Law Commons^™

Response To Oliar And Stern: On Duration, The Idea/Expression Dichotomy, And Time, Wendy J. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Courts often use possession to determine who should own unclaimed resources. Yet, as Oliar and Stern demonstrate, the concept of possession is little more than a metaphor, capable of being applied to a broad range of phenomena. The authors helpfully deploy “time” as a metric to sort through the rules determining what should count as possession, and they survey the likely costs and benefits attached to choosing earlier versus later events as triggers for acquiring title.

With those tools in hand, Oliar and Stern employ “time” and the analogy of physical possession to address problems in copyright, patent, and trademark …

Price Discrimination & Intellectual Property, Michael J. Meurer, Ben Depoorter

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter reviews the law and economics literature on intellectual property law and price discrimination. We introduce legal scholars to the wide range of techniques used by intellectual property owners to practice price discrimination; in many cases the link between commercial practice and price discrimination may not be apparent to non-economists. We introduce economists to the many facets of intellectual property law that influence the profitability and practice of price discrimination. The law in this area has complex effects on customer sorting and arbitrage. Intellectual property law offers fertile ground for analysis of policies that facilitate or discourage price discrimination. …

Bargaining Failure And Failure To Bargain, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

In this talk I want to do four things. First, I’m going to present a motivating example, and second I will discuss what causes IP litigation. I want to distinguish between bargaining failure and failure to bargain ex ante. This is the descriptive portion of my project, and the message is really pretty simple. In law and economics, we think a lot about why people who have a dispute, who sit cross from each other at a table, fail to do the efficient thing, which is to stay out of the courtroom and avoid incurring litigation costs. Law and economics …

The Fair Use Doctrine: Markets, Market Failure And Rights Of Use, Wendy J. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Markets are most acceptable when they serve efficiency and other goals. It is only under transaction-costless conditions of perfect knowledge, flawless and cost-free enforcement, full monetization, and instantaneous ability to organize and negotiate, that markets are guaranteed to generate efficient outcomes. And even then, markets could fall short as social tools, because goals other than allocative efficiency may fail to be met.

Copyright And Parody: Touring The Certainties Of Property And Restitution, Wendy J. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

One of the supposed certainties of the common law is that persons need not pay for benefits they receive except when they have agreed in advance to make payment. The rule takes many forms. One of the most familiar is the doctrine that absent a contractual obligation, a person benefited by a volunteer ordinarily need not pay for what he has received. This rule supposedly both encourages economic efficiency and respects autonomy.

Price Discrimination, Personal Use And Piracy: Copyright Protection Of Digital Works, Michael J. Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

The growth of digital information transmission worries copyright holders who fear the new technology threatens their profits because of greater piracy and widespread sharing of digital works. They have responded with proposals for expanded protection of digital works. Specifically, they seek restrictions on personal use rights regarding digital works provided by the fair use and first sale doctrines. The proposed changes in the allocation of property rights to digital information significantly affect the ability of copyright holders to practice price discrimination. Broader user rights make discrimination more difficult; broader producer rights make discrimination easier. I argue that more price discrimination …