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Regulation Of The Work Performance Relationship: Independent Contractors, Labor Subcontractors, And Joint Control Over An Employment-Like Relationship, Marley S. Weiss
Regulation Of The Work Performance Relationship: Independent Contractors, Labor Subcontractors, And Joint Control Over An Employment-Like Relationship, Marley S. Weiss
Marley S. Weiss
I. Introduction. II. Who is covered and who is excluded from the protective scope of labor law, and the legal consequences for those excluded as independent contractors or owners. III. Benefits and burdens of the “employment relationship” characterization compared to a contract for services. IV. Speculations about solutions to the work relationship problem.
The Right To Strike In Essential Services Under United States Labor Law, Marley S. Weiss
The Right To Strike In Essential Services Under United States Labor Law, Marley S. Weiss
Marley S. Weiss
SUMMARY: I. Introduction. II. A Brief History of U.S. Collective Labor Relations Laws. III. The Structure of Labor-Management Relations in The U.S. IV. The Right to Strike. V. Private Sector “Essential Services” Provisions: LMRA National. VI. Conclusion.
Architectural Digest For International Trade And Labor Law: Regional Free Trade Agreements And Minimum Criteria For Enforceable Social Clauses, Marley S. Weiss
Architectural Digest For International Trade And Labor Law: Regional Free Trade Agreements And Minimum Criteria For Enforceable Social Clauses, Marley S. Weiss
Marley S. Weiss
Until the advent of binding “social clauses” in free trade arrangements, and incorporation of stronger social rights in the European Community treaties, the rapid widening and deepening of international commercial integration proceeded largely separate from international labor rights obligations. Inclusion of a “social clause” in a trade agreement ensures that the parties´ international labor rights commitments have equal dignity and binding force with their trade obligations. The threat of economic sanction for non-observance of labor commitments akin to the penalties for trade rule violations also may provide some “teeth” to induce compliance, unlike the lack of economic sanctions for violation …