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Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, Steven C. Salop
Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, Steven C. Salop
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This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for purposes of antitrust analysis, what is 'market power' and/or 'monopoly power'? The question should be well settled because antitrust law requires proof of actual or likely market power or monopoly power to establish most types of antitrust violations.
Examination of key antitrust law opinions, however, shows that courts define 'market power' and 'monopoly power' in ways that are both vague and inconsistent. We conclude that the present level of confusion is unnecessary and results from two different but related errors:
(1) the belief or suspicion that …
Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande
Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande
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Vertical restraints come in a glittering menu of exceptional variety, including resale price maintenance (RPM), tying, exclusive dealing, requirements contracts, "best efforts" clauses, full-line forcing, airtight and nonairtight exclusive territories, customer restrictions, areas of primary responsibility, profit-passover provisions, restrictions on locations of outlets, and dual distribution. Firms sometimes combine vertical restraints into packages. The great variety of individual and combined vertical restraints complicates the discovery of market effects. Indeed, identifying what restraint(s) a given firm is using at any particular time can be difficult.
Coase And The Courts: Economics For The Common Man, Barbara Ann White
Coase And The Courts: Economics For The Common Man, Barbara Ann White
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The arguments collectively known as the Coase Theorem criticize the judicial policy of requiring businesses to ‘internalize’ their external costs of production, i.e., pay for the social costs their production incurs such as environmental or noise pollution. Coase argues that the policy of internalization often leads to economic inefficiency rather than efficiency maximization, contrary to what Pigouvian economic analysis asserts. The right to be free of the external costs of production ought to be based, instead, on Coase’s total product rule: Courts should allocate rights according to what maximizes overall total production and thereby maximize social welfare.
Coasian analysis has …