more resilient. Unconventional ideas were also welcome.
The Bankruptcy Code’S Safe Harbors For Settlement Payments And Securities Contracts: When Is Safe Too Safe?, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
The Bankruptcy Code’S Safe Harbors For Settlement Payments And Securities Contracts: When Is Safe Too Safe?, Charles W. Mooney Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article addresses insolvency law-related issues in connection with certain financial-markets contracts, such as securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements (repos), swaps and other derivatives, and master netting agreements. The Bankruptcy Code provides special treatment—safe harbors—for these contracts (collectively, qualified financial contracts or QFCs). This special treatment is considerably more favorable for nondebtor parties to QFCs than the rules applicable to nondebtor parties to other contracts with a debtor. Yet even some strong critics of the safe harbors concede that some special treatment may be warranted. This Article offers a critique of the safe harbor for settlement payments, …
Behaviorism In Finance And Securities Law, David A. Skeel Jr.
Behaviorism In Finance And Securities Law, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
In this Essay, I take stock (as something of an outsider) of the behavioral economics movement, focusing in particular on its interaction with traditional cost-benefit analysis and its implications for agency structure. The usual strategy for such a project—a strategy that has been used by others with behavioral economics—is to marshal the existing evidence and critically assess its significance. My approach in this Essay is somewhat different. Although I describe behavioral economics and summarize the strongest criticisms of its use, the heart of the Essay is inductive, and focuses on a particular context: financial and securities regulation, as recently revamped …
Three Discount Windows, Kathryn Judge
Three Discount Windows, Kathryn Judge
Faculty Scholarship
It is widely assumed that the Federal Reserve is the lender of last resort in the United States and that the Fed's discount window is the primary mechanism through which it fulfills this role. Yet, when banks faced liquidity constraints during the 2007-2009 financial cfisis (the Cisis), the discount window played a relatively small role in providing banks much needed liquidity. This is not because banks forewent government-backed liquidity; rather, they sought it elsewhere. First, they increased their reliance on collateralized loans, known as advances, from the Federal Home Loan Bank System, a little-known government-sponsored enterprise that grew in size …