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Limiting A Constitutional Tort Without Probably Cause: First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest After Hartman, Colin P. Watson
Limiting A Constitutional Tort Without Probably Cause: First Amendment Retaliatory Arrest After Hartman, Colin P. Watson
Michigan Law Review
Federal law provides a cause of action for individuals who are the target of adverse state action taken in retaliation for their exercise of First Amendment rights. Because these constitutional torts are "easy to allege and hard to disprove," they raise difficult questions concerning the proper balance between allowing meaningful access to the courts and protecting government agents from frivolous and vexatious litigation. In its recent decision in Hartman v. Moore, the U.S. Supreme Court tipped the scales in favor of the state in one subset of First Amendment retaliation actions by holding that plaintiffs in actions for retaliatory …
Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, Ann Woolhandler, Caleb Nelson
Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, Ann Woolhandler, Caleb Nelson
Michigan Law Review
According to the Supreme Court, the Federal Constitution limits not only the types of matters that federal courts can adjudicate, but also the parties who can bring those matters before them. In particular, the Court has held that private citizens who have suffered no concrete private injury lack standing to ask federal courts to redress diffuse harms to the public at large. When such harms are justiciable at all, the proper party plaintiff is the public itself, represented by an authorized officer of the government. Although the Court claims historical support for these ideas, academic critics insist that the law …
Section 1983 And Implied Rights Of Action: Rights, Remedies, And Realism, Michael A. Mazzuchi
Section 1983 And Implied Rights Of Action: Rights, Remedies, And Realism, Michael A. Mazzuchi
Michigan Law Review
This Note criticizes the Court's current reconciliation of the implied right of action and section 1983 inquiries, and argues that the availability of lawsuits under section 1983 should be the same as under an implied right of action test. Part I, by offering a working definition of rights, suggests an approach to identifying statutorily created rights. Part II discusses the evolution of the Court's implied right of action ' jurisprudence, and explores several explanations for the Court's hesitancy to create implied rights of action. Part III examines the influence of the Court's implied right of action test on its jurisprudence …