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The Rico Nexus Requirement: A "Flexible" Linkage, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that the RICO "nexus" requirement can be interpreted to limit effectively this overbroad use of RICO without emasculating the statute. The "nexus requirement" is generally described as defining the word "through" in section 1962(c), the provision of RICO that makes it illegal to "conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." This language establishes the necessity of proving a relationship between the enterprise and the racketeering. Once evidence of the alleged enterprise and the predicate racketeering acts has been submitted, the final element of proof must …

Consequences Of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, Jesse H. Choper

Michigan Law Review

The thrust of this Article is to attempt to ascertain just what differences the Court's judgments upholding individual constitutional rights have made for those who fall within the ambit of their protection. It seeks to address such questions as: What were the conditions that existed before the Court's ruling? How many people were subject to the regime that was invalidated by the Justices? Was the Court's mandate successfully implemented? What were the consequences for those affected? At a subjective level, were the repercussions perceived as salutary by those (or at least most of those) who were the beneficiaries of the …

Legal Theory And The Obligation Of A Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, Philip Soper

Book Chapters

Confronted with standards beyond those obvious in purpose and rule, the positivist, says Dworkin, has two choices. He must either claim that such standards are only discretionary and hence not legally binding, or he may concede their binding status and argue that he identifies them as legal standards through reference, in some more complex way, to his theoretical master test.

There is, however, a third possibility. The positivist might admit that some standards bind judges but explain that they play a role in the legal system sufficiently different from that of ordinary rules and principles to justify excluding them from …