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Articles 1 - 30 of 30
Full-Text Articles in Law
Are They All Textualists Now?, Austin Peters
Are They All Textualists Now?, Austin Peters
Northwestern University Law Review
Recent developments at the U.S. Supreme Court have rekindled debates over textualism. Missing from the conversation is a discussion of the courts that decide the vast majority of statutory interpretation cases in the United States—state courts. This Article uses supervised machine learning to conduct the first-ever empirical study of the statutory interpretation methods used by state supreme courts. In total, this study analyzes over 44,000 opinions from all fifty states from 1980 to 2019.
This Article establishes several key descriptive findings. First, since the 1980s, textualism has risen rapidly in state supreme court opinions. Second, this rise is primarily attributable …
Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Interpreting State Statutes In Federal Court, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl
Notre Dame Law Review
This Article addresses a problem that potentially arises whenever a federal court encounters a state statute. When interpreting the state statute, should the federal court use the state’s methods of statutory interpretation—the state’s canons of construction, its rules about the use of legislative history, and the like—or should the court instead use federal methods of statutory interpretation? The question is interesting as a matter of theory, and it is practically significant because different jurisdictions have somewhat different interpretive approaches. In addressing itself to this problem, the Article makes two contributions. First, it shows, as a normative matter, that federal courts …
Two Types Of Empirical Textualism, Kevin Tobia, John Mikhail
Two Types Of Empirical Textualism, Kevin Tobia, John Mikhail
Brooklyn Law Review
Modern textualist and originalist theories increasingly center interpretation around the “ordinary” or “public” meaning of legal texts. This approach is premised on the promotion of values like publicity, fair notice, and democratic legitimacy. As such, ordinary meaning is typically understood as a question about how members of the general public understand the text—an empirical question with an objective answer. This essay explores the role of empirical methods, particularly experimental survey methods, in these ordinary meaning inquiries. The essay expresses optimism about new insight that empirical methods can bring, but it also cautions against the view that these methods will deliver …
Finding Original Public Meaning, James Macleod
Finding Original Public Meaning, James Macleod
Georgia Law Review
Textualists seek to interpret statutes consistent with their “original public meaning” (OPM). To find it, they ask an avowedly empirical question: how would ordinary readers have understood the statute’s terms at the time of their enactment? But as the Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County highlights, merely asking an empirical question doesn’t preclude interpretive controversy. In considering how Title VII applies to LGBT people, the Bostock majority and dissents vehemently disagreed over the statute’s bar on discrimination “because of sex”—each side claiming that OPM clearly supported its interpretation. So who, if anyone, was right? And how can textualists’ …
Pepperdine University School Of Law Legal Summaries, Analise Nuxoll
Pepperdine University School Of Law Legal Summaries, Analise Nuxoll
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
No abstract provided.
The Rhetorical Canons Of Construction: New Textualism's Rhetoric Problem, Charlie D. Stewart
The Rhetorical Canons Of Construction: New Textualism's Rhetoric Problem, Charlie D. Stewart
Michigan Law Review
New Textualism is ascendant. Elevated to prominence by the late Justice Antonin Scalia and championed by others like Justice Neil Gorsuch, the method of interpretation occupies an increasingly dominant place in American jurisprudence. Yet, this Comment argues the proponents of New Textualism acted unfairly to reach this lofty perch. To reach this conclusion, this Comment develops and applies a framework to evaluate the rhetoric behind New Textualism: the rhetorical canons of construction. Through the rhetorical canons, this Comment demonstrates that proponents of New Textualism advance specious arguments, declare other methods illegitimate hypocritically, refuse to engage with the merits of their …
"We Are All Textualists Now": The Legacy Of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
"We Are All Textualists Now": The Legacy Of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
One of my favorite extra-judicial activities is meeting with law students, and it is a pleasure to be with you today. But it is a special privilege to come back to the Jamaica campus of St. John’s College from which I graduated 60 years ago, long before the Law School had moved here from Schermerhorn Street in Brooklyn, and when there was only one building on this former golf course.
I was honored to call Justice Scalia a role model and friend. What I hope to convey to you today, however, is the effect Justice Scalia’s tenure on the …
Change, Creation, And Unpredictability In Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use In The Roberts Court's First Decade, Nina A. Mendelson
Change, Creation, And Unpredictability In Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use In The Roberts Court's First Decade, Nina A. Mendelson
Michigan Law Review
In resolving questions of statutory meaning, the lion’s share of Roberts Court opinions considers and applies at least one interpretive canon, whether the rule against surplusage or the presumption against state law preemption. This is part of a decades-long turn toward textualist statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court. Commentators have debated how to justify canons, since they are judicially created rules that reside outside the statutory text. Earlier studies have cast substantial doubt on whether these canons can be justified as capturing congressional practices or preferences; commentators have accordingly turned toward second-order justifications, arguing that canons usefully make interpretation constrained …
A Means To An Element: The Supreme Court's Modified Categorical Approach After Mathis V. United States, Michael Mcgivney
A Means To An Element: The Supreme Court's Modified Categorical Approach After Mathis V. United States, Michael Mcgivney
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
No abstract provided.
Defining Ambiguity In Broken Statutory Frameworks And Its Limits On Agency Action, Amanda Urban
Defining Ambiguity In Broken Statutory Frameworks And Its Limits On Agency Action, Amanda Urban
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
“The Problem” occurs when a statute’s provisions become contradictory or unworkable in the context of new or unforeseen phenomena, yet the statute mandates agency action. The application of an unambiguous statutory provision may become problematic or unclear. Similarly, unambiguous provisions may become inconsistent given a particular application of the statute. During the same term, in Scialabba and UARG, the Supreme Court performed a Chevron review of agency interpretations of statutes facing three variations of the Problem, which this Note characterizes as direct conflict, internal inconsistency, and unworkability. In each case, the Court defined ambiguity in various, nontraditional ways and …
Superfund Chaos Theory: What Happens When The Lower Federal Courts Don't Follow The Supreme Court, Steven Ferrey
Superfund Chaos Theory: What Happens When The Lower Federal Courts Don't Follow The Supreme Court, Steven Ferrey
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
There is legal chaos in the national Superfund. The Supreme Court reversed decisions of eleven federal circuit courts in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. There is no instance in modern Supreme Court history where the Court reversed every federal circuit court in the country, as it did in Atlantic Research. The Supreme Court’s reversal was through a unanimous decision. This was extraordinary: It not only reversed the entire legal interpretation of one of America’s most critical statutes, but also re-allocated billions of dollars among private parties.
The Supreme Court, when it rendered its decision, seemed to be rectifying a …
The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler
The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler
Northwestern University Law Review
It is widely accepted that courts may correct legislative drafting mistakes, i.e., so-called scrivener’s errors, if and only if such mistakes are “absolutely clear.” The rationale is that if a court were to recognize a less clear error, it might be “rewriting” the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.
This Article argues that the standard is much too strict. The current rationale ignores that courts can “rewrite,” i.e., misinterpret, a statute both by recognizing an error and by failing to do so. Accordingly, because the current doctrine is designed to protect against one type of mistake (false positives) but …
The Science Of Sociological Jurisprudence As A Methodology For Legal Analysis, Richard Langone
The Science Of Sociological Jurisprudence As A Methodology For Legal Analysis, Richard Langone
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Fun With Administrative Law: A Game For Lawyers And Judges, Adam Babich
Fun With Administrative Law: A Game For Lawyers And Judges, Adam Babich
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
The practice of law is not a game. Administrative law in particular can implicate important issues that impact people’s health, safety, and welfare and change business’ profitability or even viability. Nonetheless, it can seem like a game. This is because courts rarely explain administrative law rulings in terms of the public purposes and policies at issue in lawsuits. Instead, the courts’ administrative law opinions tend to turn on arcane interpretive doctrines with silly names, such as the “Chevron two-step” or “Chevron step zero.” To advance doctrinal arguments, advocates and courts engage in linguistic debates that resemble a smokescreen—tending to obscure …
The Demise Of Habeas Corpus And The Rise Of Qualified Immunity: The Court's Ever Increasing Limitations On The Development And Enforcement Of Constitutional Rights And Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, Stephen R. Reinhardt
Michigan Law Review
The collapse of habeas corpus as a remedy for even the most glaring of constitutional violations ranks among the greater wrongs of our legal era. Once hailed as the Great Writ, and still feted with all the standard rhetorical flourishes, habeas corpus has been transformed over the past two decades from a vital guarantor of liberty into an instrument for ratifying the power of state courts to disregard the protections of the Constitution. Along with so many other judicial tools meant to safeguard the powerless, enforce constitutional rights, and hold the government accountable, habeas has been slowly eroded by a …
Using Public Disclosure As The Vesting Point For Moral Rights Under The Visual Artists Rights Act, Elizabeth M. Bock
Using Public Disclosure As The Vesting Point For Moral Rights Under The Visual Artists Rights Act, Elizabeth M. Bock
Michigan Law Review
In 2010, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit confronted the novel question of when moral rights protections vest under the Visual Artists Rights Act. In Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc. v. Bichel, the First Circuit determined that the protections of the Visual Artists Rights Act begin when a work is "created" under the Copyright Act. This Note argues that this decision harms moral rights conceptually and is likely to result in unpredictable and inconsistent decisions. This Note proposes instead that these statutory protections should vest when an artist determines that his work is complete and presents …
Claims, Civil Actions, Congress & The Court: Limiting The Reasoning Of Cases Construing Poorly Drawn Statutes, Joan Steinman
Claims, Civil Actions, Congress & The Court: Limiting The Reasoning Of Cases Construing Poorly Drawn Statutes, Joan Steinman
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Foundations Of Section 1983 Jurisprudence: A Look From The Concept Of Law, Timothy I. Oppelt
The Foundations Of Section 1983 Jurisprudence: A Look From The Concept Of Law, Timothy I. Oppelt
Florida A & M University Law Review
This article uses the theories of H.L.A. Hart to provide an interpretive framework for a vital civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Any interpretation of Sec. 1983 requires some sense of the fundamental nature of law and the ability to identify legal rules. Specifically, this article examines the "under color of" language of Sec. 1983 and the statute's application to municipalities. It is possible that these areas remain partially in flux or undeveloped because the Court lacks an interpretation of the statute that accounts for how rules can confer power, create artificial persons, delegate the ability to act with …
Reply To Judge Easterbrook: Judicial Discretion And Statutory Interpretation, Steven J. Cleveland
Reply To Judge Easterbrook: Judicial Discretion And Statutory Interpretation, Steven J. Cleveland
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Reply To Judge Easterbrook: Regarding History As A Judicial Duty, Harry F. Tepker
Reply To Judge Easterbrook: Regarding History As A Judicial Duty, Harry F. Tepker
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Second Annual Henry Lecture: Judicial Discretion In Statutory Interpretation, Frank H. Easterbrook
Second Annual Henry Lecture: Judicial Discretion In Statutory Interpretation, Frank H. Easterbrook
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Reply To Judge Easterbrook: The Unsupported Delegation Of Conflict Adjudication In Erisa Benefit Claims Under The Guise Of Judicial Deference, Donald T. Bogan
Reply To Judge Easterbrook: The Unsupported Delegation Of Conflict Adjudication In Erisa Benefit Claims Under The Guise Of Judicial Deference, Donald T. Bogan
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, Judith S. Kaye
Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, Judith S. Kaye
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder
Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, Robert S. Summers
Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, Robert S. Summers
Michigan Law Review
A Review of The Problems of Jurisprudence by Richard A. Posner
The Case Of The Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis For Statutory Cases, William N. Eskridge Jr.
The Case Of The Amorous Defendant: Criticizing Absolute Stare Decisis For Statutory Cases, William N. Eskridge Jr.
Michigan Law Review
Earlier in this the first year of the new millennium, Professor Larry Marshall was appointed Chief Justice of the United States. The first important case coming before the Marshall Court involved the government's prosecution of Frankly Amorous under the White Slave Traffic Act of June 25, 1910 (the Mann Act), as amended. Defendant Amorous was a law student in Virginia who paid for the airplane ticket of his female lover to travel from North Carolina to Virginia for the admitted purpose of having extramarital sexual relations. The U.S. Attorney prosecuted Amorous for violating the Mann Act, which criminalizes the knowing …
Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall
Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall
Michigan Law Review
In the law school tradition of "suspending belief," Professor Eskridge has created a hypothetical in which I, in my first case as Chief Justice of the United States, must decide whether to adhere to various antiquated and seemingly erroneous precedents interpreting the Mann Act. Eskridge assumes that I will feel compelled to adhere to these decisions, for to do otherwise, he contends, would force me to abandon the proposal for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that I advanced recently in this Law Review. Eskridge then offers a variety of critiques of my thesis, coming from perspectives as diverse …
Raborn V. Davis - Paycheck In Employee's Possession: A Limitation Of The Current Wage Exemption In Texas., Richard E. Flint
Raborn V. Davis - Paycheck In Employee's Possession: A Limitation Of The Current Wage Exemption In Texas., Richard E. Flint
St. Mary's Law Journal
Extensions of credit generally help both the debtor and creditor. However, a result of our credit-based economy is that individuals are free to make poor economic decisions, and that they should suffer the consequences of these poor decisions. Although legal rules have had a role in ensuring that debtors are protected from overzealous creditors, commercial transactions can only exist if obligations of debtors are legally enforceable. The role of government, therefore, is to set parameters for procedures to enforce these obligations, while also setting a floor of protected or exempt assets so that debtors will not become wards of the …
Cooperative Action For Improved Statutory Interpretation, Frank E. Horack Jr.
Cooperative Action For Improved Statutory Interpretation, Frank E. Horack Jr.
Vanderbilt Law Review
During the past quarter century there has been a constant acceleration in legal periodical comment concerning statutory construction. Judges, practicing attorneys and law professors all have echoed basic dissatisfaction with the operation and application of the rules of statutory interpretation. Some would return to the "safe old ground" of literal interpretation; others would find relief in an expanded use of extrinsic aids; all find the process in a state of confusion and disintegration.
Reappraisal Of Federal Question Jurisdiction, G. Merle Bergman
Reappraisal Of Federal Question Jurisdiction, G. Merle Bergman
Michigan Law Review
For some time I have been reading and listening to criticisms directed toward decisions which the Supreme Court has rendered in cases involving federal question jurisdiction. The general 'tenor of this criticism is that these decisions demonstrate a surprising lack of uniformity and conscious purpose. Writers profess to search in vain for sound logic in the Court's opinions. They point up instead the anomaly which is reflected when cases involving a substantial federal issue are tried in state courts, while those in which no real federal issue is involved are nevertheless accepted for trial in the federal courts. This result, …