Law Commons^™

Semiotic Disobedience, Sonia K. Katyal

Sonia Katyal

Nearly twenty years ago, a prominent media studies professor, John Fiske, coined the term “semiotic democracy” to describe a world where audiences freely and widely engage in the use of cultural symbols in response to the forces of media. A semiotic democracy enables the audience, to a varying degree, to “resist,” “subvert,” and “recode” certain cultural symbols to express meanings that are different from the ones intended by their creators, thereby empowering consumers, rather than producers. In this Article, I seek to introduce another framework to supplement Fiske’s important metaphor: the phenomenon of “semiotic disobedience.” Three contemporary cultural moments in …

Are Jurisprudential Debates Conceptual?: Some Lessons From Democratic Theory, Dan Priel

Dan Priel

The dominant view among legal philosophers is that jurisprudential debates about the nature of law are conceptual. In this article I challenge this view. I do so by comparing these debates to debates about the justification of democracy and showing that the arguments found in both are often very similar. I demonstrate that in both domains, there are arguments on one side that explain an institution (either law or democracy) in terms of its ability to help people lead a better life, and there are arguments on the other side that highlight the value of these institutions in promoting political …

Estructuras De Apoyo Y Justicia Dialógica. Vías Para La Reconciliación Entre Constitucionalismo Y Democracia, Juan Luis Hernández Macías

Juan Luis Hernández Macías

No abstract provided.

Reconciling Positivism And Realism: Kelsen And Habermas On Democracy And Human Rights, David Ingram

David Ingram

It is well known that Hans Kelsen and Jürgen Habermas invoke realist arguments drawn from social science in defending an international, democratic human rights regime against Carl Schmitt’s attack on the rule of law. However, despite embracing the realist spirit of Kelsen’s legal positivism, Habermas criticizes Kelsen for neglecting to connect the rule of law with a concept of procedural justice (Part I). I argue, to the contrary (Part II), that Kelsen does connect these terms, albeit in a manner that may be best described as functional, rather than conceptual. Indeed, whereas Habermas tends to emphasize a conceptual connection between …

Does Political Islam Conflict With Secular Democracy? Philosophical Reflections On Religion And Politics, David Ingram

David Ingram

Abstract: This paper rebuts the thesis that political Islam conflicts with secular democracy. More precisely, it examines three sorts of claims that ostensibly support this thesis: (a) The Muslim religion is incompatible with secular democracy; (b) No Muslim country has instituted secular democracy; and (c) No movement seeking to advance its agenda as aggressively as political Islam does can do so with the degree of moderation required of a political party that is committed to secular democracy. Theologians, philosophers, and political scientists have debated (a) through (c) within the jurisdiction of their respective fields. I propose to combine these debates …

Objectivity And Democracy, David K. Millon

David K. Millon

As a response to skepticism about the possibility of objectivity in legal decisionmaking conventionalism posits the shared understandings of the legal profession (about method and the implications of doctrine) as the source of constraint in legal interpretation. In this Article, Professor Millon argues that conventionalism's proponents have failed to offer an adequate account of interpretive constraint, but that conventionalism properly understood can nevertheless provide a useful perspective on the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation. This account locates interpretive constraint in the practices of the legal profession as a whole, acting as an "interpretive community" or constituting a distinctive "language-game" …

Objectivity And Democracy, David K. Millon

David K. Millon

As a response to skepticism about the possibility of objectivity in legal decisionmaking conventionalism posits the shared understandings of the legal profession (about method and the implications of doctrine) as the source of constraint in legal interpretation. In this Article, Professor Millon argues that conventionalism's proponents have failed to offer an adequate account of interpretive constraint, but that conventionalism properly understood can nevertheless provide a useful perspective on the possibility of objectivity in legal interpretation. This account locates interpretive constraint in the practices of the legal profession as a whole, acting as an "interpretive community" or constituting a distinctive "language-game" …

Direct (Anti-)Democracy, Maxwell L. Stearns

Maxwell L. Stearns

Legal scholars, economists, and political scientists are divided on whether voter initiatives and legislative referendums tend to produce outcomes that are more (or less) majoritarian, efficient, or solicitous of minority concerns than traditional legislation. Scholars also embrace opposing views on which law-making mechanism better promotes citizen engagement, registers preference intensities, encourages compromise, and prevents outcomes masking cycling voter preferences. Despite these disagreements, commentators generally assume that the voting mechanism itself renders plebiscites more democratic than legislative lawmaking. This assumption is mistaken. Although it might seem unimaginable that a lawmaking process that directly engages voters possesses fundamentally antidemocratic features, this Article …

Money And Rights, Deborah Hellman

Deborah Hellman

This article looks at when constitutionally protected rights are interpreted by courts to include a concomitant right to spend money to effectuate the underlying right and when they are not. It concludes that there are two strands in our constitutional law: the Integral Strand, in which a right includes the right to spend money and the Blocked Strand, in which it does not.

The Rule Of Law As The Rule Of Reasons, Mathilde Cohen

Mathilde Cohen

An Excuse-Centered Approach To Transitional Justice, David Gray

David C. Gray

Transitional justice asks what successor regimes, committed to human rights and the rule of law, can and should do to seek justice for atrocities perpetrated by and under their predecessors. The normal instinct is to prosecute criminally everyone implicated in past wrongs; but practical conditions in transitions make this impossible. As a result, most transitions pursue hybrid approaches, featuring prosecutions of those most responsible, amnesties, truth commissions, and reparations. This approach is often condemned as a compromise against justice. This article advances a transitional jurisprudence that justifies the hybrid approach by taking normative account of the unique conditions that define …

Gunneflo - Demokrati Och Lagprövning: Om Rättfärdigandet Av En Positiv Respektive Negativ Inställning Till Lagprövning [Democracy And Judicial Review: On The Justicfication Of A Positive And A Negative Attitude To Judicial Review In A Democracy], Markus Gunneflo

Markus Gunneflo

Democratic Governance: An Emerging Customary Norm?, Jackson N. Maogoto

Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto

Democratic entitlement as a universal human right is a complex and multifaceted issue. The Article has as its modest aim a general reflection on the enshrinement of democracy as a universal entitlement and the movement of international law in a pro-democratic direction The Article will seek to highlight the general uncertainties that continue to plague the democratic entitlement. The Article deliberately focuses on the United Nations system with reference also being given to regional efforts. The Article does not discuss the legal justifications and nature of measures to address undemocratic regimes. While such measures are significant in pro-democratic discourse, it …