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Full-Text Articles in Law
Contract Design When Relationship-Specific Investment Produces Asymmetric Information, Albert H. Choi, George Triantis
Contract Design When Relationship-Specific Investment Produces Asymmetric Information, Albert H. Choi, George Triantis
Articles
Under conventional contract theory, contracts may be efficient by protecting relationship specific investment from holdup in subsequent (re)negotiation over terms of trade. This paper demonstrates a different problem when specific investment also provides significant private information to the investing party. This is fairly common: for example, a manufacturer invests to learn about its buyer's idiosyncratic needs or a collaborator invests to learn about a joint venture. We show how such private information can lead to subsequent bargaining failure and suboptimal ex ante relationship-specific investment. We also show that this inefficiency is worse if the parties enter into a binding and …
The Economics Of Class Action Waivers, Albert H. Choi, Kathryn E. Spier
The Economics Of Class Action Waivers, Albert H. Choi, Kathryn E. Spier
Articles
Many firms require consumers, employees, and suppliers to sign class action waivers as a condition of doing business with the firm, and the U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed companies’ ability to block class actions through mandatory individual arbitration clauses. Are class action waivers serving the interests of society or are they facilitating socially harmful business practices? This paper synthesizes and extends the existing law and economics literature by analyzing the firms’ incentive to impose class action waivers. While in many settings the firms’ incentive to block class actions may be aligned with maximizing social welfare, in many other settings it …
Noncompete Agreements In The U.S. Labor Force, Evan P. Starr, J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara
Noncompete Agreements In The U.S. Labor Force, Evan P. Starr, J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara
Articles
Using nationally representative survey data on 11,505 labor force participants, we examine the use and implementation of noncompete agreements and the employee outcomes associated with these provisions. Approximately 18 percent of labor force participants are bound by noncompetes, with 38 percent having agreed to at least one in the past. Noncompetes are more likely to be found in high-skill, high-paying jobs, but they are also common in low-skill, low-paying jobs and in states where noncompetes are unenforceable. Only 10 percent of employees negotiate over their noncompetes, and about one-third of employees are presented with noncompetes after having already accepted job …