Law Commons^™

An Empirical Analysis Of Ceo Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The Employment Consequences Of Wrongful-Discharge Laws: Large, Small, Or None At All?, David H. Autor, John J. Donahue Iii, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Arbitration And Litigation Of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, Theodore Eisenberg, Elizabeth Hill

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The authors conducted empirical research comparing court case and arbitrated outcomes for employment disputes. In cases not involving civil rights claims, they found little evidence that arbitrated outcomes materially differed from trial outcomes where the claimant was a higher-paid employee. Moreover, they found no statistically significant differences between employee win rates or in the median or mean awards in arbitration and litigation. They also reported evidence indicating that arbitrated disputes conclude more quickly than litigated disputes.

How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare In The Federal Courts Of Appeals, Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Employment-discrimination plaintiffs swim against the tide. Compared to the typical plaintiff, they win a lower proportion of cases during pretrial and after trial. Then, many of their successful cases are appealed. On appeal, they have a harder time in upholding their successes, as well in reversing adverse outcome.

This tough story does not describe some tiny corner of the litigation world. Employment-discrimination cases constitute an increasing fraction of the federal civil docket, now reigning as the largest single category of cases at nearly 10 percent.

In this article, we use official government data to describe the appellate phase of this …

Employment Discrimination, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This article first parses the multiple overlapping definitions of discrimination, including distinctions between group and individual discrimination and between segregation and discrimination in pay. The article then summarizes the major economic models of discrimination, particularly Becker’s taste-for-discrimination model and statistical-discrimination models, as well as sorting the status-production models. The discussion focuses on the conditions under which markets will tend to eliminate discrimination, noting that this occurs in a more limited range of situations than commonly recognized. The article next surveys the economic role of anti-discrimination laws, evaluating arguments that the law speeds the journey to a non-discriminatory equilibrium and that …

Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Diversity Of Contingent Workers And The Need For Nuanced Policy, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The contingent work force is rising. Policymakers and analysts must respond. These are the central themes of Dr. Belous's paper m this symposium. Twenty-five to thirty percent—his current upper- and lower-bound estimates of the size of the contingent work force—are the basic statistics underpinning his call to arms. Dr. Belous includes in the contingent work force all workers who are temporary, part-time, self-employed, or in business services. The spread comes from different methods of handling double counting. The figures update similar estimates he published in 1989 in his well-known book, The Contingent Economy. Dr. Belous has done a great …

Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause And Employment At Will, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications