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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Law In Hiding: Market Principles In The Global Legal Order, Odette Lienau
Law In Hiding: Market Principles In The Global Legal Order, Odette Lienau
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Standing in the background of the global legal order are a range of what might be called “market principles” or “market givens” -- collective presentations or beliefs about how markets work -- which are treated as objective descriptions at a particular time and place. This Article argues that such market givens should be understood as a kind of “law in hiding,” shaping the policy space available to states and other actors and affecting global legal developments in important but unrecognized ways. Drawing on examples from global financial law, rules on capital mobility, and sovereign debt practices, I demonstrate how market …
Law-And-Economics Approaches To Labour And Employment Law, Stewart J. Schwab
Law-And-Economics Approaches To Labour And Employment Law, Stewart J. Schwab
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This article describes the distinctive approaches that law and economics takes to labour and employment law. The article distinguishes between ‘economic analysis of law’ and ‘law and economics’, with the former applying economic models to generally simple legal rules while the latter blends messier institutional detail with legal and economic thought. The article describes three eras of law-and-economics scholarship, recognizing that economics teaches that markets work and markets fail. Era One emphasizes that labour laws and mandatory employment rules might reduce overall social welfare by preventing a benefit or term from going to the party that values it most highly. …
Pain And Suffering Damages In Personal Injury Cases: An Empirical Study, Yun-Chien Chang, Theodore Eisenberg, Tsung Hsien Li, Martin T. Wells
Pain And Suffering Damages In Personal Injury Cases: An Empirical Study, Yun-Chien Chang, Theodore Eisenberg, Tsung Hsien Li, Martin T. Wells
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Many jurisdictions award pain and suffering damages, yet it is difficult for judges or juries to quantify pain. Several jurisdictions, such as California, cap pain and suffering damages or other noneconomic damages, and legal scholars have proposed ways to control such damages. Reforms and proposals, however, have been based on limited empirical evidence. It remains an open question whether components of economic damages explain pain and suffering damages. This study employs a unique dataset of Taiwan district court cases and uses detailed information on the components of pecuniary damages. Pain and suffering damages highly correlate with the plaintiff’s medical expenses, …
Inside The Arbitrator's Mind, Susan D. Franck, Anne Van Aaken, James Freda, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Inside The Arbitrator's Mind, Susan D. Franck, Anne Van Aaken, James Freda, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Arbitrators are lead actors in global dispute resolution. They are to global dispute resolution what judges are to domestic dispute resolution. Despite its global significance, arbitral decision making is a black box. This Article is the first to use original experimental research to explore how international arbitrators decide cases. We find that arbitrators often make intuitive and impressionistic decisions, rather than fully deliberative decisions. We also find evidence that casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that arbitrators render “split the baby” decisions. Although direct comparisons are difficult, we find that arbitrators generally perform at least as well as, but never …
Putting Distribution First, Robert C. Hockett
Putting Distribution First, Robert C. Hockett
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
It is common for normative legal theorists, economists and other policy analysts to conduct and communicate their work mainly in maximizing terms. They take the maximization of welfare, for example, or of wealth or utility, to be primary objectives of legislation and public policy. Few if any of these theorists seem to notice, however, that any time we speak explicitly of maximizing one thing, we speak implicitly of distributing other things and of equalizing yet other things. Fewer still seem to recognize that we effectively define ourselves by reference to that which we distribute and equalize. For it is in …