Law Commons^™

Qualified Plans And Identifying Tax Expenditures: A Rejoinder To Professor Stein, Edward A. Zelinsky

Articles

No abstract provided.

The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight By Protest, Robert Marshall, Michael J. Meurer, Jean-Francois Richard

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, protests are analyzed, from both an economic and legal perspective, as a decentralized mechanism for oversight of the competitive procurement process. Attention focuses on the protest process at the General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals (hereinafter "the Board" or "GSBCA"). It is argued that protests are an effective means of deterring and correcting agency problems among procurement personnel and, consequently, accomplishing the procurement objectives of the government. Drawbacks of the protest process are identified, explanations are offered for the existence of these negative side effects, and solutions are proposed. In addition, protests are compared to centralized …

Mindlessness And The Law, Paul J. Heald, James E. Heald

Scholarly Works

No less an authority than Milton Friedman has argued that improving the realism of assumptions in economic theory, although hardly essential to establishing the absolute validity of the theory (purely an empirical question), may offer several benefits. First, a “restructuring” (to use Posner's term) of an assumption may help explain divergences between predicted and observed results. Second, an explanation of why a seemingly unrealistic assumption does not destroy the predictive value of a theory may strengthen the theory by connecting it to “a more general theory that applies to a wider variety of phenomena . . . and has failed …

The World In Our Courts, Stephen B. Burbank

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Economic Development Policies Enterprise Zone Legislation, Umass Amherst Center Economic Development

Center for Economic Development Technical Reports

This report was made to review the history and efficacy of enterprise zones in the United States, and provides a summary of the House Bill number 5868, an economic incentive bill sponsored by representative Daniel Bosley.

One Tax Piece Of The Savings And Loan Crisis: Can The Federal Home Loan Bank Board Use The Internal Revenue Cose To Bail Out The Ailing Savings And Loan Industry?, Beverly I. Moran

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner the Sixth Circuit delves into a little known aspect of the savings and loan crisis-the attempt by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to use the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") to help bolster its failing constituent thrifts. In the course of its analysis, the Sixth Circuit must articulate the requirements for transforming an economic loss into a deductible tax loss.

Interest Group Politics And Judicial Behavior: Macey's Public Choice, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The economic theory of government has lately gained the acceptance in legal circles that it has long enjoyed in political science and economics. The economic theory, also known as "public choice," analyzes and explains government action and private political activity according to the basic assumption of economics, that individuals respond to economic incentives in their environments in a self-interested manner. The economic theory is thus useful descriptively, to explain diverse political phenomena, and prescriptively, to help formulate reform strategy.

Economic Rents And Essential Facilities, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents an economic analysis of the essential facility doctrine of antitrust. According to this doctrine, a firm or group of firms that possesses exclusive access to a cost-reducing facility must be prepared to share such access on fair terms with competitors.

Status And Incentive Aspects Of Judicial Decisions, Jeffrey E. Stake

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Cleaning Up Krakow: Poland's Ecological Crisis And The Political Economy Of International Environmental Assistance, Daniel H. Cole

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Relaxing Traditional Economic Assumptions And Values: Toward A New Disciplinary Discourse On Law, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Economics has been viewed traditionally as a discipline removed from other, "softer", fields of social analysis. Professor R. Malloy has fought to remove these barriers and encourage interdisciplinary dialogue. In a field previously dominated by normative values of majority power holders, a multidisciplinary approach allows for a more extensive examination of social trends and the question of innate human "rights". By relaxing the assumptions of traditional neoclassical economic analysis, one can gain a theoretical perspective that includes insights from multiple disciplines. This article reinforces Malloy's conceptualization of new social analysis, hoping to further this new interdisciplinary cooperation.

Rewriting History: The Propriety Of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement And Vacatur, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

An Economic Justification For Corporate Reorganizations, Charles Adams

Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

A Redrafted Section I Of The Sherman Act, Robert H. Heidt

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

The Regulation Of Green Advertising: The State, The Market And The Environmental Good, David S. Cohen

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

In this paper I explore this most recent development in regulatory policy and, in particular, the role government plays when it chooses to use private markets (consumer, institutional and corporate) as regulatory instruments to produce and allocate environmental benefits. The privatization of environmental regulation by employing markets to deliver environmental benefits does not involve the implementation of public policy through executive or legislative action. Rather, it is achieved through a public choice to privatize the delivery of environmental regulation by permitting or encouraging decentralized economic power to respond to consumer demands for environmental quality.

Start Making Sense: An Analysis And Proposal For Insider Trading Regulation, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Logic And (Uncertain) Significance Of Institutional Shareholder Activism, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Recovery For Pure Economic Loss In Tort: Another Look At Robins Dry Dock V. Flint, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

In Robins Dry Dock and Repair Co. v. Flint, the Supreme Court laid down the general proposition that claims for pure economic loss are not recoverable in tort. Although courts have sometimes ignored or distinguished Robins, its holding is still a central feature of tort law. In a recent en bane decision regarding claims by those injured by a chemical spill in the Mississippi River, the Fifth Circuit engaged in an extensive debate over the continued vitality of Robins and concluded (despite five dissenters) that it remained good law.

The Robins rule is overbroad, lumping together a number of …

Normativity And The Politics Of Form, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

Frankenstein's Monster Hits The Campaign Trail: An Approach To Regulation Of Corporate Political Expenditures, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Corporations, Markets, And Courts, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The times they are a changin'. Vanguard firms of the 1980s takeover boom have announced associate layoffs and salary freezes because business is down. Bankruptcy and corporate reorganization are the hot new specialties as reflected in law school class size and law firm entrepreneurialism. Acquisition activity has fallen dramatically from the halcyon days of the 1980s. The gargantuan headline-grabbing hostile bid is now rare. In particular, the "boot-strap, bust-up" highly leveraged transaction that so engaged the passions of corporate managers and raiders now seems part of the history of corporate finance rather than its future.

Many forces have played a …

The Economic Theory Of Politics And Legal Interpretation In The United States, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Litigation Costs And The Economic Theory Of Tort Law, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

The economic theory of tort law has developed along two lines. The first and more traditional is positive theory, which justifies tort doctrine. The second is normative theory, which usually criticizes the operational efficiency of the tort system, and is the focus of this Article. This Article argues that once the dynamics of litigation are properly taken into account, all bets are off on the economic efficiency of tort law. The simple fact that litigation is a costly enterprise provides a rich source of inefficiencies with which the tort system must grapple.