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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Limits Of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets, Dan Awrey
The Limits Of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets, Dan Awrey
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
From standardized contracts for loans, repurchase agreements, and derivatives, to stock exchanges and alternative trading platforms, to benchmark interest and foreign exchange rates, private market structures play a number of important roles within modern financial markets. These market structures hold out a number of significant benefits. Specifically, by harnessing the powerful incentives of market participants, these market structures can help lower information, agency, coordination, and other transaction costs, enhance the process of price discovery, and promote greater market liquidity. Simultaneously, however, successful market structures are the source of significant and often overlooked market distortions. These distortions--or limits of private ordering--stem …
Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Paying For Risk: Bankers, Compensation, And Competition, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead
Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers
Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to supervise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on executive pay, believing that executives will bring non-executives into line—using incentives to manage risk-taking—once their own pay is regulated. What they overlook is the effect on non-executive pay of the competition for talent. Even if executive pay is regulated, and executives act in the bank’s best interests, they will still be trapped into providing incentives that encourage risk-taking by non-executives due to the negative externality that arises …
Preliberal Autonomy And Postliberal Finance, Robert C. Hockett
Preliberal Autonomy And Postliberal Finance, Robert C. Hockett
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Even American Founders whose views diverged as dramatically as those of Jefferson and Hamilton shared a view of finance and of enterprise that one might call “productive republican.” Pursuant to this vision, financial and other forms of market activity are instrumentally rather than intrinsically good — and for that very reason are of interest to the public qua public rather than to the public qua aggregate of “private” individuals. Citizens are best left free to engage in financial and other market activities, per this understanding, only insofar as these are consistent with sustainable collective republic-making. And the republic — the …
Materializing Citizenship: Finance In A Producers' Republic, Robert C. Hockett
Materializing Citizenship: Finance In A Producers' Republic, Robert C. Hockett
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This invited essay critically assesses a movement of which I consider myself to be part – the movement to “redemocratize” financial institutions in a manner that restores, to non-wealthy citizens, access to basic financial services comparable to those enjoyed by wealthy citizens. I argue that while financial redemocratization of this sort is necessary to the larger project from which it draws most of its meaning – viz that of redemocratizing access to the resources requisite to productive enterprise and meaningful citizenship more generally – it is far from sufficient to this task. We must therefore take special care not to …