Law Commons^™

Regulating The Food Truck Industry: An Illustration Of Proximity And Sanitation Regulations, Nicholas Alvarez

Journal of Food Law & Policy

Manny Hernandez, a Chicago food truck owner, would wake up in the middle of the night and slowly travel by foot around downtown Chicago carrying a 200-foot rope. The rope was used to measure the distance from the doors of brick-and-mortar restaurants to possible parking locations for his food truck. A Chicago ordinance prohibited food trucks from operating within 200 feet of the front door of any brick-and-mortar restaurant. Furthermore, Manny could not just find one spot; he needed to find many spots because Chicago law also stated that food trucks were only allowed to park at one location for …

Can Permissionless Blockchains Avoid Governance And The Law?, Eric Alston, Wilson Law, Ilia Murtazashvili, Martin Weiss

Notre Dame Journal on Emerging Technologies

Permissionless (or public) blockchain networks are a new form of decentralized private governance in the digital sphere. Though legal scholars recognize the significance of law in the use of blockchain, existing research using legal and institutional perspectives leaves blockchain governance as something of a black box. We provide a more granular analysis, finding that blockchain governance operates on four distinct levels. Governance at the protocol layer involves discrete institutional design choices intended to constrain network members’ incentives in an ongoing sense. Subsidiary governance arises from the need for communities to draft protocol updates and from the fact that governance protocol …

Anticompetitive Mergers In Labor Markets, Ioana Marinescu, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Indiana Law Journal

Mergers of competitors are conventionally challenged under the federal antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition in some product or service market in which the merging firms sell. In many of these cases the threat is that in concentrated markets—those with only a few sellers—the merger increases the likelihood of collusion or collusion-like behavior. The result will be that the post-merger firm will reduce the volume of sales in the affected market and prices will rise.

Mergers can also injure competition in markets in which the firms purchase, however. Although that principle is widely recognized, very few litigated cases …

Given Today's New Wave Of Protectionsim, Is Antitrust Law The Last Hope For Preserving A Free Global Economy Or Another Nail In Free Trade's Coffin?, Allison Murray

Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review

No abstract provided.

Integrating Micro And Macro Policy Levers In Response To Financial Crises, Daniel A. Crane, Markus Kitzmuller, Graciela Miralles

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis originated from a poor incentive structure in the asset market derived from subprime mortgages. The ultimate bursting and unwinding of an asset bubble (here highly overvalued real estate prices woven into a complex multilayer network of securitization, so called collateralized debt obligations or CDOs) put enormous stress on the financial system, spreading through the global network economy and ultimately resulting in the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Economists today agree that the severe economic fallout can be largely attributed to the poor systemic performance of international financial markets. Global macroeconomic imbalances, as well …

Exclusion In Digital Markets, Konstantinos Stylianou

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

This article recasts the existing analytical framework on exclusion to account for the technology-intensive nature of digital markets. It discusses:

a) technological ways that affect the competitive intensity in digital markets
b) empirical data on the durability of competitive advantage in digital markets, and
c) the nature of exclusion as a monopolization tactic from a technological point of view

The technology element is important because as a matter of order it is technological capabilities and limitations that define what the transactional overlay can be, not the other way around. Economists start from the pre-assumption that “in the beginning there [are] …

A Socio-Economic Approach To Antitrust: Unpacking Competition, Consumer Surplus, And Allocative Efficiency, Jeffrey L. Harrison

Akron Law Review

The primary function of socio-economics is to ask questions and broaden the discussion. I have attempted to do that by unpacking and contextualizing the two economic goals of antitrust law - maximizing consumer surplus and allocative efficiency. I have avoided what I believe is today's faith-based approach as exemplified by the Supreme Court. That approach has now gone beyond economics and seems to reveal, in its most benign form, a deep distrust of government.

At its most basic and obvious level the two antitrust goals cede to those with income - earned or not - the right to determine how …

The Corporation’S Place In Society, Gabriel Rauterberg

Michigan Law Review

The vast majority of economic activity is now organized through corporations. The public corporation is usurping the state’s role as the most important institution of wealthy capitalist societies. Across the developed world, there is increasing convergence on the shareholder-owned corporation as the primary vehicle for creating wealth. Yet nothing like this degree of convergence has occurred in answering the fundamental questions of corporate capitalism: What role do corporations serve? What is the goal of corporate law? What should corporate managers do? Discussion of these questions is as old as the institutions involved.

Services, Intellectual Property And The Major Issues Of The Uruguay Round, Claude E. Barfield

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

A Comprehensive Economic And Legal Analysis Of Tying Arrangements, Guy Sagi

Seattle University Law Review

The law of tying arrangements as it stands does not correspond with modern economic analysis. Therefore, and because tying arrangements are so widely common, the law is expected to change and extensive academic writing is currently attempting to guide its way. In tying arrangements, monopolistic firms coerce consumers to buy additional products or services beyond what they intended to purchase. This pressure can be applied because a consumer in a monopolistic market does not have the alternative to buy the product or service from a competing firm. In the absence of such choice, the monopolistic firm can allegedly force the …

E-Books, Collusion, And Antitrust Policy: Protecting A Dominant Firm At The Cost Of Innovation, Nicholas Timchalk

Seattle University Law Review

Amazon’s main rival, Apple, went to great lengths and took major risks to enter the e-book market. Why did Apple simply choose not to compete on the merits of its product and brand equity (the iPad and iBookstore) as it does with its other products? Why did Apple decide not to continue to rely on its earlier success of situating its products differently in the market than other electronics and working hard to be different and cutting-edge with its e-book delivery? This Note argues that the combination of Amazon’s 90% market share, network externalities, and an innovative technology market creates …

Banking And Competition In Exceptional Times, Brett Christophers

Seattle University Law Review

This Article has two main aims: to provide a critical consideration of this contemporary antitrust “revival” from an explicitly political–economic perspective and to point toward some theoretical resources that might facilitate such an assessment.Part II looks backward at the evolution and application of competition law in the banking sector over the relatively longue durée. In this Part, I invoke the concept of “exception” to understand how antitrust policy has developed, and my chief interlocutors are the perhaps unlikely figures of Giorgio Agamben and Karl Marx. Part III looks forward and considers the central question around which the recent resurgence of …

Compatible Or Conflicting: The Promotion Of A High Level Of Employment And The Consumer Welfare Standard Under Article 101, Tom C. Hodge

William & Mary Business Law Review

The antitrust, or competition, regime of the European Union (EU) differs substantially from that of the United States, because EU competition law forms part of the EU Treaties and is therefore imbibed with the multiple values of the European Union itself. Accordingly, it is by no means clear or settled if the anti-cartel law of the European Union, Article 101 TFEU, must focus solely on a consumer welfare standard or must also consider the broad and multiple policy aims enshrined in the EU Treaties. If Article 101 must balance multiple aims, this would be in stark contrast to Section 1 …

Congress, Corporate Boards, And Oversight: A Public Law/Private Law Comparison, Paul S. Miller

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Politics Of Competition: Review Of Clifford Winston's Government Failure Versus Market Failure: Microeconomics Policy Research And Government Performance And Mark K. Landy, Martin A. Levin & Martin Shapiro, Eds., Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics Of Regulatory Reform, Russell P. Hanser

Federal Communications Law Journal

Two recent books focus attention on the role of regulation in the modem economy and the reasons why efforts at deregulation succeed or fail. Clifford Winston's Government Failure Versus Market Failure: Microeconomics Policy Research and Government Performance reviews empirical studies of regulation and its alternatives, arguing that economic regulation has quite often done more harm than good. In Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics of Regulatory Reform, editors Mark K. Landy, Martin A. Levin and Martin Shapiro collect essays addressing the political dangers faced by those pursuing market liberalization, both before and (especially) after reform is enacted. Read together, these books …

Trolling For Trolls: The Pitfalls Of The Emerging Market Competition Requirement For Permanent Injunctions In Patent Cases Post-Ebay, Benjamin H. Diessel

Michigan Law Review

In eBay v. MercExchange, a unanimous Supreme Court announced that a new four-factor test should be employed by district courts in determining whether to award an injunction or damages to an aggrieved party whose intellectual property has been infringed. In the context of permanent injunctions in patent cases, district courts have distorted the four-factor test resulting in a "market competition requirement." Under the new market competition requirement, success at obtaining an injunction is contingent upon a party demonstrating that it is a market competitor After consistent application in the first twenty-five district court cases post-eBay, the market competition requirement …

Knowledge, Competition And The Innovation: Is Stronger Ipr Protection Really Needed For More And Better Innovations, Giovanni Dosi, Luigi Marengo, Corrado Pasquali

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

The main questions addressed in this Article are thus: given that growth is a highly desirable phenomenon and that it is primarily spurred by technological innovation, how should society solve the problem of favoring a sufficient level of investments in R&D? In particular, is it necessarily true and always desirable that, independent of any other consideration, society should protect innovators from competition and shelter them in a legally protected and enforced monopoly? Is it true that the real source of economic value of new recipes is only found in the blueprints of ideas that those recipes implement? Is it necessarily …

Maximum Vertical Price Fixing From Albrecht Through Brunswick To Khan: An Antitrust Odyssey, James M. Fesmire

Seattle University Law Review

The article attempts to sort out some of this confusion caused by the legal journey from Albrecht to Khan by portraying that long road as a successful example of the antitrust injury doctrine's ability to bring substantive antitrust law into compliance with the goals of antitrust. First, the article examines how the existence of successive monopoly provides an incentive for maximum vertical price fixing and how maximum vertical price fixing leads to an increase in consumer welfare. Second, it examines manufacturer alternatives to vertical price restraints, finding them less attractive in terms of social welfare. Third, the article analyzes other …

The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo

Michigan Law Review

There are many cases in which a firm passively invests in its competitor. For example, Microsoft passively invested in $150 million worth of the nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the operating systems market. Also, in November 1998, Northwest Airlines, the nation's fourth-largest airline, purchased 14% of the common stock of Continental Airlines Inc., the nation's fifth-largest (and fastest growing) airline. Northwest competes with Continental on seven routes, serving 3.6 million passengers per year. In another example, TCI, the nation's largest cable operator, became a passive investor with a 9% stake (which can be increased, under the terms …

The Price Of Law: How The Market For Lawyers Distorts The Justice System, Gillian K. Hadfield

Michigan Law Review

Bill Clinton's legal bills in connection with the Lewinsky scandal topped $10 million; the bill for Ken Starr's investigation of the President exceeded $50 million. The cost to the eight families portrayed in the bestseller A Civil Action for their tort suit against a manufacturing company accused of dumping hazardous chemicals into the water supply was $4.8 million (paid from a settlement of about $8 million); the cost for the defense exceeded $7 million. Lawyers who represented the three states in the nationwide suit by state attorneys general against tobacco companies to recoup smoking-related health care costs were awarded $8.2 …

Scholarship Of The Absurd: Bob Bork Meets The Bald Soprano, Alex Kozinski

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Antitrust Economics on Trial: A Dialogue on the New Laissez-Faire by Walter Adams and James W. Brock

Models Of Market Behaviour And Competition Law: Exclusive Dealing, Marilyn Maccrimmon, Asha Sadanand

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

The paper arose out of the authors' belief that economic principles should, and probably will, play a larger role in the decisions of the new Competition Tribunal. The objective of the paper is to clarify some of the underlying assumptions and choices implicit in the regulation of competitive behaviour by examining the literature on economic analysis of market behaviour written by both economists and lawyers. The authors are especially concerned with the recent emphasis on strategic behaviour and its contrast to the Chicago school approach which recommends less interference with market behaviour. They examine the differences between the assumptions of …

A Micro-Microeconomic Approach To Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, Harry S. Gerla

Michigan Law Review

If we are to gain an accurate perspective on the impact of antitrust laws and policies on the behavior of firms in the real world, we must adopt a micro-microeconomic approach which focuses not on how rational, profit-maximizing firms will theoretically behave, but upon how late twentieth-century American managers and executives actually behave. This article attempts to begin that task.

Part I of this article examines the justifications for focusing on individual managers rather than profit-maximizing firms as the key actors in antitrust law. Part II looks at contemporary management mores and practices and develops some generalized "rules of the …

Consumer Beware Chicago, Eleanor M. Fox

Michigan Law Review

Professor Hovenkamp's article, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, reveals an important truth. Chicago School economics does not provide a superior roadmap to efficiency. I would take the critique one step further and assert: The main gap between Chicago and its critics is not even the design of the roadmap to efficiency. The main gap is social and political philosophy.

Rhetoric And Skepticism In Antitrust Argument, Herbert Hovenkamp

Michigan Law Review

In his essay on Workable Antitrust Policy Judge Easterbrook professes an extraordinary skepticism about economic models in general, and particularly about the ability of courts to use economic models to distinguish the competitive from the anticompetitive. But a profession of skepticism is itself a very powerful rhetorical device; it creates a perception of tough-mindedness, of refusal to yield real-world observations to analytic models or other abstractions, of extreme reluctance to accept any proposition that has not been clearly proven. Further, it is always very easy to be a skeptic, because every position ever taken except perhaps for a few tautologies …

Workable Antitrust Policy, Frank H. Easterbrook

Michigan Law Review

One of the schools of thought in the economics of antitrust was called "workable competition." The adherents to this school believed that markets were prone to cartelization and that concentration was death on competition, but that occasionally competition might prove "workable." These scholars were suspicious of almost every industrial practice they saw. One of the manifestations of their work came to be known as the "structure-conduct-performance paradigm." The thesis was that you could tell whether competition was feasible from the structure of the market. If the top four firms had fifty percent or so of the sales, we should abandon …

Antitrust Law, Competition, And The Macroeconomy, Peter C. Carstensen

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This article examines the links between antitrust law-one possible tool for dealing with economic ills-and macroeconomic structure. It analyzes the current policy and economic assumptions underlying the importance of antitrust enforcement in reaching a healthy, competitive economy and concludes that such enforcement does contribute to the increased effectiveness of macroeconomic tools.

Part I explores the current macroeconomic theories and their policy implications. Part II discusses the related concepts of market power and competition and concludes that dissipation of market power is preferable, but that the regulation of market power may yield significant social and economic benefits in the short run, …

The Patent-Antitrust Balance: Proposals For Change, N.R. Powers

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Law - The Per Se Rule - Naked Horizontal Territorial Restraints Held To Be Illegal Per Se, A. Roy Decaro

Villanova Law Review

No abstract provided.

N-Person Game Theory: Concepts And Applications, By Anatol Rapoport, Robert L. Birmingham

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.