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Analogical Legal Reasoning: Theory And Evidence, Joshua C. Teitelbaum
Analogical Legal Reasoning: Theory And Evidence, Joshua C. Teitelbaum
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The paper offers a formal model of analogical legal reasoning and takes the model to data. Under the model, the outcome of a new case is a weighted average of the outcomes of prior cases. The weights capture precedential influence and depend on fact similarity (distance in fact space) and precedential authority (position in the judicial hierarchy). The empirical analysis suggests that the model is a plausible model for the time series of U.S. maritime salvage cases. Moreover, the results evince that prior cases decided by inferior courts have less influence than prior cases decided by superior courts.
Response Essay: Some Observations On Professor Schwartz's "Foundation" Theory Of Evidence, Paul F. Rothstein
Response Essay: Some Observations On Professor Schwartz's "Foundation" Theory Of Evidence, Paul F. Rothstein
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Professor David Schwartz's A Foundation Theory of Evidence posits an intriguing new way to look at Evidence. It asserts that offered evidence must meet a tripartite requirement before it can be relevant. The tripartite requirement is that the evidence must be "case-specific, assertive, and probably true." His shorthand for the tripartite requirement is that evidence must be "well founded." Hence, he calls his theory the "foundation theory of evidence" and claims this foundation notion is so central to evidence law that it eclipses in importance even relevance itself. The tripartite requirement inheres in the very concept of evidence and relevancy, …