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Jurisprudence

Statutory interpretation

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Formulaic Deliberation, Andre L. Smith Sep 2006

Formulaic Deliberation, Andre L. Smith

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Formulaic Deliberation describes the major interpretive regimes--textualism, intentionalism, purposivism, and pragmatism—and represents them formulaically. By classifying them this way, it more precisely describes them as theories, so that we can more precisely perform them as deliberative techniques. And, if we agree that none of them, individually, fits all cases at all times, we can formulaically describe how to synthesize them toward a discrete decision.

William Eskridge, Stanley Fish, Hon. Antonin Scalia, Richard Posner, Ronald Dworkin, John Hart Ely, Adrian Vermeule, Hon. Stephen Breyer, Cass Sunstein, Lawrence Lessig. All of them are right, their method for deciding cases produces benefits with …


Waters Of The United States: Theory, Practice And Integrity At The Supreme Court, Jamison E. Colburn Jul 2006

Waters Of The United States: Theory, Practice And Integrity At The Supreme Court, Jamison E. Colburn

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In the Supreme Court's two wetlands cases this Term, a question of statutory interpretation divided the justices sharply, in part because so much rides on the particular statutory provision at issue. The provision, a cryptic definition within the Clean Water Act (CWA), has now provided three separate occasions at the Court where the justices have confronted (1) the Chevron doctrine and the Court’s own ambivalence toward it, and (2) the CWA's enormous project of restoring the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In this essay, I argue that the way the Court went about resolving its differences …


Review Essay: Using All Available Information, Max Huffman May 2006

Review Essay: Using All Available Information, Max Huffman

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This is a review essay entitled “Using All Available Information,” in which I review and comment on Justice Stephen Breyer’s new book, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, published in September 2005. Justice Breyer’s book, adapted from the Tanner Lectures given in 2005 at Harvard Law School, serves partly as a response to Justice Scalia’s 1997 volume A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. I review Justice Breyer’s book in part by comparison to and contrast with Justice Scalia’s. I propose that much about Justice Breyer’s interpretive philosophy, which centers on determining the “purposes” of texts and interpreting …


Lawyers, Guns And Money: Content Contextualism And The Cognitive Foundations Of Statutory Interpretation, Gary Blasi Mar 2004

Lawyers, Guns And Money: Content Contextualism And The Cognitive Foundations Of Statutory Interpretation, Gary Blasi

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The field of statutory interpretation is one of central importance to both lawyers and judges, perhaps even more central to their daily work than the analysis of appellate opinions. As a field of academic inquiry, however, the field has become rather stagnant and seems now at a stalemate between contending schools of thought, with most siding against the pure forms of textualism sometimes associated with Justice Scalia and arguing for some form of contextualism. What kinds of context should matter is disputed. Thus far, however, scholars have paid remarkably little attention to one crucial contextual factor: What is the statute …


The Role Of Purposivism In The Delegation Of Rulemaking Authority To The Courts, Michael Rosensaft Mar 2004

The Role Of Purposivism In The Delegation Of Rulemaking Authority To The Courts, Michael Rosensaft

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The courts are often used by Congress as a “political lightning rod,” when Congress cannot decide how to resolve an issue. Congress relies on administrative agencies for their expertise, and it also makes sense for Congress to delegate some rulemaking authority to the courts, relying on a court’s expertise in developing caselaw in an incremental basis. However, this authority should not be lightly implied. A court can tell that Congress has delegated rulemaking authority to it when the purpose of the statute is clear and the text is broadly worded. It thus makes sense in these cases that purposivism should …