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Full-Text Articles in Law

The $1.75 Trillion Lie, Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman Jan 2012

The $1.75 Trillion Lie, Lisa Heinzerling, Frank Ackerman

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

A 2010 study commissioned by the Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration claims that federal regulations impose annual economic costs of $1.75 trillion. This estimate has been widely circulated, in everything from op-ed pages to Congressional testimony. But the estimate is not credible. For costs of economic regulations, the estimate reflects a calculation that rests on a misunderstanding of the definition of the relevant data, flunks an elementary question on the normal distribution, pads the analysis with several years of near-identical data, and fails to recognize the difference between correlation and causation. For costs of environmental regulation, …


Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis Of Confidential Settlements, Scott A. Moss Mar 2007

Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis Of Confidential Settlements, Scott A. Moss

Michigan Law Review

Even the most hotly contested lawsuits typically end in a confidential settlement forbidding the parties from disclosing their allegations, evidence, or settlement amount. Confidentiality draws fierce criticism for harming third parties by concealing serious misdeeds like discrimination, pollution, defective manufacturing, and sexual abuse. Others defend confidentiality as a mutually beneficial pay-for-silence bargain that facilitates settlement, serves judicial economy, and prevents frivolous copycat lawsuits. This debate is based in economic logic, yet most analyses have been surprisingly shallow as to how confidentiality affects incentives to settle. Depicting a more nuanced, complex reality of litigation and settlement, this Article reaches several conclusions …


Theorizing Behavioral Law And Economics: A Defense Of Evolutionary Analysis And The Law, Neel P. Parekh Oct 2002

Theorizing Behavioral Law And Economics: A Defense Of Evolutionary Analysis And The Law, Neel P. Parekh

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Behavioral law and economics (BLE) provides a steady stream of empirical evidence that counters the predictions of law and economics. Despite this research and data, however, many theorists argue that BLE ultimately fails because it posits no underlying theory. This Note argues that perspectives from evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, and the brain sciences can provide the missing motivational theory for BLE's empirical findings. The Note also examines the implications a more consistent and reasoned consideration of evolutionary analysis and the law (EA) has for our legal regime. In theorizing BLE and defending EA, this Note aims to show how evolutionary …


Information Economics And Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws To Produce And Use Data, Mary L. Lyndon Jun 1989

Information Economics And Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws To Produce And Use Data, Mary L. Lyndon

Michigan Law Review

Just as laws may create entitlements to the use of information, they may also be written to distribute information and to encourage information production. This Article discusses the ways in which law affects the generation and distribution of information related to chemical exposure and toxicity. It describes the economic impact of recently enacted right-to-know laws and proposes that better and more abundant data could be produced if the law paid greater attention to basic economic principles that influence research and information systems.


The Effectiveness Of Measures To Increase Appellate Court Efficiency And Decision Output, Thomas B. Marvell, Carlisle E. Moody Apr 1988

The Effectiveness Of Measures To Increase Appellate Court Efficiency And Decision Output, Thomas B. Marvell, Carlisle E. Moody

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article will examine the effectiveness of measures commonly employed to increase appellate court productivity. Part I of the Article sets forth some common design problems and explains how the research technique employed in the present study avoids these problems by using a multiple time-series research design. Part II applies this design to state court data. Part II also describes the dependent variable, the number of appeals decided per judge, used in the regression analysis. Part III discusses the results of that analysis-the impact of each change listed above on judicial productivity. The Article, although not advocating the adoption of …