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Full-Text Articles in Law
Laying Down The "Brics": Enhancing The Portability Of Awards In International Commercial Arbitration, Benjamin C. Mccarty
Laying Down The "Brics": Enhancing The Portability Of Awards In International Commercial Arbitration, Benjamin C. Mccarty
Benjamin C McCarty
The drafters of the 1958 New York Convention intended Article V(2)(b) to be interpreted narrowly, and while most pro-arbitration national courts do maintain narrowly defined areas of public policy that are sufficient for refusal of the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, this is not always the case. Developing states and jurisdictions that maintain corrupt or inefficient judicial systems have shown a greater willingness to invoke the public policy exception for a broader, amorphous variety of reasons. This phenomenon has created a sense of unpredictability among international investors, arbitrators, and business executives as to the amount of deference …
An Approach To The Regulation Of Spanish Banking Foundations, Miguel Martínez
An Approach To The Regulation Of Spanish Banking Foundations, Miguel Martínez
Miguel Martínez
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the legal framework governing banking foundations as they have been regulated by Spanish Act 26/2013, of December 27th, on savings banks and banking foundations. Title 2 of this regulation addresses a construct that is groundbreaking for the Spanish legal system, still of paramount importance for the entire financial system insofar as these foundations become the leading players behind certain banking institutions given the high interest that foundations hold in the share capital of such institutions.
A Comparison Of The Jurisprudence Of The Ecj And The Efta Court On The Free Movement Of Goods In The Eea: Is There An Intolerable Separation Of Article 34 Of The Tfeu And Article Of 11 Of The Eea?, Jarrod Tudor
Jarrod Tudor
Article 11 of the European Economic Area (“EEA”) and Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) prohibit quantitative restrictions on the free movement of goods. The EEA is monitored by the European Free Trade Area Court (“EFTA Court”) and the TFEU is monitored by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”). In theory, the EFTA Court and the ECJ should interpret Article 11 and Article 34 in the same manner in order to promote harmonization of the law on the free movement of goods and allow for further economic integration between EFTA and the EU. …
The Free Movement Of Capital In Europe: Is The European Court Of Justice Living Up To Its Framers' Intent And Setting An Example For The World?, Jarrod Tudor
Jarrod Tudor
The benefits to free movement of international financial flows are numerous but include an efficient asset market and the opportunity for economic growth and development for countries engaged in an agreement allowing for such freedom. The free movement of capital is one of the four pillars of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union (TFEU) along with the free movement of goods, services, and labor. Article 63 of the TFEU prohibits limitations on the free movement of capital while Article 65 of the TFEU allows for some exceptions. Not only does the free movement of capital doctrine suppose …
Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang
Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, many questions still remain unanswered. In particular, an important puzzle in a bad-law jurisdiction is: why some controlling shareholders (“roving controllers”) loot the entire corporate assets at once, and why others (“stationary controllers”) siphon a part of corporate assets on a continuous basis. To solve this conundrum, this Article provides analytical frameworks exploring the behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. To begin with, I reinterpret Olson’s political theory of “banditry” in the context of corporate governance in developing countries. Based on a new taxonomy of controlling shareholders (“roving controllers” …
Re-Envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, And Implications, Sang Yop Kang
Re-Envisioning Investors’ Anti-Director Rights Index: Theory, Criticism, And Implications, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
‘Law and Finance’ theory – which offers analytical frameworks to measure the protection of public investors and the quality of corporate governance – has dominated the comparative corporate governance scholarship in the last decade. So far, many proponents and critics have had debates on the relevance of the theory and the implications of the theory’s empirical studies. Several important points in relation to shareholder protection, however, have been highly neglected in these debates. In particular, the significance of one-share-one-vote (OSOV) rule has been inappropriately underestimated. In response, this Article explores (1) why OSOV is an utmost critical component in corporate …
On The Public-Law Character Of Competition Law: A Lesson Of Asian Capitalism, Michael Dowdle
On The Public-Law Character Of Competition Law: A Lesson Of Asian Capitalism, Michael Dowdle
Michael Dowdle
This article argues that competition law is best seen as a form of public law – ‘the law that governs the governing of the state – and not as simply a form of private market regulation. It uses the experiences of ‘Asian capitalism’ to show how capitalist economies are in fact much more variegated than the orthodox model of competition law presumes, and that this variegated character demands a form of regulation that is innately political rather than simply technical. Orthodox competition regimes address this complexity by segregating non-standard capitalisms into alternative doctrinal jurisprudences, but this renders conceptually invisible the …
Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang
Controlling Shareholders: Benevolent “King” Or Ruthless “Pirate”, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Unfair self-dealing and expropriation of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder are common business practices in developing countries (“bad-law countries”). Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, there are many questions unanswered in relation to behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. For example, a puzzle is that some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries voluntarily extract minority shareholders less than other controlling shareholders. Applying Mancur Olson’s framework of political theory of “banditry” to the context of corporate governance, this Article proposes that there are at least two categories of controlling shareholders. “Roving controllers” are dominant shareholders with …
Directors’ Legal Duties And Csr: Prohibited, Permitted Or Prescribed In Contemporary Corporate Law?, Benedict Sheehy, Donald Feaver
Directors’ Legal Duties And Csr: Prohibited, Permitted Or Prescribed In Contemporary Corporate Law?, Benedict Sheehy, Donald Feaver
Benedict Sheehy
Abstract: The interaction between CSR obligations and directors’ legal duties is seriously under examined. This article addresses that lack by examining directors’ duties in case law and legislation across the major commonwealth countries and the USA. It provides an analysis of leading cases and examines how they deal with the issues of the shareholder primacy doctrine, corporate legal theory, CSR and directors’ duties. The article reviews fiduciary relations and duties, analyses the directors’ duties to exercise power in the best interests of the company as a whole and for proper purposes. As this area of law is highly contested there …
Efficient Breach In The Common European Sales Law (Cesl), Wenqing Liao
Efficient Breach In The Common European Sales Law (Cesl), Wenqing Liao
Wenqing Liao
In the classic economic theory, it is suggested that contract law should be structured in such a way that efficient breaches (i.e. those increasing social welfare) would be promoted. The default remedy of expectation damages was justified on this cognition. Nowadays, more and more suspects and critiques are raised against the so called simple efficient breach model. The aim of this paper is to re-sketch the theory of efficient breach and to compare the consequences resulting from economic analysis with the remedy rules of the Common European Sales Law (CESL). It is proposed that the doctrine of efficient breach has …
Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang
Re-Envisioning The Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why Controlling Shareholders And Minority Shareholders Embrace Each Other, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
According to conventional corporate governance scholarship, controlling shareholder regimes exist in jurisdictions where minority shareholders are not well protected by controlling shareholders’ expropriation. However, Professor Ronald Gilson raises a critical point against the conventional view; if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the conventional view explains, why do we observe any minority shareholders at all in such “bad-law” countries? One possible reason is that in response to controlling shareholders’ expropriation, minority shareholders discount severely shares that corporations issue. Then, a related question is: if it is true, why do some controlling shareholders in bad-law countries have many …
The Separation Of Powers, Constitutionalism And Governance In Africa: The Case Of Modern Cameroon, John Mukum Mbaku
The Separation Of Powers, Constitutionalism And Governance In Africa: The Case Of Modern Cameroon, John Mukum Mbaku
JOHN MUKUM MBAKU
The Separation of Powers, Constitutionalism and Governance in Africa: The Case of Modern Cameroon
John Mukum Mbaku, Esq.
Abstract
Countries incorporate the principle of the separation of powers in their constitutions in an effort to meet several goals, the most important of which is to minimize government-induced tyranny. Specifically, countries that make this principle part of their constitutional practice intend to limit public servants by national laws and institutions, enhance government accountability, minimize opportunistic behaviors by civil servants and politicians, provide for checks and balances, and generally improve government efficiency. Cameroon, like many other African countries that transitioned to democratic …
Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition And The Enforcement Of Foreign Money Judgments In The United States, Gregory Shill
Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition And The Enforcement Of Foreign Money Judgments In The United States, Gregory Shill
Gregory Shill
Recent multi-billion-dollar damage awards issued by foreign courts against large American companies have focused attention on the once-obscure, patchwork system of enforcing foreign-country judgments in the United States. That system’s structural problems are even more serious than its critics have charged. However, the leading proposals for reform overlook the positive potential embedded in its design.
In the United States, no treaty or federal law controls the domestication of foreign judgments; the process is instead governed by state law. Although they are often conflated in practice, the procedure consists of two formally and conceptually distinct stages: foreign judgments must first be …
Foreign Citizens In Transnational Class Actions, Jay Tidmarsh, Linda Sandstrom Simard
Foreign Citizens In Transnational Class Actions, Jay Tidmarsh, Linda Sandstrom Simard
Jay Tidmarsh
This Article addresses an increasingly important question: When, if ever, should foreign citizens be included as members of an American class action? The existing consensus holds that courts should exclude from class membership those foreign citizens whose country does not recognize an American class judgment. Our analysis begins by establishing that this consensus is flawed. Rather, to minimize the costs associated with relitigation in a foreign forum, we must distinguish between foreign claimants who are likely to commence a subsequent foreign proceeding from those who are unlikely to do so; distinguishing between those who come from recognizing and nonrecognizing countries …