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Full-Text Articles in Law
Fait Accompli?: Where The Supreme Court And Equal Pay Meet A Narrow Legislative Override Under The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Megan Coluccio
Fait Accompli?: Where The Supreme Court And Equal Pay Meet A Narrow Legislative Override Under The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Megan Coluccio
Seattle University Law Review
This Comment argues the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act’s consequences will be minimally felt, so long as the Act is narrowly construed. The Comment suggests congressional action was appropriate after the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter decision and discusses the political and legislative debate leading to the Act. In addition, the Comment analyzes the Act in application, exploring its meaning, implications, and function. The Comment argues that the concerns and consequences arising from the enactment of the Act can be alleviated and avoided by a narrow interpretation of its amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Finally, the Comment recommends …
The "Presence Is An Essential Function" Myth: The Ada's Trapdoor For The Chronically Ill, Audrey E. Smith
The "Presence Is An Essential Function" Myth: The Ada's Trapdoor For The Chronically Ill, Audrey E. Smith
Seattle University Law Review
In nearly all cases, long-term chronic illnesses satisfy the ADA's broad definition of disability. However, when these illnesses begin to cause absenteeism, the "presence is an essential function" rule effectively denies protection to the victims of these illnesses, as they are no longer "qualified individuals" under the ADA regardless of whether they satisfy the technical requirements for a position. The idea that "presence is an essential function" is a myth because (1) it erroneously assumes that most jobs can be performed only at the worksite, and (2) virtually all employers are able to, and do, accommodate some degree of employee …
Employer Liability Under The Third Party Provision Of The Washington Industrial Insurance Act: The Dual Capacity And Dual Persona Doctrines In Evans V. Thompson, Melissa M. Jackson
Employer Liability Under The Third Party Provision Of The Washington Industrial Insurance Act: The Dual Capacity And Dual Persona Doctrines In Evans V. Thompson, Melissa M. Jackson
Seattle University Law Review
Most workers' compensation schemes are designed to provide a swift and sure source of benefits to injured workers by placing on employers the risks and burdens of modern industry. In keeping with this policy, Washington's Industrial Insurance Act2 (IIA) requires injured workers to relinquish the right to sue at common law for damages sustained on the job, and it requires employers to accept liability for a measure of damages set out by the statute. However, if a worker's injuries are caused by the negligence of a third person who is not in the worker's same employ, the IIA's third-party provision …
Should Representation Elections Be Governed By Principles Or Expediency?, Mary Ellen Krug, Michele Gammer
Should Representation Elections Be Governed By Principles Or Expediency?, Mary Ellen Krug, Michele Gammer
Seattle University Law Review
Should the National Labor Relations Board' set aside representation elections because one or more parties has tried to influence the voting with misrepresentation of facts or law? Although the Board is responsible for ensuring fair elections, in Midland National Life Insurance Co. it embraced a rule inconsistent with this statutory responsibility, rejecting the Hollywood Ceramics Co. rule and narrowly limiting Board review of campaign misrepresentations. This Article examines the Midland standard in light of the Board's statutory duty to protect the right of employees to a free and fair choice of collective bargaining representatives. The Article reviews the historical development …
An Observation About Comparable Worth, George Schatzki
An Observation About Comparable Worth, George Schatzki
Seattle University Law Review
The ultimate legal question is: Does Title VII incorporate the comparable worth doctrine? The courts are saying, "No." Their reasoning is, at best, unpersuasive. Indeed, often their reasoning is nothing more than mere conclusion. Given what I have described briefly as the legal arguments pro and con, one can easily understand that so long as Griggs remains a part of the Title VII scene, there is a rational but not compelling argument to incorporate comparable worth into the Act. How, then, does a court decide? The following discussion is offered not as an example of desirable or undesirable judicial analysis. …