Law Commons^™

Billions Of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating The Housing Bubble: How And Why The Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, Rebecca N. Morrow

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The mortgage interest deduction is an incredibly popular, politically well-supported and hugely expensive tax incentive. Yet economic studies consistently show that the mortgage interest deduction fails to advance its fundamental purpose. It does not increase the rate of homeownership. On the contrary, to the extent that it is effective in influencing human behavior, it does so by inflating home prices and encouraging borrowing against equity. These effects – inflated home prices and excessive borrowing – contributed to the economic crisis of 2008. In the years leading up to the crisis, Americans spent billions of tax dollars further inflating a dangerously …

The Eleventh Annual Albert A. Destefano Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law At The Fordham Corporate Law Center: Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes In An Age Of Economic Expertise, The Honorable Jed Rakoff

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The title of my little talk here tonight is “Are

Federal Judges Competent?” This naturally raises the question of whether I am competent to answer that question. I put this question to myself, and, after careful consideration of both sides of the argument, concluded that I am competent to determine whether I am competent. As H. L. Mencken once said, “A judge is a law student who grades his own exams.”

Accountability And The Bureau Of Consumer Financial Protection, Susan Block-Lieb

Faculty Scholarship

Some industry and political actors oppose the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) on the grounds that its institutional design ensures its lack of accountability. Specifically, opponents point to the CFPB’s regulatory and financial independence and to the fact that a single director heads the Bureau rather than a bipartisan panel of commissioners. But to focus on the Bureau’s financial independence and single director misses the distinctive political deal struck when Congress created the CFPB. The CFPB has been uniquely and intentionally structured to insulate it not only from interest group influence and executive interference, but also from congressional control, while …