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Full-Text Articles in Law
Distributional Arguments, In Reverse, Alex Raskolnikov
Distributional Arguments, In Reverse, Alex Raskolnikov
Faculty Scholarship
This Article contends that the government should consider – rather than ignore – distributional consequences both in the design of legal rules and during legal transitions. This does not mean that the distributional effect of every legal rule should be measured and taken into account in the rule’s design. But if the likely distributional effects are unintended, large, and objectionable, if the efficiency of the legal rule is doubtful, if the compensating tax-and-transfer adjustment is not forthcoming (or has not occurred), policymakers should take distribution into account. One way of doing so is to choose among several alternative legal rules …
Appraisal Arbitrage And Shareholder Value, Scott Callahan, Darius Palia, Eric L. Talley
Appraisal Arbitrage And Shareholder Value, Scott Callahan, Darius Palia, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Post-merger appraisal rights have been the focus of heated controversy within mergers and acquisitions circles in recent years. Traditionally perceived as an arcane and cabalistic proceeding, the appraisal action has recently come to occupy center stage through the ascendancy of appraisal arbitrage — whereby investors purchase target-company shares shortly after an announcement principally to pursue appraisal. Such strategies became more feasible and profitable a decade ago, on the heels of two seemingly technocratic reforms in Delaware: (i) the statutory codification of pre-judgment interest, pegging a presumptive rate at five percent above the federal discount rate; and (ii) the Transkaryotic opinion, …
Lessons From Sec V. Citigroup: The Optimal Scope For Judicial Review Of Agency Consent Decrees, Dorothy S. Lund
Lessons From Sec V. Citigroup: The Optimal Scope For Judicial Review Of Agency Consent Decrees, Dorothy S. Lund
Faculty Scholarship
On November 28, 2011, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Manhattan declined to approve a consent judgment between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Citigroup. Because Citigroup had not admitted or denied the allegations in the consent decree, Judge Rakoff concluded that he was unable to make an informed judgment about the merits of the settlement. Judge Rakoffs decision has garnered serious criticism from legal observers and rekindled discussion about the scope of judicial review of agency consent decrees, which have become a valuable agency enforcement tool. …
Measuring Benchmark Damages In Antitrust Litigation, Justin Mccrary, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Measuring Benchmark Damages In Antitrust Litigation, Justin Mccrary, Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Faculty Scholarship
We compare the two dominant approaches to estimation of benchmark damages in antitrust litigation, the forecasting approach and the dummy variable approach. We give conditions under which the two approaches are equivalent and present the results of a small simulation study.
Accepting The Limits Of Tax Law And Economics, Alex Raskolnikov
Accepting The Limits Of Tax Law And Economics, Alex Raskolnikov
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the limits of tax law and economics, attributing them to the unique complexity of the tax optimization problem. Designers of the optimal tax system must account for the impossibility of deterring socially undesirable behavior, provide for redistribution, and minimize social costs on the basis of assumptions that are laden with deeply contested value judgments, pervasive empirical uncertainty, or both. Given these challenges, it is hardly surprising that economic theory has a much weaker connection to the content of our tax laws and their enforcement than it does to the content and enforcement of many other legal regimes. …
Becker And Foucault On Crime And Punishment – A Conversation With Gary Becker, François Ewald, And Bernard Harcourt: The Second Session, Gary S. Becker, Francois Ewald, Bernard E. Harcourt
Becker And Foucault On Crime And Punishment – A Conversation With Gary Becker, François Ewald, And Bernard Harcourt: The Second Session, Gary S. Becker, Francois Ewald, Bernard E. Harcourt
Faculty Scholarship
In his 1979 lectures at the Collège de France, The Birth of Biopolitics, Michel Foucault discussed and analyzed Gary Becker’s economic theory of crime and punishment, originally published in The Journal of Political Economy in 1968 under the title “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” In this historic, second encounter at the University of Chicago, Gary Becker responds to Foucault’s lectures and possible critical readings of his writings on crime and punishment, in conversation with Professors François Ewald (who was, at the time in 1979, Foucault’s assistant at the Collège and one of Foucault’s closest interlocutors) and Bernard Harcourt (a …
Marine-Salvage Law And Marine-Peril-Related Policy: A Second-Best And Third-Best Economic-Efficiency Analysis Of The Problem, The Law, And The Classic Landes And Posner Study, Richard S. Markovits
Marine-Salvage Law And Marine-Peril-Related Policy: A Second-Best And Third-Best Economic-Efficiency Analysis Of The Problem, The Law, And The Classic Landes And Posner Study, Richard S. Markovits
Faculty Scholarship
This Article (1) delineates the different kinds of allocative costs that marine-peril contingencies can generate and the different kinds of marine-peril-related decisions that can generate allocative inefficiency (marine-salvage-operation investment decisions; decisions about whether to offer to attempt or to actually attempt marine rescues; decisions about the character of the marine-rescue attempts that are made; decisions by potential rescuees to accept or reject offers of marine-rescue attempts; and decisions by potential rescuees to make or reject various marine-peril-avoidance moves); (2) defines the formal meaning of "the most-allocatively-efficient response a State can make to marine-peril contingencies;" (3) explains why, standing alone, judge-prescribed …
The Strategic Structure Of Offer And Acceptance: Game Theory And The Law Of Contract Formation, Avery W. Katz
The Strategic Structure Of Offer And Acceptance: Game Theory And The Law Of Contract Formation, Avery W. Katz
Faculty Scholarship
The purpose of this article is to promote a particular research program; namely, the use of game theory to analyze the law of contract formation. Although I will often simply speak of offer and acceptance in my discussion, I mean to refer to a broader set of issues than are commonly denoted by this doctrinal label. My program transcends the narrow issue of whether particular communications technically should be classified as offers and acceptances, and includes questions often analyzed under the rubrics of implication and interpretation. At its broadest, my argument addresses all legal rules that answer two types of …