Law Commons^™

Reply To Judge Easterbrook: Judicial Discretion And Statutory Interpretation, Steven J. Cleveland

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reply To Judge Easterbrook: Regarding History As A Judicial Duty, Harry F. Tepker

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Second Annual Henry Lecture: Judicial Discretion In Statutory Interpretation, Frank H. Easterbrook

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reply To Judge Easterbrook: The Unsupported Delegation Of Conflict Adjudication In Erisa Benefit Claims Under The Guise Of Judicial Deference, Donald T. Bogan

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Linguistics In Law, Alani Golanski

Alani Golanski

The "new textualism" is amenable to the use of linguists in legal cases. New textualists seek to interpret statutes "objectively," according to the "plain meaning" of the statutory terms; these jurists and scholars see plain-meaning analysis as linguistics, and linguistics as science. Law and linguistics pursue different ends, however, and linguists construing statutes will miss legally decisive issues. Modern linguistics theory is an area of central concern to cognitive psychologists as well as philosophers of mind and language. While not hegemonic, Chomsky's psychological program influences modern linguistics, and the linguist's approach often leads in a different direction from that taken …

Communis Opinio And The Methods Of Statutory Interpretation: Interpreting Law Or Changing Law, Michael P. Healy

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Interpretive methodology lies at the core of the Supreme Court's persistent modern debate about statutory interpretation. Supreme Court Justices have applied two fundamentally different methods of interpretation. One is the formalist method, which seeks to promote rule-of-law values and purports to constrain the discretion of judges by limiting them to the autonomous legal text. The second is the nonformalist or antiformalist method, which may consider the legislature's intent or purpose or other evidence as context for understanding the statutory text. The debate within the current Court is commonly framed and advanced by Justices Stevens and Scalia. Justice Scalia is now …

Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element In Statutory Interpretation, William S. Blatt

Articles

No abstract provided.

Evolutionary Statutory Interpretation: Mr. Justice Scalia Meets Darwin, Jeffrey G. Miller

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This paper examines the seeming contrast between the legal doctrines that the interpretation of statutes can evolve over time and that the interpretation of statutes must be grounded only in their texts, which never change unless amended by Congress. That examination is illuminated by complexity and meme theories. The examination is concluded by applying both doctrines and theories to the question of whether the term “navigable water” in a water pollution control statute includes underground water.

No Vehicles In The Park, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

Textualism's Selective Canons Of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, And Deference To Executive Agencies, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This Article demonstrates that textualist Judges, most notably Justices Scalia, Thomas, and, to a lesser extent, Kennedy, have applied some canons too aggressively, and slighted others. Textualist Judges have overused clear-statement rules that narrow statutory meaning, especially as a means to promote federalism and states' rights. On the other hand, textualists have neglected canons that promote individual liberty or executive authority Because canons must be applied on a case-by-case basis and different canons can conflict, it is impossible to formulate one rule for how they should be applied. Nevertheless, the common textualist approach of selectively favoring some canons at the …

Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, Judith S. Kaye

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Statutory Interpretation In Securities Jurisprudence: A Failure Of Textualism, Ediberto Román

Faculty Publications

This Article critiques the development of textualist theory in securities jurisprudence and analyzes the Central Bank decision as an example of the defects inherent in the application of a textualist approach. It demonstrates how the development of textualist securities jurisprudence stemmed from decisions that casually rejected precedent and mischaracterized existing law, thereby resulting in a distortion of the legislature’s intent. An analysis of the Securities Exchange Act demonstrates how the Central Bank Court’s approach towards statutory interpretation led to its failure to analyze other relevant Exchange Act provisions, including the most relevant provision – Section 20(a). The first section of …

The Chaotic Pseudotext, Paul F. Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.

Work Of Knowledge , Abner S. Greene

Faculty Scholarship

Interpretation involves the acquisition of knowledge. We are continually confronted with the results of purposive action. Sometimes these results are written texts, such as statutes or novels. Other times these results are events in the physical world, actions that we observe or the results of actions about which we are told. To make sense of these results of purposive action, that is, to make the results be more than just a jumble of sense impressions, the observer must find a way of organizing the material with which he or she is presented. These methods of organizing the results of purposive …

Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Modern Parol Evidence Rule And Its Implications For New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, Stephen F. Ross, Daniel Trannen

Journal Articles

Part I of this article focuses on the history of parol evidence in contract interpretation, describing both Williston's and Corbin's definition and application of the parol evidence rule. With the adoption of the UCC and the Second Restatement, we suggest that Corbin's position-that expansion of admissibility of parol evidence will more accurately reflect the drafters' manifest intentions and minimize the judge's personal biases-has been accepted by experts and legislators alike. In Part II, we summarize the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, focusing on the rise of the New Textualism and its critique of the use of legislative history …

This Is Not A Sentence, Paul F. Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.

Absurdity And The Limits Of Literalism: Defining The Absurd Result Principle In Statutory Interpretation, Veronica Dougherty

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

The absurd result principle in statutory interpretation provides an exception to the rule that a statute should be interpreted according to its plain meaning. In an age of increasing debate about the proper approach to statutory interpretation, and of increasing emphasis on literal approaches, the absurd result principle poses intriguing challenges to literalism and to theories of interpretation generally.The absurd result principle is extraordinarily powerful. It authorizes a judge to ignore a statute's plain words in order to avoid the outcome those words would require in a particular situation. This is a radical thing; judges are not supposed to rewrite …

That Obscure Object Of Desire: Hermeneutics And The Autonomous Legal Text, Paul Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.

Book Review, Paul Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Stare Decisis "Exception" To The Chevron Deference Rule, Rebecca White

Scholarly Works

In this article, the author discusses how Chevron intersects with one important competing norm - stare decisis. Stare decisis counsels the Court to adhere to its own decisions, particularly statutory ones, absent substantial justification for departure. To what extent should stare decisis apply when an agency's interpretation of a statute, otherwise deserving of deference under Chevron, conflicts with a prior interpretation of the statute by the Supreme Court?

This article suggests the following answer: If the Court's prior opinion upheld the agency's interpretation as one reasonable reading of the statute, but not the only one possible, and the agency thereafter …

Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, Robert S. Summers

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Problems of Jurisprudence by Richard A. Posner

The Case Of The Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis For Statutory Cases, William N. Eskridge Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Earlier in this the first year of the new millennium, Professor Larry Marshall was appointed Chief Justice of the United States. The first important case coming before the Marshall Court involved the government's prosecution of Frankly Amorous under the White Slave Traffic Act of June 25, 1910 (the Mann Act), as amended. Defendant Amorous was a law student in Virginia who paid for the airplane ticket of his female lover to travel from North Carolina to Virginia for the admitted purpose of having extramarital sexual relations. The U.S. Attorney prosecuted Amorous for violating the Mann Act, which criminalizes the knowing …

Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall

Michigan Law Review

In the law school tradition of "suspending belief," Professor Eskridge has created a hypothetical in which I, in my first case as Chief Justice of the United States, must decide whether to adhere to various antiquated and seemingly erroneous precedents interpreting the Mann Act. Eskridge assumes that I will feel compelled to adhere to these decisions, for to do otherwise, he contends, would force me to abandon the proposal for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that I advanced recently in this Law Review. Eskridge then offers a variety of critiques of my thesis, coming from perspectives as diverse …

Raborn V. Davis - Paycheck In Employee's Possession: A Limitation Of The Current Wage Exemption In Texas., Richard E. Flint

St. Mary's Law Journal

Extensions of credit generally help both the debtor and creditor. However, a result of our credit-based economy is that individuals are free to make poor economic decisions, and that they should suffer the consequences of these poor decisions. Although legal rules have had a role in ensuring that debtors are protected from overzealous creditors, commercial transactions can only exist if obligations of debtors are legally enforceable. The role of government, therefore, is to set parameters for procedures to enforce these obligations, while also setting a floor of protected or exempt assets so that debtors will not become wards of the …

The History Of Statutory Interpretation: A Study In Form And Substance, William S. Blatt

Articles

No abstract provided.

Statutory Interpretation In America: Dipping Into Legislative History, Part Ii, Reed Dickerson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Statutory Interpretation In America: Dipping Into Legislative History, Part I, Reed Dickerson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, Reed Dickerson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Cooperative Action For Improved Statutory Interpretation, Frank E. Horack Jr.

Vanderbilt Law Review

During the past quarter century there has been a constant acceleration in legal periodical comment concerning statutory construction. Judges, practicing attorneys and law professors all have echoed basic dissatisfaction with the operation and application of the rules of statutory interpretation. Some would return to the "safe old ground" of literal interpretation; others would find relief in an expanded use of extrinsic aids; all find the process in a state of confusion and disintegration.