Law Commons^™

Janus-Faced Judging: How The Supreme Court Is Radically Weakening Stare Decisis, Michael Gentithes

William & Mary Law Review

Drastic changes in Supreme Court doctrine require citizens to reorder their affairs rapidly, undermining their trust in the judiciary. Stare decisis has traditionally limited the pace of such change on the Court. It is a bulwark against wholesale jurisprudential reversals. But, in recent years, the stare decisis doctrine has come under threat.

With little public or scholarly notice, the Supreme Court has radically weakened stare decisis in two ways. First, the Court has reversed its long-standing view that a precedent, regardless of the quality of its reasoning, should stand unless there is some special, practical justification to overrule it. Recent …

Lower Court Compliance With Supreme Court Remands, Elise Borochoff

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Thinking Critically About Equality: Government Can Make Us Equal, Robert L. Hayman, Nancy Levit

Nancy Levit

As kids we called it having to use the old noodle: needing to think real hard about something that was real hard to think about. It was the kind of thinking that would cause your face to get all scrunched up, and if you didn't stop or if someone didn't stop you - it would eventually make your head hurt. The expression came from our families when we figured something out: that's using your old noodle, they'd tell us. The noodle we eventually understood to be our brains, which, we reckon, do look something like noodles, though we were quite …

Thinking Critically About Equality: Government Can Make Us Equal, Robert L. Hayman, Nancy Levit

Robert L. Hayman

No abstract provided.

In Suport Of The Thayer Theory Of Presumptions, Charles V. Laughlin

Michigan Law Review

A learned judge once said to a young lawyer, "If you are ever a trial court judge, never give reasons for your decisions. Your rulings will probably be right, but your reasons will likely be wrong." That statement may aptly apply to judicial pronouncements relating to the subject of presumptions. Decisions are largely free from criticism so far as concerns the results reached, but the reasoning processes by which they are reached appear to be in hopeless confusion. It is believed that a theory can be presented which will both reconcile these confusions of judicial techniques and explain the general …