Law Commons^™

Decision Theory And Babbitt V. Sweet Home: Skepticism About Norms, Discretion, And The Virtues Of Purposivism, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this writing, the author applies a “decision theory” of statutory interpretation, elaborated recently in the Yale Law Journal, to Professor William Eskridge’s illustrative case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon. In the course of this application, she takes issue with the conventional wisdom that purposivism, as a method of statutory interpretation, is inevitably a more virtuous model of statutory interpretation. First, the author questions whether we have a clear enough jurisprudential picture both of judicial discretion and legal as opposed to political normativity. Second, she argues that, under decision theory, Sweet Home is …

Statutory Proximate Cause, Sandra F. Sperino

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Federal statutes often use general causal language to describe how an actor’s conduct must be connected to harm for liability to attach. For example, a statute might state that harm must be “because of” certain conduct. Federal courts have recently relied on this general causal language and other arguments to apply the common law idea of proximate cause to several federal statutes.

While legal scholarship has explored the relationship between statutes and the common law generally, it has not considered whether particular common law doctrines are especially problematic in the statutory context. This Article argues that using proximate cause in …

Bond V. United States: Can The President Increase Congress's Legislative Power By Entering Into A Treaty?, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The proposition that treaties can increase the power of Congress is inconsistent with the text of the Treaty Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. It is inconsistent with the fundamental structural principle that "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and limited."S It implies, insidiously, that that the President and the Senate can increase their own power by treaty. And it implies, bizarrely, that the President alone--or a foreign government alone--can decrease Congress's power and render federal statutes unconstitutional. Finally, it creates a doubly perverse incentive: an incentive to enter into foreign entanglements simply to increase …

Book Review - 'The Elements Of Legislation' By Neil Duxbury, Brian Christopher Jones

Brian Christopher Jones

No abstract provided.