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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Why (Only) Esops?, Robert C. Hockett
Why (Only) Esops?, Robert C. Hockett
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Minding The Gaps: Fairness, Welfare, And The Constitutive Structure Of Distributive Assessment, Robert C. Hockett
Minding The Gaps: Fairness, Welfare, And The Constitutive Structure Of Distributive Assessment, Robert C. Hockett
Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers
Despite over a century’s disputation and attendant opportunity for clarification, the field of inquiry now loosely labeled “welfare economics” (WE) remains surprisingly prone to foundational confusions. The same holds of work done by many practitioners of WE’s influential offshoot, normative “law and economics” (LE).
A conspicuous contemporary case of confusion turns up in recent discussion concerning “fairness versus welfare.” The very naming of this putative dispute signals a crude category error. “Welfare” denotes a proposed object of distribution. “Fairness” describes and appropriate pattern of distribution. Welfare itself is distributed fairly or unfairly. “Fairness versus welfare” is analytically on all fours …
Discounting, On Stilts, Douglas A. Kysar
Discounting, On Stilts, Douglas A. Kysar
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This paper provides a critical overview of several articles presented at the Intergenerational Discounting and Intergenerational Equity Conference held at the University of Chicago Law School on April 27-28, 2006. First, it demonstrates that conventional normative justifications offered for the use of discounting future costs and benefits for policy analysis in the intergenerational context do not withstand scrutiny. Second, it observes that the compensatory transfers that are sometimes thought to sanitize the cost-benefit procedure in the intergenerational context are deeply problematic, both in their theoretical construction and in their practical adequacy for the tasks they are being deployed to accomplish. …
Comparative Foreign Direct Investment Law: Determinants Of The Legal Framework And The Level Of Openness And Attractiveness Of Host Economies, Jean-Yves P. Steyt
Comparative Foreign Direct Investment Law: Determinants Of The Legal Framework And The Level Of Openness And Attractiveness Of Host Economies, Jean-Yves P. Steyt
Cornell Law School LL.M. Student Research Papers
Foreign direct investment, henceforth denoted FDI, constitutes a basic component of the ongoing economic globalization. The latter phenomenon refers to the increasing economic interdependence of countries in the sense that today goods, services, capital and technologies are exchanged or diffused on a truly global market, accompanied by an unprecedented cross-border flow of human resources.
A large majority of states on every continent have been liberalizing or further liberalizing their investment policies and laws over the last decades. The substantial impact and role of international instruments and organizations on this progressive liberalization process has been stressed on both the global and …
Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies In Corporate Law, Margaret M. Blair, Lynn A. Stout
Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies In Corporate Law, Margaret M. Blair, Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This Article has two goals: to praise Professor Robert Clark as a remarkable corporate scholar, and to explore how his work has helped to advance our understanding of corporations and corporate law. Clark wrote his classic treatise at a time when corporate scholarship was dominated by a principal-agent paradigm that viewed shareholders as the principals or sole residual claimants in public corporations and treated directors as shareholders' agents. This view naturally led contemporary scholars to believe that the chief economic problem of interest in corporate law was the "agency cost" problem of getting corporate directors to do what shareholders wanted …