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Don't Answer The Door: Montejo V. Louisiana Relaxes Police Restrictions For Questioning Non-Custodial Defendants, Emily Bretz
Don't Answer The Door: Montejo V. Louisiana Relaxes Police Restrictions For Questioning Non-Custodial Defendants, Emily Bretz
Michigan Law Review
In 2009, the Supreme Court held in Montejo v. Louisiana that a defendant may validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during police interrogation, even if police initiate interrogation after the defendant's invocation of the right at the first formal proceeding. This Note asserts that Montejo significantly altered the Sixth Amendment protections available to represented defendants. By increasing defendants' exposure to law enforcement, the decision allows police to try to elicit incriminating statements and waivers of the right to counsel after the defendant has expressed a desire for counsel. In order to protect the defendant's constitutional guarantee of a …
Identifying And (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, And Incidental Rights In Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Susan R. Klein
Identifying And (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, And Incidental Rights In Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Susan R. Klein
Michigan Law Review
The Miranda conundrum runs something like this. If the Miranda decision represents true constitutional interpretation, and all unwarned statements taken during custodial interrogation are "compelled" within the meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the impeachment and "fruits" exceptions to Miranda should fall. If it is not true constitutional interpretation, than the Court has no business reversing state criminal convictions for its violation. I offer here what I hope is a satisfying answer to this conundrum, on both descriptive and normative levels, that justifies not only Miranda but a host of similar Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court decisions as well. In Part …
Police-Obtained Evidence And The Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, Arnold H. Loewy
Police-Obtained Evidence And The Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, Arnold H. Loewy
Michigan Law Review
The article will consider four different types of police-obtained evidence: evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation, confessions and lineup identifications obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel, and coerced confessions. My conclusions are that evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure is excluded because of the police misconduct by which it was obtained. On the other hand, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation is (or ought to be) excluded because use of that evidence compromises the defendant's procedural right not to be compelled to be a witness against …
Confusing The Fifth Amendment With The Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication Of The Innis Definition Of Interrogation, Jonathan L. Marks
Confusing The Fifth Amendment With The Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication Of The Innis Definition Of Interrogation, Jonathan L. Marks
Michigan Law Review
This Note examines how these courts have applied or misapplied Innis, and concludes that, while many of these decisions are consistent with Miranda and Innis, too many others are not. In order to evaluate these cases, it is first necessary to understand the meaning and significance of Innis. Part I thus considers Innis and its background. Part II then examines lower court decisions applying the Innis test, dividing these decisions into six groups based on the most common factual scenarios. Because the cases deal with factually specific police practices, this method constitutes the most useful way to …
Due Process And Parole Revocation, Michigan Law Review
Due Process And Parole Revocation, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
In Morrissey, the Court set the level of due process needed in parole revocations. Specifically, it held that the parolee facing •revocation has a right (a) to receive written notice of the claimed parole violations; (b) to hear the evidence against him; (c) to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing the confrontation); (e) to have a neutral and detached hearing body, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) to be given …
Kirby, Biggers, And Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against The Danger Of Convicting The Innocent?, Joseph D. Grano
Kirby, Biggers, And Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against The Danger Of Convicting The Innocent?, Joseph D. Grano
Michigan Law Review
Even recognizing the danger of misidentification, procedural safeguards, especially constitutional ones, are not readily apparent. Some judges, such as Justice Stewart, find less need for counsel at photographic displays than at lineups; others find an equivalent or even greater need for counsel. Some judges, in approving on-the-scene identifications without counsel, find a guarantee of accuracy in the short interval between the crime and the identification; other judges decry such procedures and find them inherently suggestive. The problem stems directly from the lack of scientific knowledge and inquiry. Therefore, in analyzing the recent identification cases, this Article will draw upon experimental …