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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Ethnography In The Realm Of The Pragmatic: Studying Pragmatism In Law And Politics, Annelise Riles
Ethnography In The Realm Of The Pragmatic: Studying Pragmatism In Law And Politics, Annelise Riles
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
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The Uncertain Psychological Case For Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
The Uncertain Psychological Case For Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The Democratization Process And Structural Adjustment In Africa, Muna Ndulo
The Democratization Process And Structural Adjustment In Africa, Muna Ndulo
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The Dynamic Of Institutional Discrepancies And Growing Contradiction Within The International Economic Order, Chantal Thomas
The Dynamic Of Institutional Discrepancies And Growing Contradiction Within The International Economic Order, Chantal Thomas
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
On The Proper Motives Of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want To Invite Homo Economicus To Join Your Board), Lynn A. Stout
On The Proper Motives Of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want To Invite Homo Economicus To Join Your Board), Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
One of the most important questions in corporate governance is how directors of public corporations can be motivated to serve the interests of the firm. Directors frequently hold only small stakes in the companies they manage. Moreover, a variety of legal rules and contractual arrangements insulate them from liability for business failures. Why then should we expect them to do a good job?
Conventional corporate scholarship has great difficulty wrestling with this question, in large part because conventional scholarship usually adopts the economist's assumption that directors are rational actors motivated purely by self-interest. This homo economicus model of behavior may …