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Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Law And Economics Of Behavioral Regulation, Avishalom Tor
The Law And Economics Of Behavioral Regulation, Avishalom Tor
Journal Articles
This article examines the law and economics of behavioral regulation (“nudging”), which governments and organizations increasingly use to substitute for and complement traditional instruments. To advance its welfare-based assessment, Section 1 examines alternative nudging definitions and Section 2 considers competing nudges taxonomies. Section 3 describes the benefits of nudges and their regulatory appeal, while Section 4 considers their myriad costs—most notably the private costs they generate for their targets and other market participants. Section 5 then illustrates the assessment of public and private welfare nudges using cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, and rationality-effects analysis.
Mistaken About Mistakes, Kathryn Zeiler
Mistaken About Mistakes, Kathryn Zeiler
Faculty Scholarship
Theoretical work in behavioral economics aims to modify assumptions of standard neoclassical models of individual decision-making to better comport with observed behavior. The alternative assumptions fall into at least two categories: nonstandard preferences and psychological mistakes. Applications of behavioral economics models in law, however, tend to assume that deviations from standard neoclassical models are meant to build in psychological mistakes that produce regrettable choices. Often follow-on policy prescriptions suggest interventions that either help individuals choose correctly or go further to substitute the “correct” choices for those that mistake-prone individuals might choose in error. Such policy prescriptions are ill suited in …
Nudges That Should Fail?, Avishalom Tor
Nudges That Should Fail?, Avishalom Tor
Journal Articles
Professor Sunstein (2017) discusses possible causes for and policy implications of the failure of nudges, with a special attention to defaults. Though he focuses on nudges that fail when they should succeed, Sunstein recognizes that some failures reveal that a nudge should not have been attempted to begin with. Nudges that fail, however, does not consider fully the relationship between the outcomes of nudging and their likely welfare effects, most notably neglecting the troubling case of nudges that succeed when they should fail. Hence, after clarifying the boundaries of legitimate nudging and noting the fourfold relationship between the efficacy of …
Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power For "We The People", Martha T. Mccluskey
Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power For "We The People", Martha T. Mccluskey
Journal Articles
Toward that goal, this essay proposes a structural principle of collective economic power for “we the people.” This principle is both consistent with longstanding Constitutional ideals and tailored to the current challenges of neoliberal ideology and policy. It develops two premises: first, it rejects the neoliberal economic ideology that defines legitimate power and freedom as individualized “choice” constrained by an existing political economy. Instead, this proposed principle recognizes that meaningful political economic freedom and power fundamentally consist of access to collective organizations with potential to create a “more perfect union” with better and less constrained options. Second, the post-Lochner principle …
The Law And Economics Of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies And Incapacitation, Murat C. Mungan
The Law And Economics Of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies And Incapacitation, Murat C. Mungan
Faculty Scholarship
Economic analyses of criminal law are frequently and heavily criticized for being unable to explain many criminal law rules and doctrines that people find intuitively just. Existing economic models cannot properly explain, for instance, why criminal law distinguishes between (i) repeat offenders and first-time offenders, (ii) murder and voluntary manslaughter, and (iii) remorseful and non-remorseful offenders.
In this Article, I propose a new and richer economic theory of crime that captures the rationales behind these practices, and potentially behind many other important criminal law principles and doctrines. Unlike an overwhelming majority of previous economic analyses, my theory accounts not only …
Beyond Individualism In Law And Economics, Robert B. Ahdieh
Beyond Individualism In Law And Economics, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
The study of law and economics was built upon two pillars. The first is the familiar assumption of individual rationality. The second, less familiar, is the principle of methodological individualism. Over the last twenty years, law and economics has largely internalized behavioral critiques of the rationality assumption. By contrast, the field has failed to appreciate the implications of growing challenges to its methodological individualism. Where social norms shape individual choices, network externalities are strong, coordination is the operative goal, or information is a substantial determinant of value, a methodology strongly oriented to the analysis of individuals overlooks at least as …
The Methodology Of The Behavioral Analysis Of Law, Avishalom Tor
The Methodology Of The Behavioral Analysis Of Law, Avishalom Tor
Journal Articles
This article examines the behavioral analysis of law, meaning the application of empirical behavioral evidence to legal analysis, which has become increasingly popular in legal scholarship in recent years. Following the introduction in Part I, this Article highlights four central propositions on the subject. The first, developed in Part II, asserts that the efficacy of the law often depends on its accounting for relevant patterns of human behavior, most notably those studied by behavioral decision scientists. This Part therefore reviews important behavioral findings, illustrating their application and relevance to a broad range of legal questions. Part III then argues that …
The "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, David A. Hoffman
The "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, David A. Hoffman
All Faculty Scholarship
How and when do courts determine that corporate disclosures are actionable under the federal securities laws? The applicable standard is materiality: would a (mythical) reasonable investor have considered a given disclosure important. As I establish through empirical and statistical testing of approximately 500 cases analyzing the materiality standard, judicial findings of immateriality are remarkably common, and have been stable over time. Materiality's scope results in the dismissal of a large number of claims, and creates a set of cases in which courts attempt to explain and defend their vision of who is, and is not, a reasonable investor. Thus, materiality …
Calabresi And The Intellectual History Of Law And Economics, Keith N. Hylton
Calabresi And The Intellectual History Of Law And Economics, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This essay traces the vein of thought represented by Calabresi's "The Costs of Accidents", both backward in time to examine its sources, and forward to its impact on current scholarship. I focus on three broad topics: positive versus normative law and economics, positivist versus anti-positivist thinking in law, and the assumption of rationality in law and economics.
Preferences And Rational Choice: New Perspectives And Legal Implications: Introduction, Matthew D. Adler, Claire Finkelstein, Peter H. Huang
Preferences And Rational Choice: New Perspectives And Legal Implications: Introduction, Matthew D. Adler, Claire Finkelstein, Peter H. Huang
Publications
No abstract provided.
How Relevant Is Jury Rationality?, David A. Hoffman
How Relevant Is Jury Rationality?, David A. Hoffman
All Faculty Scholarship
This essay reviews Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide by Cass Sunstein, et al. The book provides a good example of a recent trend: the use of behavioralist research to justify surprisingly paternalistic legal reforms. While critics of behavioralism often contend that its theoretical foundations are weak, this approach is unlikely to prove an effective rejoinder in the new debate about what kinds of paternalism are made permissible by human "irrationality". A better approach: (1) notes the lack of a nexus between behavioralism and the supposed emergent necessity of paternalist reforms; and (2) suggests that juror unwillingness to apply cost-benefit formula …
Risk And Design, James E. Krier
Risk And Design, James E. Krier
Articles
Risk springs from uncertainty,' uncertainty invites error, and, since error can be costly, we would prefer to avoid it (provided, of course, that avoidance is not more costly yet). While there is much in the Noll and Krier article2 about judgmental error under conditions of risk and uncertainty, there is little about ways to avoid it. So avoidance-more accurately, minimization-of error costs is the topic I want to address very briefly and partially here.
The Brilliant, The Curious, And The Wrong, Pierre Schlag
The Brilliant, The Curious, And The Wrong, Pierre Schlag
Publications
No abstract provided.
The Problem Of Social Cost Revisited, Donald H. Regan
The Problem Of Social Cost Revisited, Donald H. Regan
Articles
SOME years ago, in a paper entitled "The Problem of Social Cost," Professor Ronald Coase asserted and argued for a proposition which has since acquired the convenient sobriquet "the Coase Theorem." The proposition is: That in a world of perfect competition, perfect information, and zero transaction costs, the allocation of resources in the economy will be efficient and will be unaffected by legal rules regarding the initial impact of costs resulting from externalities. Note that there are two claims being made, which it is well to separate for purposes of discussion. The first claim is that, under the conditions described, …