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Labor and Employment Law

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Arbitration

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Is Labor Arbitration Lawless?, Paige M. Skiba, Ariana R. Levinson, Erin O'Hara O'Connor Jan 2021

Is Labor Arbitration Lawless?, Paige M. Skiba, Ariana R. Levinson, Erin O'Hara O'Connor

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Labor arbitration is often viewed as a more peaceful, productive, and private alternative to workplace strikes and violence. On the other hand, statutory laws are intended to protect all workers, and contract law default rules and rules of interpretation often serve a protective role that could be harmful if ignored in this private dispute resolution setting. To provide more insight into how arbitrators decide labor disputes, we utilize our newly crafted data set of hundreds of labor arbitration awards spanning a decade. Unlike prior data sets, our data are more inclusive: they include both published and unpublished awards as well …


Predictability Of Arbitrators' Reliance On External Authority?, Paige M. Skiba, A. Levinson, E. O'Hara O'Connor Jan 2020

Predictability Of Arbitrators' Reliance On External Authority?, Paige M. Skiba, A. Levinson, E. O'Hara O'Connor

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Should arbitrators consider authority-such as statutes or case law-external to the collective bargaining agreement when deciding labor grievances? Do they rely on such external authority? If so, do they do so in particular circumstances or in certain types of cases? To provide more insight on this often-debated issue, we have amassed a new data set of hundreds of labor arbitration awards spanning a decade. In contrast to previous research, we find that the overwhelming majority of awards do not cite to any external authority (statutes, administrative authorities, case law, or secondary sources). Yet, only a small fraction of awards explicitly …


Inside The Arbitrator's Mind, Chris Guthrie, Susan D. Franck, Anne Van Aaken, James Freda, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski Jan 2017

Inside The Arbitrator's Mind, Chris Guthrie, Susan D. Franck, Anne Van Aaken, James Freda, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Arbitrators are lead actors in global dispute resolution. They are to global dispute resolution what judges are to domestic dispute resolution. Despite its global significance, arbitral decision making is a black box. This Article is the first to use original experimental research to explore how international arbitrators decide cases. We find that arbitrators often make intuitive and impressionistic decisions, rather than fully deliberative decisions. We also find evidence that casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that arbitrators render “split the baby” decisions. Although direct comparisons are difficult, we find that arbitrators generally perform at least as well as, but never …


An Empirical Analysis Of Noncompetition Clauses And Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, Randall Thomas Jan 2015

An Empirical Analysis Of Noncompetition Clauses And Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Employment contracts for most employees are not publicly available, leaving researchers to speculate about whether they contain postemployment restrictions on employee mobility, and if so, what those provisions look like. Using a large sample of publicly available CEO employment contracts, we are able to examine these noncompetition covenants, including postemployment covenants not to compete ("CNCs" or "noncompetes'), nonsolicitation agreements ("NSAs"), and nondisclosure agreements ("NDAs'). What we found confirms some long-held assumptions about restrictive covenants but also uncovers some surprises.

We begin by discussing why employers use restrictive covenants and examining how the courts have treated them. We then analyze an …


An Empirical Analysis Of Ceo Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, Randall Thomas, Stewart J. Schwab Jan 2006

An Empirical Analysis Of Ceo Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, Randall Thomas, Stewart J. Schwab

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this paper, we examine the key legal characteristics of 375 employment contracts between some of the largest 1500 public corporations and their Chief Executive Officers. We look at the actual language of these contracts, asking whether and in what ways CEO contracts differ from what are thought of as standard employment contract features for other workers. Our data provide some empirical answers to several common assertions or speculations about CEO contracts, and shed light on whether these contracts are negotiated solely to suit the preferences of CEOs or have provisions that insure that the employers' interests are also safeguarded. …