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Commodified Inequality: Racialized Harm To Children And Families In The Injustice Enterprise, Daniel L. Hatcher Apr 2023

Commodified Inequality: Racialized Harm To Children And Families In The Injustice Enterprise, Daniel L. Hatcher

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This article addresses the systemic racialized harm of a vast injustice enterprise, with a focus on the symbiotic operations of agencies and justice systems monetizing vulnerable children and families, including the impact of contractual revenue schemes uncovered in my new book, Injustice, Inc. Our foundational justice systems are permeated by a history of racial injustice, and that history reverberates into factory-like operations that churn children and the poor into revenue. The revenue-generating mechanisms used by juvenile and family courts, prosecutors, probation departments, police, sheriffs, and detention facilities all draw the concerning historical connection—interlinked with the practices of child and …


Expanding Civil Rights To Combat Digital Discrimination On The Basis Of Poverty, Michele E. Gilman Jul 2022

Expanding Civil Rights To Combat Digital Discrimination On The Basis Of Poverty, Michele E. Gilman

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Low-income people suffer from digital discrimination on the basis of their socio-economic status. Automated decision-making systems, often powered by machine learning and artificial intelligence, shape the opportunities of those experiencing poverty because they serve as gatekeepers to the necessities of modern life. Yet in the existing legal regime, it is perfectly legal to discriminate against people because they are poor. Poverty is not a protected characteristic, unlike race, gender, disability, religion or certain other identities. This lack of legal protection has accelerated digital discrimination against the poor, fueled by the scope, speed, and scale of big data networks. This Article …


En-Gendering Economic Inequality, Michele E. Gilman Jan 2016

En-Gendering Economic Inequality, Michele E. Gilman

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We live in an era of growing economic inequality. Luminaries ranging from the President to the Pope to economist Thomas Piketty in his bestselling book Capital in the Twenty- First Century have raised alarms about the disparity between the haves and the have-nots. Overlooked, however, in these important discussions is the reality that economic inequality is not a uniform experience; rather, its effects fall more harshly on women and minorities. With regard to gender, American women have higher rates of poverty and get paid less than comparable men, and their workplace participation rates are falling. Yet economic inequality is neither …


Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are Mostly Less Than Single Damages, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande Jul 2015

Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are Mostly Less Than Single Damages, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

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Antitrust law provides treble damages for victims of antitrust violations, but the vast majority of private cases settle. The average or median size of these settlements relative to the overcharges involved has, until now, been only the subject of anecdotes or speculation. To ascertain what we term "Recovery Ratios," we assembled a sample consisting of every completed private U.S. cartel case discovered from 1990 to mid-2014 for which we could find the necessary information. For each of these 71 cases we collected, we assembled neutral scholarly estimates of affected commerce and overcharges. We compared these to the damages secured in …


Confronting Chaos: The Fiscal Constitution Faces Federal Shutdowns And (Almost) Debt Defaults, Charles Tiefer Jan 2014

Confronting Chaos: The Fiscal Constitution Faces Federal Shutdowns And (Almost) Debt Defaults, Charles Tiefer

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Recent events raise the question of whether two near-failures in what scholars call the "Fiscal Constitution" may plunge the government into paralysis or chaos. In October 2013, a lapse in congressional appropriations shut the government down for two weeks. The shutdown furloughed hundreds of thousands of federal employees. It caused some agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), virtually to close their doors and to curtail their services.

Simultaneously, and potentially even more devastating, the House of Representatives (alternatively "House") firmly refused during an extremely tense countdown to raise the statutory debt ceiling of the government. When the government …


Taking On Water: Local Government, Eminent Domain, And The Foreclosure Crisis, Brian Cullin Jan 2014

Taking On Water: Local Government, Eminent Domain, And The Foreclosure Crisis, Brian Cullin

University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development

The 2008 Financial Crisis and the ensuing Great Recession sent shockwaves throughout the U.S. and global economy, wreaking havoc from Wall Street to Main Street. The Crisis harkened economic contraction, high unemployment, and elevated rates of home foreclosure. While the financial industry recovered, spelling an end to one crisis, another continues - the Foreclosure Crisis. The rate of home foreclosure, already ominously on the rise before 2008 and growing in intensity and breadth in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, provides the foundation for this paper. This article examines an innovative public-private partnership between a private firm, Mortgage Resolution Partners …


Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case For Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande Oct 2013

Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case For Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande

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The conventional wisdom is that private antitrust enforcement lacks any value. Indeed, skepticism of private enforcement has been so great that its critics make contradictory claims. The first major line of criticism is that private enforcement achieves too little — it does not even minimally compensate the actual victims of antitrust violations and does not significantly deter those violations. A second line of criticism contends that private enforcement achieves too much — providing excessive compensation, often to the wrong parties, and producing overdeterrence. This article undertakes the first ever systematic evaluation of these claims. Building upon original empirical work and …


Can You Hear Me Now?: Making Participatory Governance Work For The Poor, Jaime Alison Lee Jul 2013

Can You Hear Me Now?: Making Participatory Governance Work For The Poor, Jaime Alison Lee

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Participatory governance engages people who are affected by a problem in the process of solving it. A participatory-governance approach to inner-city crime, for example, might include local residents in the process of designing a community-policing program. In recent decades, courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and other institutions all have used participatory-governance approaches to tackle complex problems of law and public policy.

Some herald the potential for participatory-governance schemes to improve legal and policy outcomes, increase institutional accountability, empower marginalized groups, and further democratic ideals of self-determination and equality. Yet participatory-governance schemes can also promote the capture of public power by private …


Toward An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande Apr 2013

Toward An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Joshua P. Davis, Robert H. Lande

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The dominant view in the antitrust field is that private enforcement cases, and especially class actions, accomplish little or nothing positive but, on the contrary, are counterproductive. Despite strongly worded convictions, that view has been premised on anecdotal, self-serving and insufficiently substantiated claims. Indeed, the authors' 2008 study of 40 private cases appears to constitute the only systematic effort to gather information about a significant number of private antitrust actions. That study generated a great deal of controversy, including questioning of our conclusions by high officials at the Department of Justice and by Professor Daniel Crane at the University of …


The Extraordinary Deterrence Of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply To Werden, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis Jan 2013

The Extraordinary Deterrence Of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply To Werden, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis

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Our article, "Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws," 2011 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 315, documented an extraordinary but usually overlooked fact: private antitrust enforcement deters a significant amount of anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, the article showed that private enforcement "probably" deters even more anticompetitive conduct than the almost universally admired anti-cartel enforcement program of the United States Department of Justice.

In a recent issue of Antitrust Bulletin, Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond, and Belinda A. Barnett challenged our analysis. They asserted that our comparison “is more misleading than informative.” It is unsurprising that they …


Perfecting Criminal Markets, David Jaros Dec 2012

Perfecting Criminal Markets, David Jaros

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From illicit drugs to human smuggling to prostitution, legislators may actually be perfecting the very criminal markets they seek to destroy. Criminal laws often create new dangers and new criminal opportunities. Criminalizing drugs creates the opportunity to sell fake drugs. Raising the penalties for illegal immigration increases the risk that smugglers will rely on dangerous methods that can injure or kill their human cargo. Banning prostitution increases the underground spread of sexually transmitted disease. Lawmakers traditionally respond to these “second order” problems in predictable fashion — with a new wave of criminalization that imposes additional penalties on fake drug dealers, …


Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Describe The Goals Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande Aug 2012

Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Describe The Goals Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande

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This article is both a short introduction to the Consumer Choice explanation for Competition Law or Antitrust Law, and also a short advocacy piece suggesting that Consumer Choice is the best way to articulate the goals of European Competition Law and United States Antitrust Law.

This article briefly:

  1. defines the consumer choice approach to antitrust or competition law and shows how it differs from other approaches;
  2. shows that the antitrust statutes and theories of violation embody a concern for optimal levels of consumer choice;
  3. shows that the United States antitrust case law embodies a concern for optimal levels of consumer …


In Search Of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism", Matthew Lindsay Jan 2010

In Search Of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism", Matthew Lindsay

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This article is a response to Professor Jed Shugerman’s Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, HARVARD LAW REVIEW (2010). Professor Shugerman argues that the widespread adoption of judicial elections in the 1850’s and the embrace by the first generation of elected judges of countermajoritarian rationales for judicial review helped to effect a transition from the active, industry-building state of the early nineteenth century to the "laissez-faire constitutionalism" of the Lochner era. This response argues that Professor Shugerman overstates the causal relationship between the elected judiciary’s robust constitutional defense of "vested rights" and the iconic, if …


The Fundamental Goal Of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande Nov 2008

The Fundamental Goal Of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande

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The conventional wisdom in the antitrust community is that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That view is incorrect. As this article shows, the fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.

This article defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, analyzes recent case law in more depth than any prior article, and explores the most likely bases for current popular support of the antitrust laws. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that …


Using The "Consumer Choice" Approach To Antitrust Law, Neil W. Averitt, Robert H. Lande Jan 2007

Using The "Consumer Choice" Approach To Antitrust Law, Neil W. Averitt, Robert H. Lande

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The current paradigms of antitrust law - price and efficiency - do not work well enough. They were an immense improvement over their predecessors, and they have served the field competently for a generation, producing reasonably accurate results in most circumstances. Accumulated experience has also revealed their shortcomings, however. They are hard to fully understand and are not particularly transparent in their application. Moreover, in a disturbingly large number of circumstances they are unable to handle the important issue of non-price competition.

In this article we suggest replacing the older paradigms with the somewhat broader approach of "consumer choice." The …


How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications For Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande Dec 2005

How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications For Optimal Cartel Fines, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

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This Article examines whether the current penalties in the United States Sentencing Guidelines are set at the appropriate levels to deter cartels optimally The authors analyze two data sets to determine how high on average cartels raise prices. The first consists of every published scholarly economic study of the effects of cartels on prices in individual cases. The second consists of every final verdict in a US. antitrust case in which a neutral finder of fact reported collusive overcharges. They report average overcharges of 49% and 31% for the two data sets, and median overcharges of 25% and 22%. They …


Economic Efficiency And The Parameters Of Fairness: A Marriage Of Marketplace Morals And The Ethic Of Care, Barbara Ann White Oct 2005

Economic Efficiency And The Parameters Of Fairness: A Marriage Of Marketplace Morals And The Ethic Of Care, Barbara Ann White

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This article provides resolutions to a number of conundrums that have vexed policy-makers and scholars for some decades. The most significant conclusion is that efficiency and fairness concerns do not conflict but rather mutually support each other in the goal of maximizing social welfare. This is contrary to the more widely-held view by both advocates of law and economic reasoning and those favoring deontological concerns that a trade-off between fairness and efficiency is inevitable. This article demonstrates how the coalescence of the two frameworks, the cultivation of fairness with law and economics' efficiency maximization, yields greater enhancements of social welfare …


Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von's Grocery To Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande Jan 2001

Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von's Grocery To Consumer Choice, Robert H. Lande

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The merger incipiency doctrine is virtually ignored in the courts today. This article argues that it should be resurrected, and it also explores the ways that effectuating Congressional intent in the area would reinvigorate merger policy.

The article documents how the legislative history of the antimerger statutes shows that Congress intended mergers to be evaluated under an incipiency approach, and explores the possible meanings of this idea. It then shows that this is a strong basis for reviving significantly stricter or more prophylactic merger enforcement.

The article shows how there are aspects of the doctrine that could be revived without …


The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel Jan 2000

The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel

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Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, "Type I" collusion is the familiar direct agreement among colluding firms (a cartel) to raise prices or, equivalently, restrict output. Alternatively, firms can collude to disadvantage rivals in ways that causes those rivals to cut output. We term this "Type II" collusion. Its indirect effect is an increase in market prices.

A number of important collusion cases neither direct manipulation of prices or output, nor direct attacks on rivals. Examples include Supreme Court cases such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. US, Bates v. State Bar of …


The Evolution Of United States Antitrust Law: The Past, Present, And (Possible) Future, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande Oct 1999

The Evolution Of United States Antitrust Law: The Past, Present, And (Possible) Future, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande

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As the world’s nations rapidly move from systems in which central planning and monopoly are replaced by free markets,2 it becomes increasingly valuable to consider the histories of competition policy experienced in different nations, on a comparative basis.3 In this article, we focus on the history of antitrust in the United States, the first nation to develop and fully-articulate a competition policy, drawing out themes that may be useful to other countries as they contemplate the shape and direction of their own competition regimes. We show that the American competition policy has reflected an underlying stability and bi-partisanship, but that …


Feminist Foundations For The Law Of Business: One Law And Economics Scholar's Survey And (Re)View, Barbara Ann White Oct 1999

Feminist Foundations For The Law Of Business: One Law And Economics Scholar's Survey And (Re)View, Barbara Ann White

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The purpose of this Essay is to suggest frameworks and modes of inquiry for applying feminist legal analysis to business law and the related theory of law and economics. It does so in two ways. One is to assess works already written by feminist scholars in the business law arena, highlighting how those contributions have begun to pave the way towards enriching the scope of business law analysis. The other is to offer two new roles for feminist jurisprudence. One role is to define just (that is, fair) distributions of rights and the other role is to define social judgments …


Recent Trends In Merger Enforcement In The United States: The Increasing Impact Of Economic Analysis, Robert H. Lande, James Langenfeld Jan 1998

Recent Trends In Merger Enforcement In The United States: The Increasing Impact Of Economic Analysis, Robert H. Lande, James Langenfeld

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From its modern origins more than thirty years ago federal merger policy has centered around the use of standard surrogates for market power to make presumptions about the likely effects of mergers. Since that time it has been evolving towards an increasingly complex approach as economic considerations have expanded their influence on merger policy. This trend was solidified in the 1982 revision of the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines, accelerated by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines' increased emphasis on unilateral (as opposed to collusive) anticompetitive effects, and has reached new heights in the …


Creating Competition Policy For Transition Economies: Introduction, Robert H. Lande Jan 1997

Creating Competition Policy For Transition Economies: Introduction, Robert H. Lande

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This is an introduction to a symposium on Creating Competition for Transition Economies. This article provides an overview of the topic, and also briefly introduces the authors of the articles in the symposium; William Kovacic, Eleanor Fox, Spencer Weber Waller, Malcolm Coate, and Armando Rodriguez.


A Law & Economics Perspective On A "Traditional" Torts Case: Insights For Classroom And Courtroom, Robert H. Lande Apr 1992

A Law & Economics Perspective On A "Traditional" Torts Case: Insights For Classroom And Courtroom, Robert H. Lande

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This article is from a symposium, "Five Approaches to Legal Reasoning in the Classroom: Contrasting Perspectives on O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co. Ltd.," 57 Missouri L. Rev. 345 (1992). The symposium contains five articles that analyze this case from, respectively, traditionalist, Law & Economics, Critical Legal Studies, Feminist, and Critical Race Theories perspectives.

This article analyzes the O'Brien case from a Law & Economics perspective. It does so in a manner suitable for presentation in a Torts class or a Law & Economics class. It explains the basic terminology and approach. It analyzes the economics underlying the vaccination requirement, whether …


More Lessons From Japan: End Industrywide Collective Bargaining?, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr. Sep 1990

More Lessons From Japan: End Industrywide Collective Bargaining?, Robert H. Lande, Richard O. Zerbe Jr.

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The number of books and articles discussing Japanese management techniques with an eye to transplanting them to the United States is staggering. Americans understandably are impressed by Japanese efficiency and like to think the adoption of some of their techniques will aid our own industries. Often these proposals seem fanciful and fail to recognize the many differences between the two countries, their economic systems and cultures.


The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law And Economics Meet The Real World, Michael I. Meyerson Apr 1990

The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law And Economics Meet The Real World, Michael I. Meyerson

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"Law and economics" has been hailed by its supporters as the only intellectually valid means for analyzing legal issues. Its critics have dismissed law and economics as amoral and biased against the poor. Ironically, each side in this frequently acrimonious debate has much to offer those in the opposing camp. This Article reflects a modest attempt to bridge the chasm.

One need not believe that money is everything in order to believe that the effect a given legal rule has on total societal wealth is relevant in decisionmaking. But this admission does not consign one to a legal world where …


Commentary: Implications Of Professor Scherer's Research For The Future Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande Jan 1990

Commentary: Implications Of Professor Scherer's Research For The Future Of Antitrust, Robert H. Lande

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One way to test the accuracy of Professor Scherer's research is to compare it to the best previous work in the area. Prior to his current article the best analysis of the state of economic thinking and knowledge during antitrust's formative period was presented twelve years ago by—Professor Scherer. This was a skeletal precurser to the well-documented version that he now presents, but his overall conclusions are identical. During the twelve years since his conclusions were presented in the Yale Law Journal no one has demonstrated that his research is in any way faulty or misleading, even though many have …


Risk-Utility Analysis And The Learned Hand Formula: A Hand That Helps Or A Hand That Hides?, Barbara Ann White Jan 1989

Risk-Utility Analysis And The Learned Hand Formula: A Hand That Helps Or A Hand That Hides?, Barbara Ann White

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Judicial inconsistencies in balancing costs against benefits in legal determinations, sometimes referred to as the Learned Hand Formula, indicate that the implications are not fully understood. The incorporation of more formal economic cost-benefit analysis by some courts has only served to increase the confusion and wariness about fostering such guidelines for social behavior.

This article's purpose is threefold. One is to demonstrate how the use of cost-benefit analysis necessarily imparts the moral and/or political values of the user into his or her decisions. While the cost-benefit technique is itself value-neutral, its application, as will be shown, requires that some moral …


Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, Steven C. Salop Dec 1987

Monopoly Power And Market Power In Antitrust Law, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande, Steven C. Salop

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This article seeks an answer to a question that should be well settled: for purposes of antitrust analysis, what is 'market power' and/or 'monopoly power'? The question should be well settled because antitrust law requires proof of actual or likely market power or monopoly power to establish most types of antitrust violations.

Examination of key antitrust law opinions, however, shows that courts define 'market power' and 'monopoly power' in ways that are both vague and inconsistent. We conclude that the present level of confusion is unnecessary and results from two different but related errors:

(1) the belief or suspicion that …


Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande Oct 1987

Do The Doj Vertical Restraints Guidelines Provide Guidance?, Alan A. Fisher Ph.D., Frederick I. Johnson, Robert H. Lande

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Vertical restraints come in a glittering menu of exceptional variety, including resale price maintenance (RPM), tying, exclusive dealing, requirements contracts, "best efforts" clauses, full-line forcing, airtight and nonairtight exclusive territories, customer restrictions, areas of primary responsibility, profit-passover provisions, restrictions on locations of outlets, and dual distribution. Firms sometimes combine vertical restraints into packages. The great variety of individual and combined vertical restraints complicates the discovery of market effects. Indeed, identifying what restraint(s) a given firm is using at any particular time can be difficult.