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Book Review: Justice In Robes By Ronald Dworkin (2006), Dan Priel
Book Review: Justice In Robes By Ronald Dworkin (2006), Dan Priel
Dan Priel
Since the 1960's Ronald Dworkin has been arguing for a particular account of law that he believed was both explanatorily superior to the one offered by competing theories, and also the basis for normative arguments for producing right answers to legal questions. Justice in Robes collects Dworkin's most recent essays on this subject and thus provides the appropriate opportunity for assessing the legal theory of one of the more influential legal philosophers. In this Review I seek to offer a clearer account than appears in the book itself of Dworkin's project, and in this way offer a measured assessment of …
When Judges Have Reasons Not To Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, Mathilde Cohen
When Judges Have Reasons Not To Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, Mathilde Cohen
Mathilde Cohen
The New Doctrinalism: Implications For Evidence Theory, Alex Stein
The New Doctrinalism: Implications For Evidence Theory, Alex Stein
Alex Stein
This Article revisits and refines the organizing principles of evidence law: case specificity, cost minimization, and equal best. These three principles explain and justify all admissibility and sufficiency requirements of the law of evidence. The case-specificity principle requires that factfinders base their decisions on the relative plausibility of the stories describing the parties’ entitlement–accountability relationship. The cost-minimization principle demands that factfinders minimize the cost of errors and the cost of avoiding errors as a total sum. The equal-best principle mandates that factfinders afford every person the maximal feasible protection against risk of error while equalizing that protection across the board. …
Catalogs, Alex Stein, Gideon Parchomovsky
Catalogs, Alex Stein, Gideon Parchomovsky
Alex Stein
It is a virtual axiom in the world of law that legal norms come in two prototypes: rules and standards. The accepted lore suggests that rules should be formulated to regulate recurrent and frequent behaviors, whose contours can be defined with sufficient precision. Standards, by contrast, should be employed to address complex, variegated, behaviors that require the weighing of multiple variables. Rules rely on an ex ante perspective and are therefore considered the domain of the legislator; standards embody a preference for ex post, ad-hoc, analysis and are therefore considered the domain of courts. The rules/standards dichotomy has become a …